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THE
"MÂNDÛKYOPANISHAD"

WITH
GAUDAPÂDA'S KÂRIKÂS
AND THE
BHÂSHYA OF SÂNKARA. *gaurāṅgī*

TRANSLATED INTO ENGLISH

BY
MANILAL N. DVIVEDI.


PRINTED FOR THE BOMBAY THEOSOPHICAL
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BY
TOOKARAM TATYA, F. T. S.

1894.

Price Two Rupees.


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Bombay:

PRINTED AT THE "TATVA-VIVECHAKA" PRESS.



PREFACE.

EARLY in 1890, Col. H. S. Olcott, President of the Theosophical Society and Mr. Bertram Keightley, General Secretary of the Indian Section of the Theosophical Society, requested me to undertake the following translation of the Māndūkya and the several commentaries accompanying the Māndūkya. The Dewan Bahadur S. Subramania Iyer of the Madras Court had offered a handsome amount towards meeting the expenses of this work, and as I found that this gentleman as well as my friends Col. Olcott and Mr. Keightley were of opinion that I should undertake the translation, I closed my offer. I have used the Māndūkya, Bhāshya and Kārika published in Mr. Apte's A'nandās'rama Series, as the basis of my translation. The Upanishad alone has been translated before by abler hands, but so far as I know the Bhāshya of S'ankara and the Kārikās of Gaudapāda have not been rendered into English. I am sure the Māndūkya will be much better understood in the light of these commentaries and it will be proved ere long that the generous gentleman who conceived the idea of accomplishing this work has rendered valuable service to the cause of literature and philosophy in general.

BARODA,
21st May, 1894. }

M. N. DVIV

INTRODUCTION.

It is difficult to determine when each of the six well-known *darśanas* or schools of Indian Philosophy came into prominence; but it is easy to trace a consistent development of thought, as we progress from Gautama and Kaṇāda to Kapila and Vyāsa. The esoteric doctrine of the Veda had given place to exoteric forms, culminating in the hard and fast rules of the *Mīmāṃsā*, generally known as the *Pūrva-mīmāṃsā*, of Jaimini. The true philosophy, the real *gnosis*, capable of leading to immediate liberation, was, however, preserved intact in the *Upanishads*; a reconciliation of whose various texts widely differing in meaning from one another, and a concise statement of the fundamental *Upanishad*-doctrine, is the aim and object of the aphorisms of Vyāsa, known as the *Vedānta-sūtras*, or the aphorisms of the *Uttara* as opposed to the *Pūrva-mīmāṃsā*. This *Uttara-mīmāṃsā* is the principal text of the *Vedānta* doctrine, nay of all religio-philosophical teaching in India. To be able to set up a new school and secure any considerable following, a fresh thinker must show that his teaching, whatever it be, follows directly from the aphorisms of the *Uttara-mīmāṃsā* and is corroborated by the principal *Upanishads* and the *Bhagavad-Gītā*. These three are called in technical language, the *Prasthānatraya*; and no one who does not connect his teaching with these has the right to be called a teacher, an *āchārya*. The four principal schools of S'ankara, Rāmānuja, Madhva, and Vallabha, though opposed in their teachings one to the other, each claim the three *Prasthānas* as their own. It is beside our purpose to pronounce upon the relative merits of these different interpretations, but it is worthy of remark that, as between S'ankara and Rāmānuja, an able scholar, Dr. Thibaut of Benares, gives*

* Introduction, Translation of the *Vedānta-Sūtras*, "Sacred Books of the East."

the palm to the latter. But all the same he records it as his emphatic opinion that if any of the interpreters of the *Pras-thānas* has fully understood and impartially explained the true philosophy of the *Upanishads* it is S'ankara and no one else. This has been the universal opinion of the best minds of India, but I cite the authority of a European scholar to assure the reader that S'ankara can always be trusted, and with the most unreserved confidence, in his treatment of philosophical points and his explanations of the *Upanishad*-doctrine.

So much for the authorities we accept as our guides. Between the two *Mimāṃsās*, both completely orthodox in their teachings and modes of interpretation, there lie a number of minor schools of philosophy, allied in nearer or more remote degrees to the orthodox Vedic teaching, and setting up a new conception of the world, each for its own purpose. It is these with which we are chiefly concerned at the outset. For, the *Advaita* is nothing less than the synthesis of thought underlying the different teachings of Indian Schools, and is truly that universal religion or philosophy which embraces within the ample folds of absolute unity the infinite variety of all shades of thinking.

The object of the minor schools, just alluded to, was none other than that of all philosophical research in general. They aimed at a theory of supreme ethics based on a, to them, rational conception of the universe. The latter necessarily included the department of physics as well as those of psychology and metaphysics. In India that specialization of thought has never arisen, which, in Europe, constitutes each of these branches of research an entire and independent science by itself. Take any, the smallest work on Indian philosophy and you will find all these branches mixed up and woven into the treatment of the main subject. But this, I think, is due more to the Indian way of thinking than to any lack of accuracy or of the love of independent research. All thought was concentrated upon the one aim—knowledge of

God and the way to final liberation; and every other department of research was followed only as a very subordinate means to this end. Any department of knowledge severed from this general and all-supreme end had no interest for the *Āryan* mind. This want of specialization of thought should, therefore, not be construed as implying the beginning of philosophic thought; for it will be no exaggeration to say that India has given to humanity the main outline at least of the whole of the philosophy and religion of the world. This may appear, to my Western readers an error of judgment, but it is no little consolation that in this instance at least, I err in good company.

The first school which claims our attention is that of Kaṇāda known as the *Vaiśeṣika* school. This school teaches the atomic theory of the universe, and believes in the existence of a personal creator, who sets the atoms in motion. The world of experience divides itself into substances, attributes, and actions, the only triad that really *exists*. These three exist by themselves, as also one in the other, by a number of relations called generic marks, differentia, and inseparable connection. Every substance has a generic mark and a specific difference, and the relation of substance with either of these as also with the attributes which make it what it is, is inseparable connection. The teaching of this school depends entirely on the realism of the highest genus—*Ens (sattd)*—a fiction endowed with existence and supposed to confer the same on the three fundamental categories—substance, attribute and action. Though they define substance as that which is the substratum of attributes the *Vaiśeṣikas* believe in the independent existence of both the substratum and the attribute.

The human soul too is a substance, the substratum of the attribute intelligence. The great soul (*Īvara*—God) is also a substance, the substratum of attributes such as omnipotence, omniscience, and the like. Knowledge is produced from the union of mind and soul, the former being in constant com-

munication with objects through the senses. The instruments of knowledge are sensation, inference, analogy, and testimony. The ethics reared on these foundations consist of entire devotion to God, and the *summum bonum* is achieved when the sum of miseries inherent in the soul is annihilated once and for all.

Gautama, the founder of the *Nyāya* philosophy, accepted the Physics and Ethics of Kanāda, and supplemented his theory by a metaphysic, the method and phraseology of which continue to govern the entire expression of subsequent Indian thought. In the opinion of Gautama, liberation can only be obtained through proper understanding of the categories, by careful analysis carried on with proper instruments of knowledge. These instruments of knowledge are four in number: Perception, Inference, Analogy, and Testimony. Perception may be right or wrong, and it may be direct, or indirect through memory. Direct perception may be immediate through one of the senses, or mediate through the object in direct touch with one of the senses. Inference is based on perception, and implies prior knowledge of the theory of causation. A cause is defined as that which is the invariable antecedent of an effect not otherwise possible. Inference leads Gautama to the subject of logic in general, and he, in my opinion, has dealt with the subject in a manner at once exhaustive and complete. His rules of induction, the theory of deduction, and the important chapter on fallacies, can find nothing more than mere mention in this place. Inference leads to analogy which, however, is a separate instrument of knowledge, inasmuch as it leads immediately to the definite naming of a thing on simple remembrance of a previous resemblance. Testimony is knowledge produced by the words of a trustworthy speaker. The theory of language, if theory it can be called, including among its chief features an explanation of the relation between words and things, forms a part of this division of *Nyāya*. It is all human testimony so far. The highest testimony is the word of the great Being. Herein lies the

relation of Kanāda and Gautama to the orthodoxy of the times. Gautama concludes his chapter on the instruments of knowledge with the pertinent query whether the rightness of an act of knowledge, say perception, is self-cognizable or not, and declares himself in favour of the latter alternative: for, says he, we know that a perception is right by reference to some previously known perception or action, *i. e.*, by inference. This point is important to remember for the simple reason that the *Advaita* maintains the contrary opinion.

An analysis of the universe carried on with these instruments of knowledge will point the way to right conduct leading to final liberation.

Kapila, the founder of the atheistic *Sāṃkhya*, the third phase of thought which requires our attention, denied the physics of Kanāda and made some important modifications in the psychology of Gautama. He took a step in advance towards the unitary conception of the universe, but he was not able completely to disentangle himself from the difficulties of a kind of dualism with which he began. He regarded the whole of nature as essentially dual in character being made up of subject and object, which he called *purusha* and *prakṛiti*. The former, according to him, is a simple centre of consciousness, the latter a self-acting principle called primordial matter. *Prakṛiti*, properly speaking, is that condition of matter in which all its properties—*Satva*, *Rajas*, and *Tamas* (passivity, energy, and grossness)—are held in a state of equilibrium. It is *rajas* which sets *prakṛiti* in action, being fired, as it were, by the mere presence of the *purusha*. The whole universe comes out of this primordial matter by a rigid process of evolution. *Prakṛiti* passes into *mahat* (cosmic mind) and *ahankāra* (cosmic individuality), which produce the subtle elements and the internal and external organs, ending finally with the elements evolved from their subtle forms, and making up the variety of the universe, differing at every step in kind and degree. *Purusha* though ever inseparable from *prakṛiti*, stands an unaffected witness of the whole chain of

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phenomena. There are of course as many *purushas* as there are beings, for otherwise variety of experience will not be possible. Nature in itself is all bliss and order, what appears to the contrary is only a defect of the perceiving mind. If it were not so, says Kapila, one and the same thing cannot be good bad and indifferent to different persons looking at it in the same moment of time. The mind, that is, *buddhi*, as they call it, (the microcosmic correspondence of *mahat*) is able to play the perceiver and knower only on account of the preponderance in it of *satva*, which admits of a reflection of the *purusha* in close contact with it. This *buddhi* passes out to objects and takes the form of the thing to which it relates itself. This action of mind is called *khyāti* by the *Sāṅkhya*s. According as the original *satva* of *buddhi* shines in native purity or is overpowered by *rajas* or *tamas*, it regards the knowledge thus received as agreeable or otherwise. *Purusha* being nearest *buddhi* takes these reflections in *buddhi* as affecting itself and feels happy or miserable. It is noteworthy that this identification of *purusha* with *buddhi* is simply false, an idea which will appear as *adhyāsa* in the *Advaita*, and will further be found expounded into the theory of illusion out and out. When *buddhi* so far clears itself of all dross as to be nothing but pure *satva*, it transmits nothing in the form of misery or happiness to the *purusha*, with whom it then identifies itself, if identification it can be called. The *purusha* is now entirely liberated from the bonds of *prakṛiti* whose action has entirely ceased in regard to that particular *purusha*.

That there is no place for a personal creator in this theory is obvious from this brief enumeration of its main conclusions. Hence the name, atheistic *Sāṅkhya*; but this atheism is entirely different from the atheism of modern materialism which looks upon every claim of the subjective as so much superstition and ignorance. Atheism, in the *Sāṅkhya*-sense of the word, is widely shared by some of the foremost thinkers of ancient India, chief among them by Buddha, Jaina, and Śaṅkara. Indeed the whole of the *Advaita* is, in this sense of the term, purely atheistic. All divine machinery

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INTRODUCTION.

of experience have also to be explained on the hypothesis of absolute transcendentalism. The first principle accordingly of the method of the *Advaita* is to test every definition by reason, then check it by the words of the Vedas and translate it in terms of experience. In other words, *Advaita* is an *a priori* hypothesis whose value as philosophical truth is shown by its being in accord with reason, history and experience. Thus, we are brought face to face with the subject of this introduction and of the pages which follow it.

In tracing our way through the vast field of Indian thought to the all-illuminating landmark of the *Advaita*, I have had a threefold object in view. First, it was necessary to show the existence of a rational interconnection between all apparently scattered and even opposite schools of Indian thought, making it possible to arrange them as so many steps in the philosophical development of thought. More than this I do not claim; for historically it is hopeless, as yet to determine in time the position of each of the ancient teachers or of their teachings either. In the second place, it was of the first importance that the real position and meaning of the phase of thought called the *Advaita* should be fully revealed before beginning the study of a work which presents it in its ultimate and absolute form, so to speak. And thirdly, it was most essential to rebut, by presenting in a concise form, some of the main issues of ancient philosophic research, the charge that in our enthusiasm for the past we read modern thought into archaic writings.

I have said that the *Advaita* is a Philosophy of the Absolute. Is it, it may, however, be asked, possible to have anything like a Philosophy of the Absolute, notwithstanding the all-embracing power of relativity which meets us at every step? And again is not materialism or agnosticism the last word alike of science and philosophy? The *Advaita* returns an emphatic negative to these questions. The relativity governs everything in the realm of experience, but there is always a something which transcends experience.

relativity and whose being is implied in the very possibility of these. Knowledge, it is true, consists of the data of experience, but that knowledge is no knowledge at all in the *Advaita* sense of the word. What the *Advaita* calls *jñāna* (*gnosis*), generally translated by the word knowledge for want of a better one, is not the knowledge which is received through the senses. It is that supreme knowledge which ensues upon full self-realization, upon that recognition of the Absolute which proves the futility of all relativity, by including everything in one unutterable Thought. That whereby experience derives its being is the Absolute. It is certainly not given to us by or from experience. If it were so, all generalization and synthetic knowledge of every description would be entirely impossible to the mind of man. Even as to causation, supposing it for a moment to be something objectively existent, though experience may inform us as to the antecedents and consequence of certain phenomena, there would ever be wanting that *nexus* which invariably connects the two and which cannot be given by any experience whatever. It was the ignoring of this *nexus* of reason, ever independent of experience, which led to that mode of thinking known as scepticism and to the consequent negation of all causality whatever; the futility of which has, I think, been effectively shown by the powerful mind of Kant. And with scepticism falls not only this particular mode of thinking, but the conclusions of materialism in general. For thought, reason, the faculty or essence, which synthesises experience, is no result of material organization or chemical combination of any description. This *nexus* of reason, this transcendental faculty of synthetic thought, the very essence of being, is the point from which the *Advaita* starts, and proceeds to set forth a theory of absolute idealism never paralleled in the history of philosophy, except perhaps by the philosophy of the Absolute enunciated by the great German metaphysician Hegel.

The famous formula of Descartes "*cogito ergo sum*" had dealt an effective blow to materialism in general and scepticism in particular. Kant, however, detected a fallacy

in the argument by showing that the "*cogito*" already implied the "*sum*," and argued from this conclusion to his philosophy of transcendent Reason. The *Advaita* builds upon the truth of Kant's remark on the Cartesian formula, its theory of absolute unity of thought and being, in place of the duality which hampered the mind of Descartes and from which even Kant was not able entirely to free himself.

And this explains to us the relation between the absolute and the relative. The *Advaita* does not say with Fichte that the "things-in-themselves" of Kant are mere shadows of a function of reason, nor with Schelling that mind yields its supremacy to nature in its perception of experience; but it lays down with Hegel that the *prius* of all reality is that absolute something which comprehends within itself every thought and every being. Thought implies being as the absolute implies the relative. Unity is inexpressible, but the very word *implies* duality, and posits a something as against itself till self-realization demolishes the illusion. Thought is being; both, in fact, are aspects, so to speak, of a something unique and one. Let us analyse any fact or thing of experience. The analysis, if carried to the extremest limit, will stop at a something which is *nothing without thought*, and is, at best, a compound, I may say, of thought and being. The *Advaita* is explicitly defined in this very phraseology by Śaṅkara in his comments on the *Sūtras** of Vyāsa.

This transcendental essence or correlative of being is present in every existence, for existence itself implies it. It is that which is active in the consciousness of every sentient being, for it is the very essence of thought. Nay it is that which is implied in the very subsistence, position, being, of lifeless things and substances. The whole of experience, with its numberless variety, is but the mere functioning of the

* The *Sūtra* runs: "*drambhavasaddidibhyat*," and Śaṅkara after explaining it says that experience is impossible without *ātman*. He explicitly says *vyatirekena abhāvāt*, which freely paraphrased means 'experience impossible without thought,' and that the cosmos is the Unit in this sense.

This idea of "self" as the real subject of all experience involving intelligence, emotion, feeling, or will, is important to take note of; inasmuch as the *Advaita* wants only to enlarge upon it and expand a self into the self, merging individuality in Absolute Unity. This self is then plainly seen at work in all experience; what we do not know, what we cannot satisfactorily analyse, is that something which is the cause of sensation. Equally inexplicable is the mysterious relation between sensation and thought. In a certain sense both thought and sensation are unknowable, but the comparative certainty with which we know thought does not allow us to relegate it to the realm of the Unknowable, and rejoice over our theories of material organisation and chemical combination which have essentially nothing whatever to do with thought. It is rather the correlative of thought, i. e., so-called matter, which is really unknowable, mysterious, all *māyā*; for it is difficult to maintain that mere extension can make an independent entity of what we call matter or experience. Kant's arguments to prove the subjective nature of time, space, and causation are too well-known to bear repetition here. That thought is the real source of all our experience is amply proved from the fact that the laws of experience, the several categories, as Kant calls them, would be impossible without thought. Sensation does not and cannot give them; no age of experience could produce the generalization which leads to these laws, but with the help of thought. Even matter the substratum of sensation cannot be said to exist but through and for thought. All attempts to mix the two up lead to false philosophy and stultify the very object of nature.

The great crux of philosophy is to explain the possibility of experience, of sensation, from the stand-point of Absolute Thought. There are those who argue that the whole of experience is only a result of the subjective thought of every individual; and there are those who, in opposition to these, maintain that the mind relates itself to mere shadows of "things-in-themselves," *noumena* which never reveal themselves. But these two phases of idealism do not really

assist us to a solution of the problem at issue, inasmuch as subjective idealism would annihilate the possibility of all general knowledge, and objective idealism would fashion an external universe from mere shadows having existence in simple imagination. Kant's attempt to posit a mysterious thing-in-itself behind each phenomenon, as the cause that supplies the material to fill in the *forms* of mind, only evades the difficulty instead of explaining it.

An explanation has to be sought in Absolute Idealism. Mind, thought, reason, or *ātman* includes both subject and object in itself. In its attempts at self-realisation, it makes itself the cause (so to speak) of experience, of everything which appears as *anātman*, non-*ātman*. Hegel points out that pure being is both thing and no-thing, the positive implies the negative. The idea of mind implies that of no-mind, *ātman* implies *anātman*, and self-realisation ensues only from experience based upon this *assumed* opposition. The process of self-realization is called in *Advaita* the *adhyāropāpātada* (the negation of something assumed for the time as opposed to the real thing). The world of experience does not really exist, but *ātman* takes it (*āropa*) as all *anātman* for its own purpose of self-realisation, which when fully accomplished (*aparāda*) shows everything as inseparably one. This is explained in the *Advaita* by a number of illustrations. Illustration, however, can throw but little light on the sphere of the Absolute. As a man sees his reflection in a mirror, and takes the reflection to be some other man forgetting his identity for the time, so does *ātman* look upon itself as the cause of dual experience. The mirror being broken the realization of the identity is complete. The difference of *ātman* and *anātman* being demolished by knowledge, *ātman*, the Absolute, is easily realized. What, it may be asked, stands in place of the mirror in the case of *ātman*? The *Advaita* replies, ignorance, eternal ignorance, called *Adhyāsa*, to be explained more particularly later on. But here it will be enough to say that the very nature of thought requires logically that the positive must imply its negative,

that *âtman* must imply *anâtman*, for both put together make up the *inexpressible* Unit. Experience is possible only through the action of this Unit, through its progress to self-realization, in the manner just explained.

The *Advaita*-theory of perception is strictly in accord with this view. Perception does not follow upon, nor accompany, sensation produced by contact of the senses with external objects, as the *Naiyāyikas* have it, or upon *buddhi* relating itself to objects, i. e., upon *khyāti*, as the *Sāṅkhyas* put it. The Absolute, as it were, perceives itself and rises by degrees to self-realization. In any object *âtman* can perceive itself, and accomplish self-realization in no time; but this process is not as easy as it appears. *Âtman* posits a non-*âtman* as against itself, and cognizes this non-*âtman* as it is reflected in *âtman*. To explain. An object is presented to the mind. The *âtman*, called *chaitanya* as the perceiving subject, within the mind (*antahkārana*), unites itself with the *âtman* (= *chaitanya*, the objective *âtman*) in the object and realises *itself* in the apparent non-*âtman* (the object perceived). If this perception of itself in what it supposes as objective existence is complete, self-realization ensues; if incomplete the perception constitutes in itself an act of knowing such and such object (a form of *anâtman*). The perception in the latter case is not of the object *in itself*, it is of the form which the *âtman* takes in relation to the supposed object. This process of perception by an act of *âtman* externalising itself, so to speak, is called *ṛtti* as opposed to the *khyāti* of the *Sāṅkhyas*. In *khyāti* it is the *satva* of *buddhi* that perceives forms of *prakṛti*, in *ṛtti* it is *âtman* externalising itself. In other words, *khyāti* admits the existence of the objective, *ṛtti* does not. *Khyāti* is a natural corollary of the theory of many *puruṣas*; *ṛtti* of that of one supreme *puruṣa* (Absolute *âtman*). It is thus easy to perceive the improvements in the psychology of Kapila made by Vyāsa and his followers, Gaṇḍapāda, Śaṅkara and other expounders of the *Advaita*. It was necessary to make this improvement partly for taking a step in advance of the incomplete ethics of Kapila

—a point which we may postpone for future consideration—and partly for arriving, as will be seen, at a satisfactory explanation of perception.

It may naturally be asked if *âtman* is one and universal, and all perception is mere *ṛtti*, how account for the variety of mental experience? The answer is plain after what has been said. In the Absolute, experience exists not; as long as the Absolute sets up a relative as against itself experience does exist in all its variety. This depends on the degree of enlightenment, on the point up to which the distinction between *âtman* and *anâtman* is supposed to be real. This is amply borne out by the fact that the experience of every individual and mind varies according to the degree of enlightenment it has received.

According, then, to the *advaita*-theory of perception it follows that the whole of experience is mere illusion, is merely imagination. It is only the logical opposite of *âtman* imagined in the very act of self-realization, which being accomplished, the inexpressible Absolute is fully recognised. This perception of *anâtman* in *âtman* is *adhyāsa*, as explained before. What is *adhyāsa*? *Adhyāsa* generally means false knowledge, but the point deserving notice is the way in which it arises. There are a number of theories to explain the mode of this kind of false knowledge, as to the nature of which all are more or less agreed. We shall continue to describe perception by the *Sāṅkhya* word *khyāti*, and to refer constantly in this discussion to the familiar illustration of the snake in the rope. All are agreed upon the fact that the knowledge of the rope as snake is false, illusive. The point is how it arises. It will be convenient to demonstrate the *advaita*-position at the beginning. The *advaita*-theory of *adhyāsa* is called *anirvachanīyakhyātivāda* (= the theory of unaccountableness).

In the first place how do we perceive the rope as rope or as any other thing whatever? The general theory of perception tells us that the *chētana* of the perceiving subject, unite

itself with the *chetana* of the perceived object, and perception ensues. If the rope is mistaken for a snake, owing to dimness of light, or some defect in the eye, or any other reason whatever, still an explanation of false knowledge ought to be found from within the limits of the said theory of perception. The *avidyā* or *māyā* (i. e., *anātmā*) always inseparable from *ātman* is present in even the smallest portion, if portion it can be called, of *ātman*, and consequently also in the subject as well as object-*chetana* concerned in every act of perception. That such *avidyā* is inseparable from *ātman* is only another form of expressing the logical axiom we have alluded to more than once. The positive implies its negative, all knowledge expressible or expressed in speech is of this nature, and pure *ātman* necessarily implies pure *anātmā* which we call *avidyā* or *māyā*. This *avidyā* in the subject-*chetana* in union with the object-*chetana*, while the rope perceived as "a something," on account of dimness of light or sight, takes on the form of a snake and, as it were, projects or posits the form in the "something" which has been perceived by the union of the two *chetanas*. I say "as it were" because the substratum of the illusion—snake—is not the rope nor the form in which it is perceived, but the *chetana* both subject and object, which welds into one in the act of perception. The *avidyā* inseparable from this *chetana* conditioned, on the one hand by the perceiving subject, and on the other by the perceived object, sends forth the snake or any similar form, and presents it as the object, in a manner which can in no way be accounted for. It is the very nature of *avidyā* to send forth illusions of any and every kind, and so long as we are not sufficiently enlightened as to the *conditionless* nature of absolute *chetana* we continue to be deluded by the creations of *anātmā* or *avidyā*. This false knowledge then is produced we know definitely from what, in what, for what, but we are entirely in the dark as to the main question, the how of it. The *modus operandi* is unaccountable, inexpressible. This theory is therefore aptly called the theory of unaccountableness (*anirvachaniyakhyātirāda*).

It may naturally be asked what distinction is then left between true and false perception? From the standpoint of the absolute, all perception short of absolute self-realization is false, and the perception of the rope as rope or a snake or a stick, is as much false as any other. The words "false" and "true" as applied to the snake and the rope in the illustration are used in relation to experience, the whole of which from the absolute point of view is entirely false. All science, all causation and generalization, are possible in the domain of *māyā*—experience,—and are, of course, false in the absolute. That there are a thousand ways of explaining one and the same fact of nature is adduced by the *Advaita* as sure proof of the utter unreliableness of that which is called "truth" in experience. The *advaita* therefore makes a distinction and divides truth into three kinds—*Pāramārthika*, the Absolute, *Vyāvahārika*, the relative, and *Prātibhāsika*, the imaginary. Absolute Self-realization is *Paramārtha*; the region between the absolute and the relative is *Pratibhāsa*; simple imagination, and the realm of experience is *Vyavahāra*. Each of the latter two is real in its own province, but both are false in the third. So these three departments on the cosmic plane correspond to the three states of sleep, dream and waking on the individual plane.

To the Unaccountableness-theory of the *Advaita* are opposed five others which try to explain the nature of false knowledge in different ways. The first is called the *Satkhyātirāda*. The particles constituting the rope, contain the particles of the snake as well, in themselves, and one or other of their forms becomes perceptible under proper conditions. This theory does not accord with the received facts of knowledge in general. When we know a thing as being such and such we necessarily discriminate it from other things, and assimilate it with certain others. In the very act of discrimination we refuse the object any nature other than the one actually perceived. While we perceive the rope we perceive it of course as not snake, not garland, not anything but rope. How in the very nature of such knowledge is it possible for the rope to change itself into

a snake? If this were possible we must certainly despair of all knowledge, general knowledge whatever, and of the possibility of any regular experience such as we actually have.

A second theory asserts the absolute falsity of all knowledge and experience. False knowledge has no substratum, nothing exists and experience is as much a chimera as *âtman* itself. This theory, called the *asatkhyâtirâda*, carries its refutation on the very face of it. You cannot postulate an absolute negation from end to end, for it would then be a merely absurd proposition, inasmuch as the asserting subject is a patent positive existence. This theory is therefore entirely inconsistent with the facts of experience, and is based on an entire misconception of the nature of knowledge in general.

A third explanation of experience is that of the subjective idealist—the *vijnânarâdin*. All objects are pre-existent in the subject in the form of *râsanâs* (ideas). These subjective ideas are supposed to exist externally as objects of experience. This is called the *âtmakhyâtirâda*, because the *âtman*, which is all *vijnâna*—ideas,—perceives itself beyond itself, of course falsely. Under *âtmakhyâti* is included also the opposite theory of objective idealism. The word *âtman* in the compound *âtmakhyâti* is capable of being interpreted as a noun and a pronoun. When it is interpreted as a noun it refers to the subject (*âtman*) and the word *âtmakhyâti* means subjective idealism. When the word *âtman* refers to a pronoun, the compound means “perception of itself,” *viz.*, the object, and the same word expresses the theory of objective idealism. Objects do exist, but ever beyond human knowledge like the noumena of Kant. What we perceive are only the phenomena, mere forms of these things, which forms are assimilated by the perceiving mind. Here it is evident, as suggested by Gandapâda (verses 24 to 28, ch. iv), that objective idealism* demolishes the conclusions of subjective

* Called *bahyârthavijnâna-râda* in opposition to the pure *vijnânarâda*. Both these *râdins* belong to Buddhism as do also the advocates of the *asatkhyâtirâda* described before.

idealism which again shares the same fate before Absolute Idealism—the theory of unaccountableness. If we see the mere shadows of objects the seer too must equally be a shadow, and so on *ad infinitum* till we are landed in absolute nihilism, or scepticism. The objects of experience are all there, the perceiving subject too is there, we only do not know how the former are produced in relation to the latter. This is the position of Absolute Idealism which looks upon the whole of experience as unaccountably present and yet nothing in itself.

The fourth view is the one that is commonly received. It lays down that the rope being imperfectly perceived, such imperfect perception helps, through similarity etc., to awaken the memory of a past experience of some actual snake, and that this awakened memory of the snake is at once perceived as the “snake in the rope.” This is called *anyathâkhyâtirâda*, the seeing one thing in place of another. This too does not hold water. That the perception—snake—could be only the previous memory of a snake now re-awakened into being, is not in accord with facts. For the false snake (in the rope) is of equal dimensions with the rope in relation with the eye, and not of the dimensions of the snake seen before, which it ought to be if the present perception were only a re-awakening of the memory of some past snake.

The fifth and last explanation of experience is that of the *akhyâtirâda* of the *Mimâmsakas*. It is held that knowledge, right or wrong, is after all a species of the genus knowledge, for otherwise it were impossible to say “I know this is false knowledge.” Both, inasmuch as there are species of the same true genus, ought to be true in themselves. The rope is as true as the snake of our perception;—the one as an object of direct perception, the other as an object of indirect perception, *viz.*, memory. This theory is a modification of the one preceding, but it differs from that in ignoring false knowledge altogether. (1) The two propositions that what we call false knowledge is an act of true memory, and (2) that the object perceived

is perceived directly, are, two statements which we may grant for a moment as true. But how explain the single perception: "this is a snake," where there is no snake whatever, but a mere piece of rope? We are, in this perception, not conscious of two mental processes, direct perception and memory, for simultaneous mental action is not possible; and our only explanation of the single act of perception remains obviously to be found again in the theory of Unaccountableness.

The *Advaita* explains experience by what is called the *anirvachanīyakhyaṭi*, and leaves science to explain the laws of experience as it likes; for from the stand-point of the Absolute everything other than itself is somehow existent in, and of itself, but nothing real in itself. The *anirvachanīyakhyaṭirāda* is of course difficult of comprehension, and several writers on the *Advaita* have set forth a number of easy illustrations and theories to help the beginner to a proper understanding of that *rāda*. Chief among these is the *dr̥ṣṭirāda*, the theory that the world of experience is coeval and co-extensive with perception. This is very near the *anirvachanīyakhyaṭirāda*; it only puts the difficult logical position in homely language, by saying that things do not exist out of the sight of the seer. All perception is a mere process of (false) externalisation. This *rāda* therefore is pure idealism, Absolute Idealism, inasmuch as the *dr̥ṣṭi* is none other than the Absolute, *ātman*. The opposite theory is called *śr̥ṣṭidr̥ṣṭi*, something akin to objective idealism. The world of experience exists, and we perceive only the phenomena of this world. Happiness or misery, is only a result of mental creation, it does not exist in the "objects-in-themselves" (the real *śr̥ṣṭi*). Things-in-themselves are all blissful, the creations of the mind produce misery and evil. This theory is not of course near to the *Advaita* theory of unaccountableness, but it presents a view of things sufficient to lead the way to the last word of *Advaita* philosophy on the subject. The noumena are an unaccountable fiction and the whole world of experience exists, even according to this theory, in an un-

accountable manner. A third theory is that of *Bimba* and *Pratibimba*, the original and its reflection, already explained in the illustration of the mirror. The Absolute is the original, the non-absolute the reflection, and experience, though presenting an innumerable variety of forms, is just like an ocean or a lake reflecting the sun in a variety of forms and colours in every ripple upon its surging bosom. There is unity in variety, the Absolute being the real Unit. A fourth theory talks of the limited and limitless (*atachchhedyāvachchhedaka*), the limitless being conditioned by imaginary limits. Limits are of three kinds: those of time, those of space, and those of nature. The Absolute knows none of these, but the variety of experience is explicable on the theory of limits, of course imaginary and false. All that is required is to forget the three conditions of time, space, and nature, by reducing them to mere subjective forms—the very conditions of experience—and thus merging all variety in Unity, all relativity in the Absolute. The last is the theory of *Ajāti*, non-evolution, as I propose to translate the word. The whole of experience has never been evolved, never been produced, it is simply *anirvachanīya* as are objects seen in dream. *Ajāti* is the exact corollary of the *anirvachanīyakhyaṭirāda*, and Gaudapāda has tried successfully to explain it in his *Kārikās* on the *Māndūkyaopaniṣad*. The very first axiom of *ajāti* is the negation of all causation: Absolute Idealism requires that it should be so.

The phenomena of experience present themselves to our mind in certain relations and appear indeed to obey certain laws. They appear principally in the relation of sequence, co-existence, resemblance, and pure existence. Of these the most important is that of sequence or succession in time, known as the law of causation. The coherence of scientific truth and the possibility of general knowledge depend on the stability of this law. The cause of a thing is defined as an invariable antecedent, but with all our knowledge we can never say with certainty what constitutes the "invariableness" of an antecedent sufficient to constitute it a "cause"

in all time to come. The whole of the experimental method of modern science, and the theory of Induction to which it appeals for a logical rationale of its existence as the only instrument of arriving at truth, is based only upon a theory of Probability. Every conclusion is only a probable conclusion which the thousandth experiment or instance may upset in a moment. With this degree of certainty in our conclusion, and this limitedness of our psychic vision, we can hardly be justified in calling anything the true cause of any other thing.

But again what is there in experience which warrants the conclusion that a certain thing or condition is the cause of a certain other thing or condition? There is nothing in experience which can give us the idea which invariably binds cause and effect to each other; that idea of invariableness is given by the mind, experience only showing that certain events follow certain other events.

This invariable relation is called *samarāya* in Sanskrit, and the *Advaita* has emphatically denied the possible existence of any such relation. Because a certain thing or condition is antecedent to a certain consequent, you cannot say that there is any invariable relation between the two. This idea of invariableness (*samarāya*) is given by the mind, and is in fact a condition of the possibility of the relation between subject (mind) and object (experience), in other words, of the possibility of knowledge. Just as time and space are the very conditions of knowledge, so is this idea of invariableness, the essence of causation, another condition of knowledge. In fact Kant regards these three, time, space, and causation as the *schema* of the mind on its way to experience. Thus causation reduces itself to a mere idea. But this is still subjective idealism, explained by Gaudapāda on the analogy of our dream-experience and the ideas of causation, time and space, we have in that condition. Absolute Idealism says, emphatically, that there has from the beginning been nothing like experience which appears as such in some unaccountable

manner, and that therefore all idea of causation is simply out of the question. The very nature of *ātman* implies *an-ātman* as has been repeatedly shown in the preceding pages, and experience is only the result of *adhyāsa*, necessary for *ātman* on its way to self-realisation, which being accomplished, the Absolute shines in native bliss, characterless, distinctionless and free from the idea of all duality.

The *Advaita* position of Absolute Idealism has so far been rendered sufficiently clear. I have done as much as lay in my power to present the doctrine in a form as clearly intelligible as possible. It remains only to say that the whole of Gaudapāda's *Kārikā* on the *Māndūkya* and the *Bhāṣya* of S'ankara on either, is another exposition of the same doctrine in another manner and from a different stand-point. I am sure this short *résumé* of the main conclusions elaborated on the lines of modern thought will prove itself of value to the unfamiliar reader of Gaudapāda.

Some further explanation in detail of some of the points likely to occur to an intelligent reader of Gaudapāda and S'ankara may not, however, be out of place:—

(1) In verse 14 chapter II, a distinction is made between waking and dream experience by stating that the former is cognizant of objects having relation to two points in time, and that the latter is cognizant of objects having relation to only one. A difficulty is hereupon suggested as to how the one experience could at all be like the other, thus calling in question the soundness of the argument about the futility of causation and the whole of experience based upon this similarity. It may appear that Gaudapāda has made no attempt to face this difficulty save by mere assertions to the contrary. On close attention, however, to verse 14, it will appear that he has suggested a reply in the words "the difference between them is not based on any other ground." The words "other ground" are commented upon by S'ankara who explains that the circumstance that objects of waking experience answer to two points in time does not in itself constitute any funda-

mental ground of difference between the two kinds of experience, for in dream objects are seen to answer to two points in time. Hence if there is no "other ground" than the circumstance of answering to two points in time to mark off waking from dream experience, there is nothing to prevent the identity of the two sought to be established by Gaudapāda.

Again, verse 14 follows close upon 13 in which Gaudapāda enunciates his theory of Absolute Idealism in the plainest terms, and seeks to show in this subsequent verse (14th) the futility of causation and experience by pointing out that there is nothing to differentiate waking from dream-experience. As in dream there is nothing in the form of sensation, sense-knowledge, to act as the cause of the phenomena which are all produced without a cause, so to speak, so in waking experience the whole of our knowledge is a causeless fiction, a mere idea in the Absolute. To memory as the cause of dream-experience the *Advaita* does not take exception, but it does not call it memory for reasons given in the discussion on *Anyathā-Khyāti*. The *Advaita* calls it *adhyāsa*, the unaccountable action of *anātman*. The argument so far is certainly plain enough and a complete grasp of the meaning of *adhyāsa* and *Anirvachanīya-khyāti* will help a great deal in understanding the apparent obscurities of the text.

(2) Verse 32, chapter II, is another knotty point likely to lead to some confusion of thought if not cleared up at the beginning. The argument that duality is as unreal as the snake for which the rope is mistaken, is, for the sake of showing the line of argument, supposed by S'ankara to be met by the counter-argument that the rope ought equally to be unreal, and also *ātman* corresponding to the rope of the illustration. The answer which the great teacher makes to this counter-argument is put in the following words: "on the disappearance of the imaginations the unimagined residuum that persists is, for that very persistence, not an imagination, but the reality"; and further on he adds "the existence of the person imagining must be antecedent to the imagination.

and ought therefore to be admitted as absolutely real." This put in plain language means that the rope is not imagination like the snake, relatively speaking. Every act of knowledge implies subject, object, and instrument. If the imagination is false the substratum of the imagination and the person imagining must be real. In the domain of the relative this is conclusive, and it is not open to the objector to say that the rope too is mere imagination. But when we pass to the Absolute, then indeed the rope and everything included in experience share the same fate as the snake, and *ātman*, the Absolute, stands as the only reality—the rope of the illustration. One cannot push this illustration to the extreme of saying that *ātman* too is unreal like the snake or the rope, for the obvious reason that in the very act of making the negation you assert the positive existence of the subject—*ātman*. In short the opposite is quite inconceivable, and the "inconceivability of the opposite" is in this instance at least a trustworthy test of truth. This is the sum and substance of what S'ankara says in reply to the nihilistic argument. But a reference to our theory of *Anirvachanīyakhyāti* will bear us out of the difficulty in the easiest manner. The substratum of knowledge, or false knowledge as all experience is supposed to be, is the *chetana* in the subject combined with the *chetana* in the object. What is perceived as rope or snake is, through the action of *avidyā*, inseparable from the *chetana*, and is entirely false, as is proved when the *chetana* is realized in its completeness. But no amount of reasoning can prove that this *chetana* itself is nothing. The rope is of course as much unreal as the snake from the stand-point of the Absolute. It is only a result of the externalising tendency of *avidyā* inseparable from *ātman* whose entire realization is sufficient to show the futility of every thing besides itself.

(3) In his comments on the next verse S'ankara has again adverted to the rationale of Absolute Idealism. He says "objects are cognized by a subject in action not by one in simple subsistence." He means in these words to account for the possibility of experience; but even as a simple psychological

truth I do not know if the principle is incorrect. The subject (mind) does not cognize sensation if it exercises itself in no way in the form of attention; and even after a sensation is received, perception cannot ensue if the mind does not immediately *refer* the sensation to something external or internal. But this apart, the point which S'ankara wants to explain in these words is the possibility of experience. And indeed on the very first principles of psychology, sensation and perception (the whole of experience) are possible when the subject is in motion, as just shown. According to S'ankara and the *Vedānta* in general a "subject in mere subsistence" is the Absolute *Ātman*, the Unconditioned. Such subject is certainly cognizant of nothing beside itself, for it is the *Advaita*, one without a second.

This position, however, need not necessarily contradict the general position of the *Vedānta* that the knower in all forms and conditions is none but *ātman*. For though in "simple subsistence" this *ātman* is cognizant of nothing, still in its steps to self-realization it reflects an *anātman* as against itself and actively cognizes it till self-realization fuses *ātman* and *anātman* into the Absolute Unit, the Ineffable Substance. That a subject in action should be cognizant of things besides itself, and not one in entire subsistence, is said with the view of explaining how, and by what steps, the Absolute returns to itself. S'ankara tries to set forth the steps of the process and winds up with the conclusion already enunciated in verse 32.

(4) Another point, likely to be misunderstood, is the argument that *ātman* cannot be unreal, because incomprehensible, for we see its effects. This is advanced by S'ankara in his comments on verse 27, chapter III. It has been repeatedly and emphatically asserted that causation is a mere chimera, and the statement that we know *ātman* by its effects is likely to lead at least to serious misunderstanding. By "effects" is here meant what we generally call experience. That experience is somehow unaccountably possible in *ātman* has already been shown more than once. We generally regard sensation as the cause of knowledge or

perception, and infer the existence of an external world of experience from our sense-impressions. In the *anirvachanīyakhyaivāda*, sensation is not regarded as the cause of perception, all that we call sensation or perception is only the unaccountable action of *avidyā* inseparably latent in all *chetana* whatever. Here then there is nothing like causation, I mean sensation as cause leading to perception as effect; and *ātman*, or *chetana*, is not the cause of the forms of experience but only a substratum, for the time being. Hence in truth *ātman* has nothing related to it as "effects." But the word has evidently been used by S'ankara in a metaphorical sense, implying that all knowledge of every description can not be possible if *ātman* were not admitted as a something real. That this metaphorical sense of the word "effects" is the one which S'ankara had in mind, and that he speaks of *ātman* as cause in the sense of being but the substratum of illusion is rendered plain by the very word "substratum," which he uses in connection with *ātman* a few lines further.

The more clearly to explain this point, it will be convenient to explain the three planes of knowledge which the *Advaita* defines for the purpose of explaining experience. The plane of the Absolute is called *Paramārtha*; that of the imaginary, as of the snake in the rope, is called *Pratibhāsa*. Experience is all *Pratibhāsa*—counter-reflection as the word literally means, that is, the counter-reflection of *ātman* viz., *anātman*. The third plane is that of *Vyavahāra* which though one with *Pratibhāsa*, being entirely of the nature of dream as already explained, is regarded as real, as the real world of experience by the grossly ignorant. To these three planes of knowledge correspond the three conditions of absolute rest (sleep), dream and waking. *Pratibhāsa* and *Vyavahāra* are false, and yet they exist through the counter-existence of *ātman*, viz., *anātman*. Whence too it is plain the whole of experience may in a way be called the effect of *ātman*; may, in other words, be called that something which cannot exist except through *ātman*. In *Advaita* works such metaphorical use of language is very common, and to a student of Absolute Idealism it

shon'd present no difficulty whatever inasmuch as language is impossible without duality which is false from his standpoint.*

(5) "*Brahman* is all thought." This is an expression we meet with at every step in the text and commentary. In verse 35, chapter III, and commentary, *Brahman* is declared to be all thought. A question naturally arises. If *Brahman* is all thought and if experience also is the result of mental action (i.e., thought) as is often asserted in the text and commentary, how can we say that experience is futile or false? The word "thought" as used of *âtman* is, however, not to be understood as that which is the result of mental action. In the English language there is unfortunately no adequate word to denote anything higher than mind as the subject of thought, the very essence of thought or knowledge. I have used the word thought on the authority of Dr. Caird, as opposed to matter, and belonging as an essential attribute, so to speak, to *âtman* alone. In Sanskrit it is called *jnâna*, whereas the result of mental action is called *Vichâra Ahankâra*, *Buddhi*, and a number of similar names all implying *jnâna* as a common substratum. I have thus used the word thought to denote that absolute antithesis of matter without which existence itself will be impossible. I have occasionally used the word "Sentiency" also, as suggested by my friend Mr. Bertram Keightley who has rendered me much important assistance in this direction. The word for mind in the *Vedânta* is *Manas*, the thinker, or more commonly *Antahkarana* the inner sense of knowledge. With these explanations the difficulty must disappear. In all such expressions as "*Brahman* is all thought," the word thought has nothing to do with what we understand by the phrase 'mental action'; nor do such expressions as

* This will raise a side-issue as to whether knowledge is possible without language? The *Advaita* answers this query in the affirmative. Communication of knowledge is not possible without language but simple thought is possible.

'*Brahman* is without mind' (verse 37, chapter III), mean that *Brahman* is not thought in the above sense of the term.

(6) We find mention made in several places (verse 11, chapter IV, for example) of the attributes of *âtman*. How is it possible to say that *âtman*, the characterless, has any attributes? The expression "attributes of *âtman*" does not however imply a substratum and attributes contained in that substratum. The *Vedânta* distinctly maintains, in opposition to the *Naiyâyikas*, that the thing and its attributes are not apart, the attributes make the thing which does not exist apart from, and out of them. This is quite in accord with the theory of Absolute Idealism. As there is nothing in the form of substratum apart from the attributes, so are the attributes nothing apart from the substratum. In other words, both are one and the same thing. Such expressions as "attributes of *âtman*" are therefore only metaphorical and are resorted to only for purposes of explanation.

(7) The last but not the least point we may touch upon in this place is the materialistic position as opposed to the idealistic one examined in the five verses from 24 to 28, chapter IV. It is urged by the opponent that subjective impressions cannot exist without objective causes; and that the actual presence of pain and evil in our experience of things gives the lie direct to the theory of idealism. The writer at first meets these objections by accepting the position of the *Vijnânâvâda* explained before under *âtma-khyâti*. By arguing (verses 26-27) that causation is only a subjective idea, he says that it does not exist in the objective form which we give to it. The commentator begins by arguing that jars etc., which the opponent regards as the objective cause of subjective impressions, are themselves without a cause. That is to say, they have nothing to rest upon but the very subject which perceives them, and there is nothing to show that they have an independent existence out of it. We must again refer to the modern theories of sensation and perception. Perception is only a reference of our sensations to something external. The new-

born child has no knowledge of this process. Sensations of sound or touch do not at first lead it to localise them in space. It is obvious that hereditary tendency developed by force of environment teaches the child to localise its sensations. But we ought to examine the relation between sensation and perception a little further before turning this conclusion to any account. Sensation leads to perception of the objective world which in its turn is supposed to produce sensations. No doubt both sensation and perception are modifications of the subject which is active in perception and passive in sensation, so that there is no mistake in saying that the objective world is the cause of sensation. That perception should reveal to us an objective world which produces sensations, the cause of perception, is simply arguing in a circle. And the way out of this circle is pointed out by the experience of a new-born child to which we have just alluded. It has no perception of the objective world, it has mere sensation, and it learns to connect sensation with perception only by force of habit, it may be added right or wrong. The *Advaita* says it is the force of this wrong habit that teaches us to find a cause for our sensations beyond the subject: in fact the cause, if cause it can be called, is in the *avidyā* inseparably present in every subject (*chētana*). This has already been explained more than once. It is plain then that experience has nothing to rest upon but the very subject which perceives, and there is nothing to show that experience has any basis of independent existence out of it. Analyse any object, you cannot find, carrying your analysis to the infinitesimal atom, anything at its base save an empty form and name *plus* the perceiving subject, but for which the name and form too will be nowhere. On this reasoning rests also the identity of cause and effect maintained by the *Advaita*. It is also necessary to remark *en passant* that extension and resistance, the two essential characteristics of matter, are regarded in *Vedāntic* psychology as fastened on experience, on sensation, by the very nature of the perceiving subject, and also by the false theory of percep-

tion taught us by the force of heredity and habit. Time and space are as much the mere conditions, the *schema*, of knowledge as causation itself. Thus all objective causes reduce themselves to the unaccountable action of the subject whose very nature is an inexhaustible storehouse of *vāsanās* of every variety, perpetually externalising themselves, till full realization of the Absolute puts an end to their activity and all that results from it by showing the subject as the All. If, on receiving a sensation, the subject were to refer itself not to anything in space, as it is by habit led to do, but to its own nature, the *Advaita* promises that it will receive enlightenment sufficient to show that the Absolute subject (*ātman*) shines within and without in its pure unity. This in brief is the gist of what is urged by Gaṇḍapāda and explained by Śaṅkara in the verses under consideration. Nothing more is now required to be said in explanation of the feeling of pain which the materialist assigns to an objective cause. This feeling too is part of the nature of the subject, and proves nothing in favour of the materialistic position. Moreover if we refer to the *Sāṅkhya* theory of pleasure and pain, this point will appear in yet clearer light. All pleasure or pain belongs only to the subject (mind) says Kapila, for, if it belonged essentially to the object, the same object cannot be the cause of different and even divergent feelings to different persons. And as to objects of constant nature, the constancy is the very essence of the subject and therefore not a cause of pleasure or pain to the subject.

The argument so far is based on what I call Subjective Idealism—the *Vijñāna-vāda*. Gaṇḍapāda goes with it so far, but abandons it the next moment, and proceeds to his theory of Absolute Idealism (verse 28). Just as external perception is shown to be false, so must internal, or what is generally called intra-organic perception, be equally false. The mind as an object of perception and causing certain internal feelings or sensations is itself nothing but mere *chētana*, at any rate a modification of it. All objective phenomena have been reduced to mental action which in its turn is as much a phenomenon

to the Absolute subject as external objects are to the mind. Thus does the *Advaita* argue to the Absolute. It defines a subject as that which, while perceiving phenomena, remains itself unaffected and unique. Thus the eye while perceiving phenomena of the objective world becomes the subject. But the eye in its turn becomes an object to the mind which perceives its different conditions and changes. The mind, made up of feeling, intelligence, and will, must become, on account of this variety of its nature, an object of perception to something beyond. This is *âtman*, all thought, distinctionless, and characterless, and therefore the last essence of knowledge, the Unconditioned Absolute. In this way the Absolute is shown to be the real substratum of all knowledge whatever, and as objects all reduce themselves to creations of the mind, the mind itself resolves into the Absolute containing within itself the germs of *Aradyâ* leading to *Adhyâsa* and experience in general. Even modern science admits that the homogeneous is unstable and must differentiate itself. The *Advaita* expresses the same fact by saying that the Absolute posits (*adhyâropa*) the relative as against itself for purposes of self-realization. The mind, therefore, is only an idea in the Absolute on its way to self-realization and is as much unreal as the whole of objective experience. The steps of this evolution may be studied from any elementary work like the *Panchadaii*. The point here aimed at is the certain conviction that you can never think beyond yourself, all your notions of evolution, or causation, imply the Absolute whose unaccountable action is sufficient to explain all experience and causation. Action, agent, causation, evolution, are all names quite inadequately used with reference to the Absolute; they seem only to explain that abstract totality of possible moveable existences which we mean by the word Absolute.

These explanations place the *Advaita* theory of *anirra-
chaniya-khyâti* in the clearest possible light, and emphatically bear out the main thesis of Gaudapâda, which we have styled Non-evolution, *Ajâti*. Where the whole of experience, including subject and object, pre-exists in the Absolute and becomes

manifest only as an idea merging ultimately into Absolute Unity, it is vain to speak of causation or evolution. But all the same the *Advaita* takes no exception to any theory of the physical universe; for, from the stand-point of *Paramârtha*, it will be only one more idea in the innumerable series of such appearing and disappearing in the Absolute. It does not here concern us to discuss the theory, only an hypothesis,* which the *Advaita* proposes by way of explaining the steps in the process of *âtman's* progress through experience and return into itself. For, from the Absolute stand-point of Gaudapâda, "There is no dissolution, no creation, none in bondage, no pupillage, none desirous of liberation, none liberated—this is the Absolute Truth" (chapter II, verse 32). What the different *Upanishads* and certain works on *Vedânta* describe as evolution is "only a means to the end," says Gaudapâda (chapter III, verse 15),—the end that is realization of Absolute Unity (*abheda*).

This condition of *abheda* (non-separateness) is often referred to in the text as the Fourth. We have already seen that there are three planes of knowledge and three conditions of experience. The fourth is no plane nor any condition; it is called the Fourth only by way of explanation, for it is none other than the negation of the three. This fourth condition is called *turiyâvasthâ*, the condition where the Absolute, *Abheda*, is perfectly realized. That the fourth is the negation of the three does not imply the unreality of the fourth, for the *Advaita* holds with Hegel that the negative of any positive is also a positive. The text of the *Mândûkyâ* often speaks of this fourth and identifies it with *Brahman*, *âtman*, and lastly with the word *Aum*. The burden of this brief *Upanishad* is an explanation of this monosyllable *Aum*. It is declared, after an analysis of the four parts of *âtman* and of the word *Aum*, that both are the same Absolute, meaning that the word is a fit symbol of *Brahman*. This comparison has the object of showing that the word *Aum* is an embodiment of the

* Readers having an interest in the subject may pursue it in my "Monism or Advaitism?"

essence of the whole of the *Veda*, viz., *Brahman*, which is taught and described in its esoteric portions, the *Upanishads*. And indeed it is impossible not to admire the intelligence and power of concentrated thought possessed by those who have thus tried to compress the whole essence of *Vedic* learning in a homely symbol of three letters. Well might the *Brāhmaṇas* use this very syllable as the first and last word of every religious ceremony. The whole syllable, as every member of it, is endowed by Gaudapāda with occult powers of the supremest character, and it is a fact that followers of the *Advaita* constantly keep up a sort of internal mental repetition of it enjoying the highest pleasure of mental ecstasy ensuing from this mystic practice. Let me say, in finishing these explanations, that the *Kārikās* of Gaudapāda extend over four chapters. The first explains the text of the *Māndūkya*; the second shows the illusive character of experience, thus enunciating the position of Non-evolution or Absolute Idealism; the third expands the theory and establishes the *Advaita* position; and the fourth completes the discussion by showing that all the different schemes of thought hold opinions mutually destructive of one another and pointing to the *Advaita* theory of Non-evolution, which does not come into conflict with any of them, and which, therefore, is in short the real synthesis of all the different phases of thought.

The *Advaita* is indeed the synthesis of all phases of thought and the enunciation of this position brings us near the concluding part of this introduction. We have seen how the *Advaita* meets the theory of the two *Nyāyas* by refusing to accept that sensation is the source of knowledge and that substance is separate from its attributes. Kapila no doubt had partially found out the mistake, but his dualism of *Prakṛti* and *Puruṣa* was not the true interpretation of the facts of experience. It was false, because *Prakṛti* as an external objective cause of evolution cannot be shown to exist, and *Puruṣa* as the unaffected witness of *Prakṛti* cannot be shown to set it in motion. The psychology of Kapāda and Gaṇṭama had undergone considerable modifications at the

hands of Kapila. His theory of *khyāti* is the nearest approach to the modern theory of perception. But the *Advaita* does not accept this, and indeed cannot. For *Prakṛti*, the root of experiences, which depends for its very existence on *ātman* (the Absolute), cannot be accepted as the cause of sensation leading to perception, or as the cause modifying *buddhi* in the theory of *khyāti*. This would be simply arguing in a circle as has been explained before. The *Advaita* therefore improves the theory of *khyāti* into its own theory of *eritti*, the theory that perception is mere externalization (false of course) of *ātman*, not on account of sensation, but through the unaccountable action of *anātman*.

This theory of knowledge must include some consideration of the instruments of knowledge. The *Advaita* recognises as many as six instruments of knowledge, four of which accord with those of the *Naiyāyikas* and the *Sāṅkhyas*, only with some modification as to the manner in which they acquire knowledge. An incidental inquiry turns up at this point. Is right knowledge knowable as right knowledge at the very moment of receiving the knowledge? In other words, do the instruments which acquire knowledge acquire also the knowledge that it is right? The *Naiyāyikas* say that we have knowledge in the first instance, and we determine its character as right or wrong afterwards, by inference. The *Advaita* does not accept this position. All knowledge in *Advaita* philosophy is right knowledge and it is always known to be right in a direct manner, i. e., by the same instrument by which it is known as knowledge. But these questions do not concern us, inasmuch as they do not occur in the following pages: and I do not wish to lead the reader into the intricacies of this abstruse discussion. Let it be noted that Absolute Idealism, inasmuch as it must hold to the self-cognizability of the Absolute, regards all knowledge as right knowledge—false knowledge being nowhere.

The *Jaina* theory of relativity can have no ground to stand upon if there is nothing Absolute behind it. Nor can the

Buddhistic theory of momentary *skandhas* meet the facts of experience, for memory and general knowledge will not be possible on account of the momentary nature of the subject (*viññāna-skandha*).

The *Advaita* thus asserts its claim to being that real synthesis of thought which Gaudapāda shows it to be; nay more—by putting forth a theory of knowledge and experience at once the synthesis of all previous attempts in the same direction and embracing the conclusions of all of them, as steps in the building up of the grand edifice of Absolute Philosophy.

It remains to consider the practical utility of the various theories of knowledge and experience. In other words, it remains to consider the ethical import of the different schools of thought; for practical life is the real field for testing the merit of any Scheme thereof, by observing its practical influence on the ideal it sets up. The two *Nyāyas* place happiness in permanently freeing the soul from its qualities, the *Sāṅkhyas* in “life according to nature” which is further amplified by the *Yoga* of Patanjali. The *Mīmāṃsakas* find the *summum bonum* in carrying out the injunctions of the *Veda*. That the *Mīmāṃsā* is out of question in a philosophical inquiry into the ethical end of existence is obvious. The *Nyāya* teaches *Bhakti* as the sole means of securing peace and happiness under the grace of God. The soul becomes free from misery and lives in the grace of God, ever happy, and full of bliss, if it finds out the truth with the help of the method of dialectics taught in this school, and follows out the code of morals deduced from such knowledge. This ethic of duality is here, as everywhere, the root of all the false theories of ethics; and the doctrine of grace has, in its practical bearings, done the greatest harm to the eternal welfare of men by creating false distinctions of caste and religion, and by making it easy to play fast and loose with ethics and religion according to individual convenience. This was clearly seen by Kapila who began his theory of evolution with the preliminary that happiness and misery are all in the subject, not beyond or without

it. The meaning of his “life according to nature” is only this, that the subject (*buddhi* according to him) must realise *satva* and live in *satva*, when certainly all cause of misery and evil will be removed, and life according to nature will be fully realised. Patanjali has prescribed a number of rules with the object of reducing the process of acquiring this condition of *satva* to as mechanical a mode of living and thinking as possible. This was certainly an advance on *Nyāya*, inasmuch as happiness was made to depend, not on any external causes, but on the light of the internal subject itself. But the real subject, the *purusha*, was left partly out of account, for though it was the subject of all fruition whatever including *moksha*, it was impossible for it to become free from *prakṛti*, the storehouse of *rajas* and *tamas* along with *satva*,—with which it subsists in inseparable union. The idea of nature had therefore to be re-constructed. The *Advaita* shows that the theory of many *purushas* is no correct reading of experience. Thought pervades nature, and the forms of experience are so many forms of universal Thought—mere ideas in the Absolute. Thus *Prakṛti* and *Purusha* reduce themselves to absolute thought. On this improvement in the world-conception of Kapila followed a corresponding improvement in his idea of “life according to nature.” Life according to nature henceforth meant life in complete self-realization in absolute *ātman*. The full import of this has yet to be seen.

The *Jaina* idea of many *jīvas* resembled Kapila's theory of many *purushas*. In *Jaina* philosophy every tangible thing had a *jīva*; and therefore every atom of this universe had equal claim to the kindness and love of every other atom. This was called the ethics of *ahimsā*, universal love, but this love was yet the love between lover and loved, it was not Absolute Unity which is the very essence of love, and which is the ethical corollary of the *Advaita*-theory of absolute *ātman*. The ethics of the *Buddha* are in remarkable accord with those of the *Advaita*, and, but for his anti-orthodox preaching, he would have been the first teacher of religion to ancient India.

The *Advaita*-theory leads to the ethics of universal unity—the essence of love—called *abheda* (non-separateness) by Gaṇḍapāda, Śaṅkara, and other writers. *Abheda* is the keynote of *Advaita* ethics. The enlightened forget all *bheda*, and realise everything as the All. This need not mean that the realization of *abheda* leads entire cessation of activity or action, for one who has realised *abheda* is neither active nor inactive, he acts and yet does not act, as the *Bhagavad-Gītā* puts it.* For the only thing required is unlearning the false habit of localising all sensations in space, instead of referring them to the subject within. This practice leads to knowledge of *ātman* which is the same in all, and thus opens the way to that *abheda* which is realized even in the variety of active experience. He, who has realised this *abheda*, has lost himself in the universe, in every thing and all things which make up the universe. He breathes with the breath of nature, sees with the eye of the All, and thinks with the thoughts of every being. He is the All.

This is described in *Advaita* works by saying that *moksha* is attained by *Jñāna*; that knowledge leads to liberation. This is often misunderstood as implying that theoretical knowing of *ātman* and speculations regarding its nature and relation to experience, lead to *moksha*, place within reach the panacea of all misery and evil. But no mistake can be greater, or more ruinous in its consequences. Knowledge in *Advaita* philosophy does not mean theoretical, but practical knowledge. But even with this explanation the maxim, knowledge leads to *moksha*, is not fully explained. This way of putting it implies that *moksha* is a something to be acquired, something to be accomplished. But surely all the teaching of Absolute Idealism must be lost upon one who cannot avoid such obvious errors. Gaṇḍapāda teaches the futility of all causation, and says in emphatic terms there is no liberation, no way to liberation, none liberated, and so on. All this means that from the stand-point of the Absolute

* Chapter IV.

everything is as it ought to be, everything is *ātman* and therefore eternally *mukta*—liberated. What appears to the contrary in individual cases is the action of unaccountable *adhyāsa*, of the false tendency to externalise subjective forms. This it is that requires to be done away with; this it is that requires to be unlearned. This can be done by proper *jñāna*; proper analytical understanding of the phenomena of the universe. That knowledge leads to *moksha* is therefore true in the sense that full knowledge of the absolute substratum (*adhisthāna*)—*ātman*—demolishes all obstacles in the way of complete realization of the native condition of *ātman*. Knowledge only *shows* as within oneself what was deemed to be lost, to be beyond grasp, and therefore beyond Self.

And this liberation by knowledge is the aim of what is called *Rāja-Yoga* which consists in complete self-realization, following a thorough practical grasp of the analytical philosophy of the *Advaita*. The student must at first prepare himself by sufficient mental development for this study, and begin practically with the four preliminary stages: *viveka* (discrimination of *ātman* and *anātman*), *vairāgya* (renunciation), *śamādiśampatti* (self-control and other cognate acquirements), and *mumukshutā* (desire for liberation). These have too often been described in almost all elementary works on *Vedānta* and *Rāja-Yoga* to require more than mere mention in this place. After these are fully acquired the student should address himself to the study of the *Advaita* philosophy proper, under some practised teacher. This is called *brāhmanā*. He should constantly think over what he learns and acquire complete grasp of the truth, by finding satisfactory explanations of everything appearing to the contrary. This is called *manana*. This is followed by *nididhyāsana*, complete absorption in the Truth without anything to distract. This is that knowledge which leads to *moksha*.

There are other means also. Contemplation upon the real meaning of such *Vedic* texts as "Thou art that" is pointed out as the way to *moksha*. Even *Karma* (formal religion)

and *Upāsana* (devotion) are supposed by degrees to lead to the realization of the *abheda* taught by the *Advaita*. But with these we are not concerned in this place. The point is to generate, by strong conviction, mental force sufficient to enable the student to grasp and realise the truth of the *Advaita*, and dive deep into the altruistic meaning of *Vedāntic* teaching. It is obviously patent that just as in its ontology and metaphysics the *Advaita* is the real synthesis of all thought, so in its theory of morals it is the true synthesis of all ethics.

It is, indeed, in the ethical bearings of a doctrine that we get the real test of its truth. We have seen that the ethics of duality emphasise individuality and lead to selfishness; that life according to nature but mitigates the din of the struggle for existence. It is reserved to the *Advaita* to pour oil over the tempestuous waters of turbulent passions and interests, and to fuse all distinctions of caste and colour, race and religion, kind and class, into the unity of selfless, supreme love. There has been no religion full of such toleration and over-flowing with such volume of positive love.

The question of free-will and necessity may require consideration in this place. The *Advaita* declares itself in favour of free-will. But this position again requires explanation. When the whole of experience is reduced to the unaccountable action of *avidyā* in *chetana*, and when the highest ideal of happiness is knowledge or self-realization, it is easy to understand that the thinking subject is free to act up to this ideal by its own unimpeded action, and without the stimulus of motives. Self-consciousness is ever free in the widest sense of the term, for freedom is the very essence of self-consciousness. This, however, on the *paramārtha* plane; on the plane of *vyavahāra*, where causation holds supreme sway, free-will can have no place. Necessity along with experience might be reduced to a mere idea by an effort of *jñāna*, but in the domain of the relative, so long as it holds sway, it is not wrong to say that free-will has no place.

The superiority of the *Advaita* is thus established on all hands, and I venture to say all modern theories of ethics, whether derived from intuition or experience, cannot bear examination in the light of *abheda*. The theory of the greatest good of the greatest number is met with a difficulty *in limine*. What is the good? This query opens up afresh the whole question of physics and metaphysics. The intuitional theory of conscience would serve the purpose of subjective idealism, but would be of no use in the non-dualistic *Advaita*. The conscience-theory fails like the utilitarian theory to supply a universal standard of right. In the *Advaita* there is no doubt as to the moral standard—*abheda*, self-realization, knowledge. These are all well-defined terms deduced from an accurately reasoned out theory of the cosmos. And moreover they are easy of reference, as being within reach of every individual consciousness.

Natural selection and survival of the fittest are two opinions derived from the evolution-hypothesis. They lead to the ethical theory of the materialistic "let-alonists," so to speak. It is really a theory not of the survival of the fittest in the fierce struggle for existence, but of the survival of the strongest. It sets up mere force—blind animal force, strong self-will—as the moral standard of life, and preaches an ethics in accord with the proverb "every one for himself and the devil take the hindmost." This theory stands self-refuted inasmuch as it ignores the intellectual and emotional side of human nature, and emphasises mere individuality and selfishness—the bane of modern civilization.

It may be argued that annihilation of individuality would deprive the world of some of the best springs of great action. This is only a question of opinion and possibilities, for the experiment in one of its aspects has never been tried on any sufficient scale. The result of individuality and selfishness, in every great centre of civilization, amply shows itself in starvation, crime, refinements of cruelty and vengeance, hypocrisy and cant, which meet us in all directions. Altruism though

never observed on any wide national scale has shown the best results imaginable, wherever it has found its way in theory or practice. The modern socialistic movements, and all cognate schemes of nationalism, anarchism, and a number of other "isms" constitute the clearest commentary on the boasted civilization reared upon individuality and selfishness. Altruism has shown its effects at different times, up to the present date, in the history of the Indian nation; and Altruism, or *abhedā*, the true outcome of *Advaita* philosophy, is the only way to establish heaven upon earth, and ought to be the future religion of civilized mankind.

M. N. DVIVEDI.

SŖÎ MÂNDUKYOPANISHAD.

THE COMMENTATOR'S BENEDICTION.

Bow to eternal *Brahman*.

I bow to that *Brahman* which, after having experienced the gross by pervading throughout all objects with its rays—all immutable sentiency—ever present in the variety of the movable and immovable universe; and after having, again, digested within itself all creations of the internal organ of knowledge propelled by *karma* and *avidyā*; sleeps ever sweetly, yet causing fruition to us through illusion; and which is the Fourth (wherein the three—gross, subtle and causal—are held together), though ever one, all bliss and without beginning.

May that which is the Fourth, and which, having as the *virāt* experienced the mighty results of ignorance and attachment, and then also the subtle ones called into being by the internal organ of knowledge, and enlightened by its own light; and, lastly, having drawn all these by degrees within itself; (may this which) is one, limitless, distinctionless, and characterless, protect us.

THE TEXT OF THE MÂNDÛKYA.

I.

Aum is the word, all this is an explanation of its (meaning and power) past, present and future. All, indeed, is *Aum*; even all that is beyond the triple conception of time.

S'ANKARA'S COMMENTARY.

From "*Aum* is the word," etc., is commenced this treatise of four chapters, embodying within itself the substance of the essence of the *Vedānta*. It is for this reason that a preliminary statement of objects and reasons is dispensed with. They are the same as those for the general subject of the *Vedānta*. However, one desirous of explaining this compendium ought not to pass them over. This compendium indirectly finds its specific relation, subject and object, in that it itself has an object in consequence of its being connected with the subject explaining the means of proper realisation (of *âtman*)* The object is, however, thus clearly explained. As a sick man recovers the equilibrium of his health on the disappearance of the cause of disease, so *âtman* being free from its (supposed) misery—the illusion of duality—will find its

* Before any subject is expounded it is customary in Sanskrit writers to set forth the subject, object and relation of the work, as also to point out the class of readers to whom it is addressed. These four things in the present case are the same, generally speaking, as for all works on the philosophy of the *Advaita*. But the specific object of such a treatise is obvious, says the commentator, from the fact that the whole of this work treats of a subject closely connected with the means whereby proper realisation of *âtman* ensues.

own equilibrium : the realisation of unity. The illusion of duality being the result of ignorance, will be dispelled by proper knowledge ; and this at once explains the why and wherefore of this treatise. For, well says the *S'ruti* : "there alone one sees or knows another where there is anything like duality or the sense of separateness, but where all is *âtman*, who should see whom, know whom?" etc.

The first chapter here, which deals chiefly with Vedic texts, and is undertaken for an explanation of the meaning of the word *Aum*, is useful as pointing the way to the proper realisation of *âtman*. The second chapter demonstrates the futility of that illusion of duality on the dispelling whereof is realised the real unit, as the rope is realised on the spell of illusion which presents it as a snake being destroyed. The third establishes the substantiality of the Unit, disposing of all arguments to the contrary. The last chapter is devoted to showing the *Advaita* in its real form, by bringing into prominence the mutual opposition and consequent refutation of those schools of thought which maintain aught to the contrary.

How an explanation of *Aum* can help to the realisation of *âtman* is now explained. "*Aum* is this ;" "This is the support ;" "One of pure desires should concentrate his mind upon *âtman* through *Aum* which is *âtman* ;" "*Aum* is *Brahman* ;" "The word—*Aum*—is all ;" these and a number of other texts clearly point out the usefulness of *Aum* in the process of realising *âtman*, inasmuch as they declare that *Aum*, and *Brahman* or *âtman* are one and the same. As the Unit—*âtman*—is the substratum of *prâṇa* and other illusions of that kind, like the rope that is the substratum of the snake and other illusions of its kind, so is *Aum* the substratum or cause of the whole of the illusion of speech, produced by the illusions of *prâṇa*, etc. And this *Aum*

is thus the same as *âtman*, for it is the word for *âtman*. The illusion of *prāṇa*, etc., subsisting in *âtman*, can never exist unless it finds expression in some manner; and this is possible only through words derived from *Aum*. And, indeed, the *Sruti* itself declares the impossibility of the existence of anything apart from verbal expression, for it says: "All is mere play of words;" "All this is of It, and is held together throughout by the string of speech or even by the cord of specific names;" "All is rendered possible in experience only by words," and the like. Hence well says our text: "All is the word," etc. The whole universe of experience, the thing requiring to be described by a name, can never exist except through being named, and as this naming can never proceed independently of *Aum*, all is *Aum*.^{*} Even the highest—*Brahman*—is realised by means of names, and is, therefore, the same as *Aum*. This treatise is, therefore, an explanation of this *Aum* which is none other than *para*- as well as *apara*-*Brahman*. The construction in the text is elliptical, and the whole sentence should be understood as having this meaning: that *Aum* being nearest *Brahman*, is the way to its realisation; and it being so, this explanation, which is a clear exposition of the meaning of *Aum*, is well begun with that object. Everything conditioned ordinarily by the triple conditions of time, is all *Brahman* for

^{*} That things cannot exist except through being named, is not to be understood in the sense of knowledge of things being rendered possible through the knowledge of their names. The idealist position looks upon everything as only the manifestation of an idea having no content apart from the one Idea—*âtman*—the All. Whence the *Upanishads* constantly say all effects are nothing but mere names, thus precluding all idea of duality. The *Advaita* maintains the identity of cause and effect and regards the difference between the two as merely nominal. Names, too, cannot exist out of *Aum* which is *Brahman*, hence it is said names cannot exist apart from *Aum*, and also that *Brahman* is one with *Aum*. It is hopeless to expect precision of language in idealistic writings.

reasons already explained. And even whatever else is beyond the limit of time, and yet present in consciousness through its effects, such as the *avyākṛta*, etc., which are ever unconditioned by time, is also not apart from *Aum*.

II.

For all this is *Brahman*, this *âtman* is *Brahman*, and this *âtman* has four quarters (*pādas*).

Though the name and the thing named are one, the preceding text has given prominence to the name alone. "All is the word *Aum*" is said with reference to the name as the more important of the two. But the way in which prominence has here been given to the thing named, shows that the name and the object named are not separable, *i. e.*, are one. If this were not said, the circumstance that knowledge of a thing is dependent on the name of the thing, would appear to suggest that the one-ness of names and object is only metaphorical. The object of establishing the unity of things and names is none other than the possibility of doing away with both of them, by a single effort, thus simultaneously realising *Brahman* as distinct from both. The same is expressed by saying further on, "the *pādas* are the letters (of the word *Aum*) and the letters are the *pādas*." With all this in view the text says, "for all this is *Brahman*." That is to say, all that is declared to be *Aum* is *Brahman*. This *Brahman* is, however, described as inferentially possible, and the text therefore proceeds to say definitely that it is not at all inferentially existent, but directly present in all our cognitions. Hence it is observed "this *âtman* is *Brahman*," meaning by "this" that which is described as with four quarters, and shown

to be present in the very Ego, by accompanying the statement "this *âtman* is *Brahman*" with the significant gesture of placing the hand on the breast. This *âtman* called *Atum* is *para* as well as *apara*, and has four quarters, four feet, not indeed like those of a cow, but like the fractions of the coin called *karshâpana*. The fourth is realised by merging the other three in it, in the order of the lower in the higher; and the word quarter should, therefore, be understood as meaning only something serving as an instrument for the realisation of the fourth. Or the word foot (quarter) may be understood as something instrumental to the act, in the sense of that by which motion* is rendered possible.

III.

The first quarter (foot) is *Vaiśvânara* whose sphere is the state of waking, who is cognisant of the objective, who has seven members, and nineteen mouths, and whose fruition consists of the gross.

The text now begins to explain how *Atum* is made up of four quarters. Cognisant of the objective, i. e., conscious only of the objective, by the power of *avidyâ*. Seven members: the *Śruti* says of this *âtman*, the *vaiśvânara*, that "the effulgent region is his head, the all-enlightening sun his eye, the wind blowing in all directions his breath, the all-embracing *ākāśa* his middle, water nourishing the production of corn, etc., his urinary organ, and the earth his feet." As this description, however, is intended to complete a personification of the *agnihôtra*, it may be added that the *âhava-*

* For let it be remembered that the word for "quarter" in the Sanskrit text is *pāda*, which means "foot."

nīya agni is his mouth. These are the seven members. The nineteen months: the five *buddhindriyas* (internal senses), plus the five *karmendriyas* (external senses), plus the five breaths called *prāṇa*, etc., and *manas*, *buddhi*, *chitta* and *ahan-kāra*. These are the nineteen months, that is to say, the avenues of knowledge and experience. The *vaiśvânara* has its experience limited to the gross plane, and its fruition, therefore, consists of gross objects. It is called *vaiśvânara* because it leads (*nara*) all (*viśva*) in the same direction, viz., enjoyment of the gross; or because it means all (*viśva*) beings (*nara*); meaning that which is a collective name for all beings on the gross plane. *Viśvânara* is the same as *vaiśvânara* only with more emphasis. As it is one with being, it is the first quarter. As all the other quarters are approached only through this, it is called the first.* It may be asked how, while speaking of the subjective self ("this *âtman* is *Brahman*") as made up of four quarters, the text has wandered into a description of the effulgent regions, etc., as his head, eyes, and so forth? This, however, is no mistake, for the whole of the universe, including the subjective (*ādhyâtma*) as well as the superphysical (*ādhibhūta*), is referred to as made up of four quarters, beginning with this *virât*, the first. In other words, the difference of subjective and objective is merely verbal, and therefore the unity of the whole is implied in this manner. And, indeed, in this way alone could the Unit be realised, on the disappearance of the illusion of duality; and the sense of the texts saying "*âtman* is one in all"; "all is in the one"; "he who sees all in the Self"; etc., may also be thus fully justified.

* This quarter is called first from the stand-point of experience, and not in the order of evolution. Our unenlightened intelligence is cognisant at first of the gross, and then ascends by a process of strict analysis to the subtle and the causal.

fied. Otherwise, the word *ātman* will be understood only in the sense of that which is present in the subjective consciousness of the Ego in every being, and thus room will be made for the thesis of the *Sāṅkhya*, which will not admit of the possibility of the unity declared by the *Śrutis*. And it is an admitted fact that the *Upanishads* point, in a body, to the unity of *ātman* throughout the universe. For this reason the identity of the subjective self with the *virāt*, meant to be demonstrated by declaring the effulgent regions, etc., as the head and other parts, is most necessary, and the words "seven members," etc., are introduced clearly with this object. The *Śruti*, too, implies this in the text, "Thy head shall full" (if thou worshipping aught as separate from the All, and as complete in itself). That *viśvānara* is said to be one with *virāt* is only with the object of implying similar unity of *hiranyagarbha* and *taijasa* on the subtle (*sūkṣma*) plane, and of *avyākṛta* and *prājña* on the causal (*kāraṇa*) plane. This unity of all is declared in the *Madhv-brāhmaṇa* as well; for it is said there: "This is that which in the earth is the *tijōmaya*, the *amṛtamaya puruṣa*, as well as also the subjective Ego," etc.* This is all very true, but it may be asked how the *avyākṛta* is the same as the *prājña*? This need not puzzle us, inasmuch as sleep (on the microcosmic plane) is the same as the *avyākṛta* (on the macrocosmic plane), for there is nothing to distinguish the one from the other. Thus, then, it is clear that the illusion of duality being over, unity is easily realised.

* It is implied that by the cognition: "This is that", predicable of *virāt*, *taijasa*, *prājña*, the unity of the three, i. e., of *ātman*, is at once established.

IV.

The second quarter is the *Taijasa* whose region is dream, who is cognizant only of the subjective, who has seven members and nineteen mouths, and whose fruition consists of the subtilo.

That whose sphere is dream is the one cognizant of dream. The intellect during the waking condition being assisted by numerous means, appears cognizant of objects as if external to itself, though essentially nothing else but mere play of the mind; and stamps its corresponding impressions (derived from this experience) on the mind. The mind full of these impressions, like a variegated piece of cloth, re-enacts the whole of its waking life (in dream) without the help of any external means, and entirely under the control of *avidyā* and *kāma* (ignorance and imagination). The *Bṛhadāraṇyaka* says the same thing: " (He sleeps) full of the impressions produced by the supremely varied experience of the waking condition (and experiences dreams)." And the *Atharvāṇa* also lays down, with reference to the mind and its creations being all the objects cognized by the ever-present cognizer, that "all this in the mind (is cognized by) the highest ever-effulgent"; and adds "here the ever-effulgent experiences its greatness." As the mind, in relation to the external senses, is the internal organ of perception, its act of cognizing through intellect consisting of *rāsanā* (the potentiality of impressions) is well described in the text calling the second quarter "cognizant only of the subjective." (The experiencer of the state of dream) is called *taijasa*, because, it being entirely of the essence of light, becomes the cognizer of the mind (consisting entirely of *rāsanā* and projecting itself into various shapes) irrespective of the objective. *Viśva* (or *virāt*) being cognizant of the objec-

tive, the mind externalizing itself as gross objects, is the object of fruition ; whereas here it is the object of fruition only in the form of *rāsanāś*. The experience of this condition is therefore rightly called experience of the subtle. The rest is common to this with the first quarter just described. This is the second quarter called *taijasa*.

V.

That is the state of deep sleep wherein the sleeper does not imagine anything, and does not see any dream. The third quarter therefore is the *Prājna*, whose sphere is (this) deep sleep, in whom all melts into one, who is a mass all sentiency, who is all bliss, whose fruition is of bliss, and who is the way of sentiency (to the objective).

The clauses "does not imagine anything, and does not see any dream", are put in for the purpose of defining the state of deep sleep as distinctly apart from that of waking and dreaming; from which two, sleep, in the sense of not being awake to the Truth, is not absent. Or the intention of the clauses may be to simply mark out the condition of deep sleep from the other two, sleep in the sense of not being awake to the Truth, being common to all three. Wherein, that is to say, in which condition, or time, the sleeper does not indulge himself in any kind of imagination, nor see any dream. And it should indeed be so, for in deep sleep there is no possibility, as in the other two states, of dream or imagination in the form of taking a thing for what it is not. He who is cognizant only of the region covered by deep sleep is one whose "sphere is deep sleep." The whole of the phenomenon of duality, born simply of the action of the mind, is proper to the other two conditions.

(And these two become welded in one, that is to say, are merged in their fountal source, without losing their respective individuality), as the day with the whole of its variety, is said, on the power of discrimination being suspended, to be lost in the darkness of night, without the said variety being at all obliterated. (It need not be doubted that this state cannot be described as a mass all sentiency) for, this condition is so described on account of its being one of entire distinctionlessness, and produced by the mingling together of that variety of consciousness which is present in the two states of waking and dream consisting solely of pure imaginations of the mind. As at night all becomes, as it were, one indiscriminate mass under the pall of darkness, so even is the *prājna* "a mass all sentiency." The word "all" appropriately exclude the possibility of any other kind of consciousness. This third state is further described as "all bliss," for, the mind being free from the trouble consequent on its action of imagining the variety of subject and object, is, so far, in bliss. We say "so far," for, this bliss is not absolute ; it is like that negative condition of happiness which implies freedom from unhappiness. This condition is entirely free from trouble, and is therefore one in which "fruition is of bliss." The *Sruti* also say "this is the highest bliss."

The *prājna* is further called "the way of sentiency (to the objective)," because it is the way to a cognition of the experience of dream and waking. Or, as it is sentiency or thought alone that enables the *prājna* to experience the other two states, it indeed the vehicle of sentiency in its so-called act of cognizing the different conditions. The *prājna* is called *prājna*, because it *knows* the past and future as well ; and it is fitly called *all knowing*, even while asleep, in consequence of its being such before. For the word *prājna* may mean that whose for

is all sentiency pure and simple, as distinguished from that of the other two which admits of variety. This *prājna* is the third quarter.

VI.

This is the Lord of all, this is all-knowing, this is the *antaryāmin*, this is the source of all—the origin and final resort of all beings.

This in its native form (*i. e.*, sentiency pure and simple—*chaitanya*) is the Lord of all (*Īśvara*), that is to say, the governor of the whole of the physical and superphysical universe. *Īśvara*, in any other form than this, as others maintain, is not possible.* The *S'ruti* too lays down the same when it says "Oh good one! Sentient being is *being* because of *sat*." This (pure *prājna* as *Īśvara*) is the knower of all, being in all beings and all conditions. Hence he is called all-knowing. He is *antaryāmin*, *i. e.*, the governor of all beings from within. He it is that is the source of all, for from him proceeds the varied universe, as described before. This being so, he is also the origin as well as the final resort of all beings.

Trans. Note. The first six ślokas of the Upanishad form a distinct section upon which Gaudapāda then comments as a whole.

GAUDAPĀDA—KĀRIKĀ.

1. *Viśva* is he who is all-pervading and cognizant of the objective; *Taijasa* is he who is cognizant of the subjective; and *Prājna* is he who is a mass all sentiency;—it is indeed the One that is thus conditioned into three.

* Says *A'nandagiri*, the commentator on *S'ankara's Bṛhadāraṇyaka*: If *Īśvara* were possible in any form other than this, he could not be free; and the extra-cosmic nature of *Īśvara* set up by *Nyāya* and *Vaiśeṣika* is not tenable being refuted by *S'ankara* in his comments on the *Sūtra* "The Lord being irrelevant"; as also by other arguments showing the injustice and cruelty of the government of such a god.

2. The *Vaiśvānara* is the cognizer in the right eye*, and the *Taijasa* in the mind within; whereas the *Prājna* is present in the *ākāśa* of the heart,—thus the One is threefold in the (same) body.

S'ANKARA'S GLOSS ON GAUDAPĀDA.

In explanation of the preceding part of the text (of the *Māndūkya*) there are these (and the following) ślokas. It is implied that as the same Unit is in three places, in succession, and as unity is warranted by the experience of all, consisting of the form of memory in the phrase "I am that", the Unit independent of the three conditions, is ever one, pure, and absolute. The *S'ruti* corroborates this by the illustration of the great fish.†

This stanza is meant to demonstrate the experience of all the three conditions in one and the same waking condition, (and thus to prove the unity of them all). The *vaiśvānara* etc., means that the *vaiśvānara* is the real cognizer of the variety of objective beings seen by the eye. The *S'ruti* also corroborates this, in that it says "the *puruṣa* in the right eye is the enlightener."

That is to say, the *vaiśvānara* which enlightens, so to speak, the objective, and which is called the *virāj* present in the Sun, is one with that cognized in the eye. A doubt may here be raised. The *hiranyagarbha* (who is known as present in the Sun) is quite apart from the *kṣhetrajña* (the soul), the

* The late Mr. T. Subba Row explained this phrase "the right eye," as meaning the mental eye of the highest intellection, by means of which we apprehend the loftiest spiritual ideal conceivable by man on the physical plane.

† A powerful fish goes from this bank of a river to that, and back, without being carried away by the force of the current, or being affected by anything pertaining to the bank or the stream. So, indeed, is *ātman*, ever One and Unaffected, though conditioned by the three states.

director of and cognizer in the right eye, and the general governor of the body. It being so how can these two, so entirely different, be said to be one? This doubt is groundless, for, in reality, we recognize no distinction; and the *Sruti* also bears us out: "One all effulgence is embedded in all beings," which is further endorsed by the *smṛti*: "O Bhārata, know me (*Brahman*) to be the soul (*kshetrajña*) in all beings (*kshetras*); "though ever unconditioned, (It) subsists in all conditions, through being." It is needless also to ask, all organs of sense being as good vehicles of the cognizer (*kshetrajña* or *vaiśānara*) as the eye, why should the latter alone be marked out as the vehicle? For, though there is no difference in this respect, the right eye being the principal organ of sight and perception, it is singled out by way of preference as the vehicle of the seer.

If the *vaiśānara* having seen the variety of forms while in the right eye, closes it, retaining memory of all that is seen, he sees the very same (forms) called into being by *vāsanā*, over again in the mind, as if in a dream. Who sees the forms of waking consciousness sees those of *vāsanā* as well. Hence the *taijasa* cognizant of the mind is the same as the *viśva* (*vaiśānara*) in the eye.

When memory is at rest, the seer is, as it were, unified with the *prājña*, in the *ākāśa* of the heart; and becomes a "mass all sentiency." The function of the mind having ceased, and cognition and memory, the acts of the mind, being at rest, *prāṇa* is indistinguishably concentrated in the heart, for the *Sruti* says: "*prāṇa* alone draws all (within)." (As *vaiśānara* and *virāj* are one, so *taijasa* is the same as *hiranyagarbha*, for it is the seer in the cosmic mind. The mind (macro- and micro-cosmic, being one) is the link between the two; and this is borne out by the *Sruti*: "this *puruṣa* is *manomaya* (all mind)."

Prāṇa is differenced or distinguishable in sleep, for then (as the *Sruti* has it) all organs of sense are fused into it; how then,

is it called indistinguishable or undifferenced? This is no mistake, for that is undifferenced (*avyākṛta*) which is not conditioned by time and space. Though in the case of those who relate their individuality to *prāṇa*, it is not in the undifferenced condition, still in sleep it is in that condition, because the ego born of the accident of body is fused, then, in it. As the *prāṇa* of those who speak of it as belonging to them, is in the undifferenced condition, at the time of death; so the condition of the *prāṇa* of those who relate their ego to it (in the waking state) ought to be similar under similar circumstances (sleep); and this *prāṇa* should (on the individual plane) be similarly the source of all, like the (*avyākṛta* on the cosmic plane). The cognizer of the two states is also one—the *avyākṛta*. The cognizer of the conditioned (*viśva* and *taijasa*) is one with this (*avyākṛta prājña* on account of the seer of all conditions being one); and the qualifications "unified," "mass all sentiency" &c., become appropriately applicable to it. How indeed is the *avyākṛta* called *prāṇa* (the breath)? The *Sruti* "the mind is bound to *prāṇa*" authorizes this usage. But this text considered in its proper place and context is not concerned with *avyākṛta* or *prāṇa*, but *sat*; for it begins "O good one, all this was *sat* in the beginning," and ought therefore to mean *sat*, i. e., *Brahman*, by the word *prāṇa* and not the mind. This discrepancy need not trouble us, for *sat* is admittedly the source of all. Though *sat*, i. e., *Brahman*, may be meant by the word *prāṇa* in the said text, still it should not be forgotten that it is described as such, and also as *prāṇa*, only because it is, for the time, supposed to be the source of all beings; for otherwise if *Brahman*, the unconditioned absolute, were meant, the expressions used would have been something like the following, viz., "not that, not that," "wherefrom speech turns back baffled," "other than both the known and the unknown," etc. The *smṛti* also enjoins the same course inasmuch as it says "It is neither *sat* nor *asat*." If by *sat* in the text in question were meant the unconditioned, it were impossible for those immersed in *sat*, as in sleep and *pralaya*, to rise again; and moreover (if it be assumed that though so immersed in *sat*, beings

in sleep and *pralaya* could rise again) the *muktas* (the liberated, i.e., unified with *sat*) will have to re-incarnate themselves*.

If it be urged that the latter contingency will never come to pass, inasmuch as the cause of such re-incarnation is absent, we reply, the absence of the cause, in both conditions (sleep and *mukti*), is the same. If it were urged that absence of cause means absence of any thing that could be done away with by gnosis (*jñāna*), the so-much-praised gnosis itself would be of no use. Therefore the word *sat*, in the text under consideration, should be taken to mean the potential cause, *prāṇa*, described as the cause in all *Śrutis*. It being so, the real unconditioned *sat* is described as "that which is above the undifferentiated," "that which is unborn either as cause or effect", "that from which speech turns back baffled," "that which is not this, not that," etc. This, the Fourth, ever unconditioned state of the *prājña*, free from all relation with cause and effect, the reality of realities, is therefore separately described. The condition of being the cause is clearly experienced, on waking, in the form of a blank memory of the time of sleep. Hence it is well said, all three conditions are experienced in one and the same body, and the one is therefore threefold in every individual.

GAUDAPĀDA-KĀRIKĀ—(continued.)

3. Fruition of the *Viśva*, *Taijasa* and *Prājña*, consists severally of the gross, the subtle, and the blissful. This is the three-fold fruition.

4. The gross satisfies the *Viśva*, the subtle the *Taijasa*, and the blissful the *Prājña*. This is the threefold satisfaction.

* Which is a *reductio ad absurdum*; for *mukti* means entire cessation of re-incarnation (at least for a *kalpa* or *manvantara*), whence *sat* in the text in question must mean *prāṇa*.

5. He who knows the object of fruition, as well subject thereof, in each of the above, is not affected by fruition.

6. It is quite plain that all beings become manifest previous (unmanifest) existence; the *puruṣa*, in the *prāṇa*, sends forth all the various centres of consciousness.

7. Some trying to analyse this process of formation, it as the work (of an extra-cosmic God), whereas others it as of a class with dream and illusion.

8. Others maintain that it is simply an act of the God, while those who rely on time declare that even proceeds from Time.

9. Some declare it an act of fruition or of desire but it is the very nature of the effulgent, and how can who is at the point of the highest desire, have any desire.

S'ANKARA'S GLOSS ON GAUDAPĀDA—(continued.)

Verses three and four have been already explained.

(5.) In all three conditions, viz., waking, etc., the fruition consisting of the gross etc., is the same object different aspects. The subject of this fruition, whether *taijasa*, or *prājña*, is also one, as inferred from the consciousness implied in the form of the cognition "That", common to all conditions; as also from the circumstance of all three being the same as the subject or cause. He who knows this variety of the subject and of fruition as being, each, one in itself, though as many, is never affected by the act of fruition; object in the absolute is experienced by the subject absolute. Nor is it possible for any relative action to modify in any way the subject of such act, just the case of fire consuming a variety of fuel to a

(6.) From previous existence, that is, from an unmanifest existence, all beings, that is, *vis'va*, *prājña*, become as such, by assuming name and form.

fest object, through the action of *avidyā*. This is thus explained. A barren woman cannot be said to give birth to a child either in reality or in illusion. For if things did come out of nothing, the whole of the world of experience ought to become nothing, a circumstance which will tend to render *Brahman* itself, whose existence is inferred from experience, a mere void. This, however, cannot be, for the snake etc., that a rope is mistaken for, on account of the action of *māyā* (illusion), are not simply nothing but are already pre-existent in the *form* of the rope. The rope, the snake, or the mirage are nowhere experienced or seen, by any one, without a suitable substratum. Just as the snake is in the rope even before it appears in being, so indeed are all beings existent in the very form of *prāṇa*, the cause, even before manifestation in existence. The same is declared by the text "All this was *Brahman* in the beginning"; "All was *ātman*," etc. *Prāṇa* sends forth all the centres of consciousness as represented by the various forms of gods, men, animals, etc., comprised under *prājña*, *aijasa*, and *viśva*. They are so many parts, as it were, of the all-conscious *puruṣa*, like so many reflections in water of one and the same sun, or like so many rays of the sun. They are all evolved from *puruṣa*, the *prāṇa*, as cause, in forms independent of one another, by their varying capacities for fruition etc., but always like their source, and therefore like so many reflections of the sun, or like so many sparks of one fire, being all called *jīvas* etc. Another apt illustration, in point, is that of the spider who spins his web out of himself. Even the *Śruti* itself lays down "As sparks from fire" etc.

(7.) Work, i. e. creation of God. This is the opinion of those who attach importance to an analysis of the cosmos, for indeed there are those who do not care at all about the matter. The *Śruti* also dismisses the subject with the remark "*Indra* becomes manifold by *māyā*." A juggler throws the end of a thread up in the sky, and climbing by the help of the thread disappears with all his accoutrements. His body begins to fall to the ground in pieces which unite anon into the

same juggler. Now those who witness this illusion do not care to look into its essence and meaning. In the same manner the series of the states of sleep, dream, and waking, is like the throwing up of the thread, and *prājña*, *aijasa*, etc., are like the juggler who appears to climb up the thread,—the real director of the whole illusion being ever entirely aloof from the thread as well as from him who climbs up the thread. As this man stands all the while on the ground, entirely unseen on account of the power of illusion, so even stands for ever the Reality of realities—the Absolute, Eternal, Truth. Hence those desirous of *mokṣa* think only of this last, and not of the panorama of illusion that supervenes. The opinion hinted at in the text is therefore, that of those who are misled by this illusion.

(8.) As ideas in the divine mind are always real, the universe is regarded by many as an act of real divine ideation like earthen pots etc., which are not other than the idea in the potter's mind. There are, however, others who regard Time as the cause of the universe.

(9.) Others take it that the object of the universe (evolved in any manner) is either fruition or diversion. The writer now refutes all these theories by the single assertion that he who stands at the highest point of desire cannot possibly have any desire either for fruition or diversion, and that there being no motive, he can never move himself towards view to creation in any of the aforesaid manners. The (the semblance) of evolution is none other than the nature (of the absolute), for in the case of the rope and the snake, the cause of the latter is to be sought not elsewhere but in the nature of original *avidyā*.

TEXT OF THE MĀNDUKYA—(continued.)

VII.

The Fourth is that which is not conscious of itself, subjective, nor that which is conscious of the object, nor that which is conscious of both, nor that which is

is simple consciousness, nor that which is a mass all sentiency, nor that which is all darkness. It is unseen, transcendent, unapprehensible, uninferable, unthinkable, indescribable, the sole essence of the consciousness of self, the negative of all illusion, the ever peaceful, all bliss, the One Unit;—this indeed is *âtman*, it should be known.

S'ANKARA'S COMMENTARY—(continued.)

The fourth quarter is now described in its place. This is done in the words "The Fourth is that etc." It is not possible to describe this, the Fourth, by words, hence it is described simply by predicating of it the negative of all possible attributes. Is it then, mere negation? No. For, imagination must always have something to stand upon. The (false) ideas of silver, a man, or the mirage can never arise but with mother-o'-pearl, a post, or a piece of saltish land, as their respective bases. If it were so, the Fourth were the substratum of all ideas and forms such as *prāna* etc., and ought to be expressible, like jars, etc., which are the substratum of water, etc., in words; and ought not to be described by predicating of it, simple negation of all possible attributes. This is not so. For, ideas such as *prāna*, etc., (supposed to *subsist* in the Fourth) are as entirely unsubstantial as the idea of silver, etc., in mother-o'-pearl, etc.; and the substantial is never known to have any relation to the unsubstantial. And first, the possessive relation cannot be good, for it is that nothing which cannot be the subject of speech. Nor could it be the subject of any other instrument of knowledge, like the cow etc., on account of its peculiar nature, for *âtman* is ever free from all accident. Nor can it be said to be that which is

describable by its generic property, like the cow etc., for being one without a second, can have no generic or specific mark. Nor is it that which *acts* like a cook etc., for it is always known to be without action. To lay hold of an object by its properties and define it as the blue etc., is out of place inasmuch as it has no properties whatever. Hence it can never be positively described by a name in any manner. Then it ought to belong to the category of "the hare of a hare." No. For, knowledge of the fourth as *âtman* destroys all desire for *anâtman*, just as the dissolution of silver is destroyed by right discrimination of its substratum. It is not at all possible that identification of the fourth with *âtman* can bring in its train *vidyā* and the brood of evils such as desire etc. Nor is there any cogent reason why the fourth should not be regarded as *âtman*, for all *upaniṣads* agree in saying the same thing; as observe, "Thou art that," "This self (*âtman*) is *Brahman*," "That is the fourth," "That which is present in direct cognition is *âtman*," "That which is present in direct cognition is *Brahman*," "It is the eternal cause and effect," "All this is *âtman*" etc., This *âtman*, the totality of the real and unreal, is supposed to be made up of four quarters. The unmarked portion of it is that which is marked off by *avidyā*; it is like the snake imagined in place of a rope, and consists of the three quarters described before as the seed and the growth. Henceforth it is intended to describe the unconditioned substance corresponding to the rope in the illustration just quoted, by negating of it the three quarters corresponding to the snake of the same illustration, in the words "not conscious of the subject etc." It may be asked why the fourth is described by simple negation of the other three? For its existence is already implied when three of the four quarters of *âtman* have been described. This need not be so. For, it is only meant that *âtman* w

its three quarters is itself the fourth when it is not any of the three, just as the rope is the rope when it is not the snake etc. This is meant to be implied in the same manner as the unity of "Thou" and "that" in the *śruti* "Thou art that." If the fourth were anything other than *ātman* qualified by the other quarters, all teaching would be to no purpose; and there would be every possibility of our being driven to the only alternative of an absolute negation as the substantial, on account of a fourth such as is meant to be conceived being not cognizable by any instrument of knowledge. When like the rope taken for a snake or a garland, or any similar thing, the one *ātman* is taken to be any of the three quarters, according to circumstances, the absolute negation of the variety of experience in *ātman* is established by the very same instrument of knowledge which demonstrates that. It is not that which is conscious of the subjective, nor that which is conscious of the objective, nor that which is a mass all sentiency. That is to say no additional effort, or no fresh act of knowledge, is necessary for conscious realization of the Fourth; (the simple negation of its being the other three being sufficient.)*

The same happens in our properly understanding the nature of the rope; for at the very moment proper discrimination reveals to us the true nature of the snake, we realize the rope as well;—in other words knowledge of the rope is simultaneous with (is in fact the same as) knowledge of the illusive character of the snake etc. But there are those

* The *advaita* holds that liberation is the very nature of the universe, it is neither a thing to be obtained nor state to be brought about. What is to be done consists of getting rid of the illusion which creates the sense of duality and prevents proper realization of the Unit. Hence it is well said no fresh effect of knowledge is necessary for realization of the fourth, other than the one for realizing the absence of illusion—the imaginary three.

who maintain that an instrument of knowledge helps not only the removal of the obstruction (illusion), as darkness etc. in the case of knowing a jar (by direct cognition), but it enables the object also to reveal itself. If this, however, were correct the act of cutting something ought, in their opinion, to accomplish something over and above the severance of the part from the main body. But if, in the case of cognizing the jar, in the illustration, enveloped in darkness, the instrument of knowledge did nothing more than disperse the darkness, which is not the object ought to be cognized (the action of the instrument, ought to be regarded as complete);—like the act of cutting directed to the severance of the part being complete with the accomplishment of the severance;—and the knowledge of the jar which follows immediately and necessarily must not be said to be any result accomplished by the instrument of knowledge. In the manner the instrument of knowledge, *viz.*, the negation of all possible predicates, employed with a view to proper discrimination of the conscious-of-the-subjective and others which the *ātman* is, at times, illusively taken to be, will not be able to cognize the Fourth unless it negated it, the conscious-of-the-subjective and others, not meant to be cognized. For the distinction between the employ of the instrument, the instrument itself, and the object meant to be accomplished by that instrument, will be annihilated with the establishing of the said negation. The same is expressed in "*gnosis* accomplished, duality nowhere." *Gnosis* does not wait even for the moment immediately next the annihilation of duality, for if it did the would be a *regressus in infinitum*, of *gnosis* after *gnosis*, and duality will not at all be annihilated. Therefore it is established that the annihilation of the illusion of *Taijasa*

subsisting in *ātman*, is simultaneous with the result, accomplished by the instrument of knowledge, *viz.*, the negation of all possible predicates.

It is not "that which is conscious of the subjective" *i. e.* It is not *Tajasa*; nor is it the *Vaiśvānara*, inasmuch as it is not that which is conscious of the objective. By saying that it is not that which is conscious of either, it is denied that it corresponds with the condition between dream and waking. By saying that it is not simple consciousness, it is shown to be other than the condition of sleep which is the condition of that indiscrimination which makes it the cause. It is denied to be that which is a mass all sentiency, to imply that it is not that which cognizes all things by a single act of knowledge. And it is shown to be other than *dead* matter by predicating of it the negation of darkness. A doubt might here suggest itself. *Tajasa* and others are demonstrated as existent in *ātman*; how could they then, by simple negation, disappear from *ātman* like the snake etc. from the rope? This could be in this wise. Though they are of the form of thought, they, like the snake etc. which the rope is mistaken for, are not mutually exclusive of one another. The essence of thought is the truth, on account of being exclusive of everything. If it be urged that it is non-exclusive of deep sleep, we say that it is not so, for sleep is capable of being experienced; and the *śruti* also says "the cognition of the cognized is not annihilated." Hence the fourth is described as "unseen"; and it is not the subject of experience because it is "unseen." It is also not capable of being apprehended by the senses, and therefore transcendent. It is "uninferable" *i. e.* not possible to prove as existing by making a middle term of anything belonging to it. Hence it

is "unthinkable," and therefore "indescribable." It is the sole essence of the consciousness of self on account of the unity of the subject implied in the conscious experience that is common to all three conditions, waking, dream, and sleep. Or "the sole essence of the consciousness of self" means that "consciousness of self (ego)" is the sole element of knowing the Fourth, and the Fourth is therefore the supreme essence, result, ground of the consciousness of self. For, the *śruti* also declares "this should be adored: Self." By the negation of "that which is conscious of the subjective" etc., the connection with the Fourth and its adjuncts of the conditioned, is negated; and by describing the Fourth as "the negation of all illusion" it is declared void of properties which make up conditions. Hence "the ever peaceful" and "all bliss." As it is the Unit without a second, free from all and every distinction, it is the Fourth, as distinguished from the other quarters generally seen and experienced. "This indeed is *ātman*, it should be known" is added by way of explaining the meaning of the *śruti* "Thou art that," in the same manner as the rope is indicated as an independent thing by itself apart from the imaginary snake, stick, etc. *Atman* is the unseen which it should be known as described in the *śruti* "the sign of the secret is never lost"; that is to say, known only relative to its previous unknown condition, for in reality *gnosis* arises, duality (in the form of knower, known, and knowledge) is nowhere.

KĀRIKĀS.

10. The Fourth is that which is capable of destroying all evils, ever changeless, of all beings the one without a second, effulgent and all-pervading.

11. *Viśva* and *Taijasa* are conditioned as cause or effect, *Prājna* as cause alone; but neither the one nor the other has any relation with the Fourth.

12. *Prājna* knows not self or non-self, nor truth or falsehood, but the Fourth is ever all-seeing.

13. Noncognition of duality is common to *Prājna* and *Turya* (the Fourth), but the difference consists in the former being with sleep in the form of cause, and the latter being entirely free from it.

14. The first two are accompanied by dream and sleep, the third by dreamless sleep, but those who are firm in the Fourth experience neither dream nor sleep.

15. Dream is the condition of him who takes things in the contrary manner, and sleep of him who is ignorant of reality. Light being thrown on the nature of this inversion, the Fourth is realized.

16. When the *Jiva* is awakened from the sleep of that delusion which has no beginning, it realizes (in itself) the unborn, ever awake, dreamless, one without a second.

17. If the variety of experience were real it certainly ought to disappear (some time); but the whole of duality is mere illusion, the reality being the Unit.

18. If any one can be supposed as possibly imagining the various ideas, these might be supposed to cease. The idea (of duality implied in the distinction of teacher, taught, and teaching) is imagined possible because of the teaching, but in gnosis there can be no duality.

S'ANKARA'S GLOSS ON GAUDAPĀDA—(continued.)

(10.) As all evil existing in the very forms—*Prājna*, *Taijasa*, *Viśva*,—is destroyed by proper realization of the Fourth, it is said to be the destroyer of all evils. It is, in fact, described as capable of so destroying them, inasmuch as the disappearance of evil is consequent on realization of the Fourth. It is ever changeless, that is to say never subject to any change (from within or without). And why? Because all entities

being unreal like the snake etc., imagined in place of the rope, it alone is of all beings the sole unchangeable Unit, one without a second. And it is also effulgent, that is, the cause which makes all beings what they are, which is the very essence of being; whence it is all-pervading as well.

(11.) The generic and specific characters of *Viśva* and others are here described with a view to clearly explain the nature of the Fourth. Effect means that which is the fruit, the result; and cause that which acts, in other words that which is the condition of the effect in embryo. *Viśva* and *Taijasa* are conditioned by cause and effect, in the sense respectively of ignorance of reality and inverted cognition. *Prājna* is conditioned by cause alone for causality in the sense of ignorance of reality is its only condition. Hence these two, cause and effect, or ignorance of reality and inverted cognition, are not possible in the unique Fourth.

(12.) How is *Prājna* said to be conditioned by causality alone, and how again are the two, ignorance of reality and inverted cognition, not possible in the Fourth? As *Prājna* does not, like *Viśva* and *Taijasa*, cognize anything of the duality born of *avidyā*, and is other than *ātman*, it is conditioned only by that which is the cause of inverted cognition, *viz.*, by causality in the form of ignorance of reality (*avidyā*). As the Fourth is ever conscious of all this, on account of the impossibility of anything yet transcendent, it is ever all-seeing. As it is all-seeing, causality in the form of ignorance of reality cannot exist in it, and consequently the result of that causality—inverted cognition—as well. For, in the sun, all light, the contrary of light *viz.*, darkness, and any light other than his native effulgence, are never possible. The *bruti* too says "The sight of the seer is never lost." Or the Fourth is ever all-seeing because it is the cause whence all beings derive their *being*, and is, as such, present in all, whether in dream waking or sleep. The *bruti* supports this when it says "There is no cognizer other than this."

(13.) This *śloka* is meant to solve a difficulty. The non-cognition of duality is common both to the *Prājña* and the Fourth; why should the former alone be regarded as conditioned by causality? That alone should be so regarded because it is with cause in the form of sleep which is the same as ignorance of reality. This is the cause of all specific waking cognitions. This is called the sleep that is the cause, and condition of the *Prājña*. This kind of sleep is not possible in the Fourth, like the snake in the rope, on account of its being ever all-seeing. Hence the condition of causality cannot exist in it.

(14.) Dream is inverted cognition like that of the snake in place of the rope. Sleep is already defined as that darkness, which is ignorance of reality. *Viśva* and *Taijasa* are accompanied by dream and sleep in this sense; and they are therefore described as conditioned by cause and effect. As darkness is never seen in the sun, so do those who are firm in the Fourth, never see either the cause or the effect, for in either instance the thing seen would be contrary to the very nature of the place where it is meant to be seen. Hence the Fourth is the absolutely unconditioned.

(15.) It is now explained when one becomes firm in the fourth. Of the two, dream and sleep, one who cognizes the reality in an inverted or some other form, like the cognition of a snake in place of the rope, experiences dream; and one who is entirely ignorant of reality experiences sleep which, however, is common to all three (*viśva* etc.). As dream and sleep are common to *viśva* and *Taijasa*, and as inverted cognition is predominant in both, they fall under the same class. Sleep, in this class, being subordinate to inverted cognition, the inversion which is the characteristic of this class is described simply as dream. In the third—*Prājña* (which forms the second class implied in the text which speaks only of dream and sleep)—sleep alone, in the form of ignorance of reality, constitutes the inversion. Thus then, when this inversion *viz.*, ignorance of reality and inverted

cognition which respectively are the conditions of cause and effect, is destroyed, on knowing the essence of reality, the Fourth is immediately realized. One who does not see these two conditions becomes firm in the Fourth (for it is that light wherein no darkness exists and which, as the substratum of the conditions, is beyond them.)

(16.) By force of the cause in the form of ignorance of reality, as well as by force of the dream in the form of inverted cognition, called illusion (*māyā*) without beginning, the *jīva* experiences dream; and imagines itself for the time to receive impressions such as this is my father, this is my son or grandson, this is my property, these are my animals, I am the master of these, I am happy, miserable, this has injured me, that has done me good, and so on. When the *jīva* is awakened by the kindness of a teacher who has himself realized the truth of the *Vedānta*, with the words "thou art not any of all that thou imaginest related to thee as cause or effect, but "Thou art that": it realizes its true nature. It (*ātman*) has neither inside nor outside, nor birth (nor the other five stages leading to decay); and it is hence called the unborn, *i. e.* free from all changes external or internal, incidental to existence. As sleep, the cause, in the form of the darkness of *avidyā* is not present, it is called the ever awake. And the Fourth is dreamless also, because it is all awake, and is not subject to inverted cognition. As it is ever awake, and dreamless, it is unborn and one without a second. This is realized as the self.

(17.) If this kind of realization follows only upon removal of illusion, how can it be said that all is one without a second, while illusion in the form of experience subsists? This is thus explained. All could not possibly be one without a second if the illusion were real. It is, however, not real, being only imagination, like that of the snake for the rope. If it were real it were possible to think of its subsequent removal. But the snake for which the rope is taken, only through simple mistake, is not actually effaced from existence, by proper dis-

crimination. Nor similarly is the illusion, spread out by a juggler, withdrawn like a real tangible thing, on the eyes of the spectators being freed from the spell cast by him. The same is true of the Duality of *māyā*, called illusion, the *advaita* (Unit) being the rope or the juggler of the illustration. It is the reality where, in truth, no illusion appears or disappears (because illusion does not *exist*, being void of substantiality).

(18.) (We may grant this, but) how could the duality implied in the very idea of teacher, taught, and the teaching, be done away with? This is not difficult to explain. If the idea subsist in the mind of any one, it is possible to think of its obliteration. Just as the whole of the illusion of experience is like the illusion cast by a juggler, or of the form of the snake, so indeed is the idea of teacher, taught, and teaching. The idea has some existence only as the cause of teaching, and it is therefore relatively true only till the teaching bears fruit. This fruit—*gnosis*—having been brought about, no variety, no duality, is possible.

TEXT OF THE MĀNDŪKYA—(Continued.)

VIII.

This is that *ātman* even with regard to the letters (of the word *aum*); it is the *aumkāra* with its parts. The quarters are the parts, and the parts the quarters the former being *a*, *u*, *m*.

The word *aum*, the object of this discourse, described as *ātman* made up of four quarters, is the same as *ātman* even by its four parts corresponding to the four quarters. What are these parts? The parts make up the whole word *aum*. This word *aum* analysed into its component parts is called the *aumkāra* with parts. How could these two (*aum* and *ātman*) be one? They are one because the parts are the quarters and the quarters are the parts. The parts are *A*, *U*, *M*.

IX.

The first part *A* is *vaiśvānara* whose sphere is the condition of waking, on account of all-pervasiveness, or on account of being the first. He who knows this has all his desires fulfilled, and is the first (of all).

This general statement of identity is now explained in particular. *Vaiśvānara* whose sphere is the condition of waking is the first part of the word *aum*, viz., the letter *A*. What ground is there for this identity? The first is all-pervasiveness, that is, being present in all, for the letter *A* is present throughout speech (*i. e.* in all letters, consonants). For, the *śruti* says "The letter *A* is the whole of speech." In the same manner is *Vaiśvānara* present throughout the whole of the universe, for says the *śruti* "of this *ātman*, the head of *Vaiśvānara* is the effulgence" etc.; and we maintain the unity of names and objects. There is also a second ground of this identity. It is the circumstance of being first for, as the letter *A* is the first of all letters, *Vaiśvānara* is the first of all the four quarters. Now is described the merit of knowing this identity. He who knows it has all his desires fulfilled. He becomes the first of the great.

X.

The second part *U* is *Taijasa* whose sphere is the condition of dream, on account of superiority, or on account of being in the middle. He who knows this has his knowledge refined to the highest point of superiority, he finds no cause of difference with anyone, nor is any one ignorant of *Brahman* born in his family.

Taijasa whose sphere is the state of dream is the second part, the letter *U*. What is the ground of this identity? The ground

is that the letter U is, as it were, superior to the letter A; and *taijasa* too is superior to *viśva*. Or there is yet another ground. As the letter U is in the middle, being between the letter A and M, so is *Taijasa* in the middle of *viśva* and *prājna*. Now is described the merit of knowing this identity. He who knows this has his knowledge refined up to the highest point of superiority, i. e. his powers of knowing increase considerably. He finds no cause of difference with anyone, that is to say he is regarded in the same light both by enemies and friends; nor is anyone ignorant of *Brahman* born in his family.

XI.

The third part *M* is *Prājna* whose sphere is the condition of sleep, on account of its being the measure, or on account of its being that wherein everything loses its identity. He who knows this is able to measure all and to comprehend all within himself.

Prājna whose sphere is the condition of sleep is the third part of *aumkāra*, the letter M. What is the ground of this identity? The ground may be thus explained. As a heap of barley is measured by a *prastha* (a kind of measure), part by part, so are *viśva* and *taijasa* as it were, measured in *pralaya* (involution), and *utpatti* (evolution) by *prājna*. In the same manner if the word *aum* were repeated immediately after one repetition, its two letters A and U appear, as it were to first merge in, and then emerge from, its last letter M. This is the ground called "measure" in the text. The next ground is that in the *Prājna* all things lose their identity. This is plain in the event of an immediate second repetition of the word *aum*, for then the letters A and U appear to merge themselves entirely in the letter M; and *viśva* and

taijasa are known to merge in *prājna* during sleep. Hence the identity of *prājna* with the letter M. Now is described the merit of knowing this. One knowing this is able to measure all, that is to say, he is able to penetrate into the nature of the universe. He is also able to comprehend all within himself, i. e., to be the cause of all. The attaching so much merit to each of these acts of knowing is meant as an explanation to help knowledge of the principal thing in view.

KĀRIKĀS—(continued).

19. The plain ground of the identity of *Viś'va* and the letter A, is the circumstance of each being first, as also the fact of the all-pervasiveness of each.

20. Of recognizing the identity of *Taijasa* and the letter U, the ground, in both cases, is superiority, as well as the being in the middle.

21. Of the identity of *Prājna* and the letter M, the ground is measure, as well as the fact that therein everything loses its identity.

22. He who positively knows that which is the ground of identity in all three conditions is the worshipped and respected of all, and the greatest of sages.

23. The letter A puts one in communication with *Viś'va*, U with *Taijasa*, and M with *Prājna*; no action being possible in that which has no parts.

S'ANKARA'S GLOSS ON GAUDAPĀDA—(continued.)

(19.) When *Viś'va* is meant to be identified with the letter A, the plain ground is being first, as described in the text or the *Upanishad* just discussed. The second ground, all-pervasiveness, also is explained under the text corresponding to this verse.

(20.) Of the identity of *Taijasa* and the letter U, the grounds are "superiority" and "being in the middle." These should be understood as before.

(21.) That is to say, in taking *Prājna* as identical with the letter M, the grounds are "measure," and the fact that in them, all things "lose their identity."

(22.) He who has a conviction, in its full sense, of the grounds of identity in all the three cases, receives the worship and respect of all. He, in fact, is *Brahmarit* (the knower of *Brahman*).

(23.) Having identified the quarters of *ātman* with the parts or letters (of the word *aum*) on the grounds already described, and having thus realized the true meaning and nature of *aumkāra*, it is now explained what is the true import of the merit assigned to a knowledge of the grounds of each identity. If one meditates on the first, he is carried to the *viśva*; in other words, if one meditates on the first part of *aumkāra* he is identified with the *Vaiśvānara*. In the same manner the letter U leads to identification with the *Taijasa*, and M with the *Prājna*. The letter M too being wiped out of the mind, the condition of causality entirely ceases, and the residue is the *aumkāra*-with-no-parts (herein there is no action incidental to any condition whether of cause or effect).

TEXT OF THE MĀNDŪKYA.—(continued.)

XII.

That which has no parts is the Fourth, indescribable, free from the illusion of experience, all bliss, one without a second. This is *aumkāra*. He who realizes *ātman* in himself, loses self in the Self.

That which has no parts is called *amātra*, and *amātra aumkāra* is the Fourth (quarter) i.e., pure *ātman*. As mind and speech, the instruments of naming, are not able to comprehend It, It is called indescribable. When in this manner the illusion of the variety implied in experience is reduced to nothing, It is necessarily all bliss, and therefore one without a

second. *Aumkāra*, as thus understood, is the same as that which is with three parts, and also as that which is with three quarters. He who knows this loses himself in the Self, i.e., *ātman*. Those who realize the reality are one with *ātman*, having reduced to naught all conditions of cause and effect; and hence they never return, for the Fourth is the unconditioned Absolute. For, the snake which has merged in the rope, on proper discrimination of the snake and its substratum, is never capable of coming to life again, by any feat of the mind, in the case of those whose knowledge never fades. To those, however, whose power of discrimination is, as yet, in the middle or initial stage, and who consequently are mere students of this philosophy; or to those who quitting the world walk in the path of virtue with the aim of mastering the truths of this teaching, knowledge of the grounds of identity of the quarters and the parts will, on their applying themselves to proper meditation of the word, *aumkāra*, prove itself of invaluable help towards the final realization of *Brahman*. The same is expressed in the text "The three inferior stages of life etc."

KĀRIKĀS—(continued.)

24. The *aumkāra* should be known as one with the quarters, the quarters being its parts. Having known the word with its parts (quarters) nothing else should be thought of.

25. The mind should be absorbed in the word (*aum*), for it is *Brahman*, the ever-fearless; one so absorbed has no fear whatever.

26. The "word of glory" (the *pranava*—*aum*) is the lower as well as higher *Brahman*; it is transcendent, unequalled, having nothing without itself, unrelated to any effect, and changeless.

27. The "word of glory" is the beginning, middle and end of all; having known it in this manner one enjoys (the peace of eternal unity).

28. The "word of glory" is the *Īvara* present in the heart of all; the wise man knowing *aumkāra* to be all-pervading, never finds cause for misery.

29. He who has known the *amātra-aumkāra*, the *anantamātra*, the substratum in which all illusion dissolves itself, all bliss, is the only sage, and none other.

S'ANKARA'S GLOSS ON GAUDAPĀDA—(continued.)

(24.) There are these *ślohas* on the text as before. On account of the grounds of identity described before, the quarters are the parts, and the parts the quarters. Hence it is well put, "*aumkāra* should be known as one with the quarters." One who has thus known the word *aum*, should not, on account of all his desires being fulfilled, think of anything seen or unseen.

(25.) The mind should be absorbed in, that is to say, unified with, the real essence of the Word, *viz.*, *aum*, as explained before. For, the "word of glory" is the ever-fearless *Brahman*. One centred in It has no fear whatever, for, says the *S'ruti*, "one knowing does not fear."

(26.) The "word of glory" is the lower as well as higher *Brahman*. That is to say, the parts and the quarters being all abandoned, the residue is pure *ātman*, the highest *Brahman*. That which has nothing corresponding to it in experience, in the form of cause (or effect), or any thing, or circumstance, is here called transcendent. The other attributes are self-evident. The ever-unborn comprising within itself all relations of cause and effect, is like the salt ever present in the waters of the ocean.

(27.) The "word of glory" is the beginning, middle, and end, *viz.*, the source, existence, and disappearance of all that is, that is to say, the whole of the concrete world beginning from *ākāśa*, and produced after the manner of the illusive elephant, the rope-snake, the mirage, etc.; all having for their

respective causes the illusionist and the like. The meaning is that one who knows "the word of glory," *ātman*, to be in place of the illusionist or the rope in the illustration, is instantaneously unified with it (*ātman*).

(28.) The "word of glory" should be known as the *Īvara* (*antaryāmin*) present in the heart, that is to say, in the place which performs the functions of memory, and knowing in general, of all beings. The wise having known *aumkāra* to be all-pervading like *ākāśa*, never find cause for misery, for duality, the cause of misery or happiness, is nowhere. The *S'ruti* also says "he who has realized *ātman* has crossed the ocean of evil."

(29.) The *amātra* (with no parts) is the Fourth, and that too is *aumkāra*. *Mātra* means measure, and that which is a measure of the highest inconceivable magnitude is the *anantamātra*. In other words, it is that whose extent and dimensions are indeterminable. (The *amātra aumkāra* being *ātman*, is the same as the *anantamātra*.) It is all bliss, because in it duality does not exist. He who has realized *aumkāra* in the manner described is the real sage, and no one else, even if he be learned in all the sciences.

CHAPTER II.

(GAUDAPĀDA'S—KĀRIKĀ.)

OF ILLUSION.

1. The wise declare the unsubstantiality of all that is seen in dream, it being all within the body, on account of its partaking of the subtle.

S'ANKARA'S GLOSS.

Aum. It has already been said, knowledge (*gnōsis*) having arisen, duality does not exist, and this has been borne out by the *S'rutis*, such as "The Unit is ever one" etc. This, however, is established only on the authority of the word of holy writ.

But it is possible also to show the unsubstantiality of the objective even from pure reasoning, and this second chapter is undertaken for that purpose. It begins with "The wise" etc. Unsubstantiality is the fact of being unsubstantial, that is to say, false, illusive. The unsubstantiality of what? Of all objects, whether things or ideas seen in dream. The wise, that is to say, those who derive knowledge by proper use of the instruments of knowledge, declare the said unsubstantiality. The text proceeds to describe the cause of the falsity of objects. They are unreal because they are seen within the body (in dream) for, without it, mountains, elephants and the like exist not. Hence all sights deserve to be regarded as futile. It may be objected that "being within" is not a valid middle term to infer futility from; for jars etc., which are "within" any cover, say a cloth, are in no way futile. To obviate this difficulty the text adds "on account of its partaking of the subtle." The whole taken together means that inasmuch as they are within the body in a subtle condition, (they are certainly non-existent as tangible objects, but are mere futile ideas.) In the subtlety prevailing in the nerves within, there certainly can never exist mountains, elephants, etc., for, in the first place, they are not in the body itself.

2. *Nor does the seer of the dream see distant places by going out to them, for the time taken up does in no way appear to be long (nor is there any relation with space); nor does the dreamer, on being awake, find himself in the place (of his dream.)*

S'ANKARA'S GLOSS.

That the objects seen in dream are only in a subtle condition within is not correct; for one sleeping in the east experiences dreams in the north. With this objection in view the text answers that the experiencer of a dream does not go out of the body to see things at a distance, or away from the place where he sleeps. The reason for this is obvious. The time between going to sleep and beginning to dream of things separated by thousands of miles, and capable otherwise of being reached only by travels extending over months, is not at all

appreciable. Nor is the time taken in returning from such places at all perceived or felt. Hence as the time taken in the act does not in anyway appear to be long, it follows that the seer of the dream does not see distant places by going out to them. Moreover, on being awake, the dreamer does not find himself at the place he dreamt of. If it be supposed that the dreamer does go out to the place he dreamt of, then certainly he ought to find himself in that place on being awake. But this does not happen. One, in bed, at night, sees visions of the day and meets many persons; (but if this meeting were real) he ought to have been seen by those whom he meets. This, however, never happens, for if it did, those who saw him ought to recognise him as the one they saw at a particular place and time. This too never happens.* Therefore, the dreamer does not go out to any place in dream.

3. *Moreover, reason bears out the unsubstantiality of chariots etc., (in dream), whence their futility thus established is declared by the wise to be laid down in the S'ruti as well.*

S'ANKARA'S GLOSS.

Objects seen in dream are false, for this reason, that their unsubstantiality is demonstrated by reason. And this is borne out by the S'ruti as well. The S'ruti runs "there are neither chariots, nor horses," etc., and suggests the futility of objects seen in dream, on the ground of these being within the body in a subtle condition. This same futility thus indirectly suggested is declared by the wise, that is, by the knowers of Brahman to be clearly laid down in the S'ruti demonstrating the self-cognizability of the Absolute.

4. *As in dream, so in waking, the objects seen are unsubstantial, though the two (conditions) differ by the one being internal and subtle, and the other external and gross.*

* There are cases on record of the recognition of persons as those seen in dream. This would appear to go against S'ankara's statement, that the dreamer does not go out &c. The dreamer is called *Svapnadik*—the seer of the dream, i.e., the real seer who certainly never goes out, whereas the subtle body may. It is a mistake to understand the subtle body by the "dreamer."

S'ANKARA'S GLOSS.

The proposition to be proved is this. Objects seen in the waking condition are unreal. The ground for such inference is their capability of being seen. The illustration (to corroborate the general induction—all that is capable of being seen as object is false) is the phenomenon of dream. The capability of being seen, which proves the futility of objects seen in the condition of dream, is found also in objects cognized during the waking condition. Thus is established a relation between the middle term and the minor. The conclusion follows that objects seen in the wakeful condition are false. Though, on account of being internal and in a subtle condition, the phenomena of dream are different from those of waking, the fact of being presented as object, and the consequent futility of presentation, are common to both.

5. *The wise regard the wakeful as well as the dreaming condition as one, in consequence of the similarity of objective experience in either, on grounds already described.*

S'ANKARA'S GLOSS.

"Already described," because cognition of objects is in every way similar in both conditions which, therefore, deserve to be similar. The wise, that is to say, those who are able to analyse and understand the truth. This verse only enunciates what has already been proved by the foregoing inference.

6. *That which is naught at the beginning and is so also at the end, does necessarily not exist in the middle. Objects are like the illusions we see, still they are regarded as if real.*

S'ANKARA'S GLOSS.

The objects of waking experience are false for the reason that they are known to have no beginning and no end, and that which is naught at its beginning and end is naught also at the middle, for instance, the mirage etc. This is the general rule of experience. The objects of waking experience are of

the same class, i. e., the mirage etc., which are naught in themselves on account of their being naught at their beginning as well as end; and are, therefore, quite unsubstantial in themselves. Though they are in reality illusive, the ignorant regard them as real.

7. *The being used as means to some end, of the objects of waking experience, comes to naught in dream; hence on account of being with beginning and end they are certainly false and no more.*

S'ANKARA'S GLOSS.

That the objects of waking experience are false like the phenomena of dream, is not correct, for, the former consisting of food, drink, etc., are used as tangible means to tangible ends, whereas the latter are not such. Therefore the futility of the objects of waking experience assumed from their similarity to the phenomena of dream, breaks down. This argument is not correct. For, the being used as a means to an end becomes naught in dream, inasmuch as a man going to bed and experiencing a dream, immediately after having satisfied his hunger by a full meal, and having quenched his thirst by a full draught of water, finds himself hungry or afflicted with thirst, for many months past. And the contrary also holds equally good; for, one awakened from a dream wherein he has regaled himself with food, drink etc., finds himself quite hungry or afflicted with thirst. Hence it is clear that 'the being used as a means to an end,' which is put forth as a test of reality, is not true of the same objects only on another plane. Thus, therefore, the futility of the objects of waking experience deduced from their similarity to the phenomena of dream, stands well demonstrated. The being with beginning and end (if it should be set up as a ground of difference between phenomena of the two conditions, may be accepted by us as) common to both, in which case too, the said futility of objects stands doubly unshaken.

8. *That the phenomena of dream transcend the limits of experience, is only a result of the condition of the cognizer, as in the*



case of those residing in heaven. The cognizer being so conditioned sees the various objects, even like one well-instructed here.

S'ANKARA'S GLOSS.

The futility of the objects of waking experience deduced from their similarity to the phenomena of dream, is not well proved, inasmuch as the illustration does not agree with the thing to be illustrated. The objects of dream are not copies of the objects of waking experience. In dream one sees objects transcending the limits of experience, and finds himself even with eight hands, sitting on an elephant with four tusks, and the like. All such things are not like anything unreal, and are therefore real in themselves. Hence the objection that the illustration does not agree; and it does not follow that waking experience is false like the phenomena of dream. The whole of this discussion is based on a pure misunderstanding. That which is supposed to transcend the limits of experience in dream, is not an absolute reality in itself, but is only a condition of the cognizer conditioned by that state. (In other words, it is a mode of manifestation of the cognizer, brought about by the condition of that state, and not an inherent power of it). As those living in heaven, such as Indra and others, have a thousand eyes (by the very conditions of their existence), so the transcending the limits of experience is the very condition of the cognizer in dream. It is no absolute property forming part of the absolute nature of the seer. The cognizer of dream sees, by the power of that state, objects of this description, consisting only of subjective ideas transcending the limits of experience. As here, in this world of experience, any well-instructed person going from one place to another by any known path, sees the variety of objects belonging to the place he goes to, so does the cognizer see in the present instance. Hence, as the rope, the serpent, the mirage, etc., being merely the conditions of the cognizer, are unreal, so the transcendent phenomena of dream, are only a result of the condition of the cognizer, and, therefore, unreal. Hence the illustration does not at all disagree.

9.—10. *Even in dream that which is subjective imagination is unreal, whereas that which is objectively existent is real; whereas in truth both are unreal. So in waking experience, though that which is subjective imagination is unreal, and that which is objectively existent is real, in fact, both ought to be unreal.*

S'ANKARA'S GLOSS.

Having solved the difficulty based on the nature of the objects of dream transcending experience, the text proceeds to again point out the likeness of waking experience to the phenomena of dream. Even in dream that which is simple mental imagination is unreal, inasmuch as it is not seen the moment next after its existence. In the same manner, objects imagined to be cognized by the external senses, such as jars etc., cognized by the eye etc., are supposed to be real. Thus, though the whole of the phenomena of dream are known to be unreal, the facts arrange themselves under reality and unreality. In the same manner, all objects, whether regarded as real or unreal, seen in waking experience, deserve to be unreal, notwithstanding their apparent opposition among themselves as real and unreal. The reason for this is the same as that for believing the unreality of the experience of dream, viz., the circumstance of being cognized by (the external or internal) senses.

11. *If in both conditions experience reduces itself to illusion, who is the cognizer of experience; who creates it?*

S'ANKARA'S GLOSS.

This is what the opponent asks. If experience in both the conditions, dream and waking, were an illusion pure and simple, who is the cognizer of the whole of subjectivity and objectivity? Who is it that creates them? In short, what is the substratum of knowledge and memory? If you say—none, the conclusion must force itself upon you that there is nothing like *Ātman*.

12. *The ātman, all light, imagines himself by himself, through the power of his Māyā; he alone cognizes the objects so sent forth. This is the last word of the Vedānta on the subject.*

S'ANKARA'S GLOSS.

The ātman, all light, that is, self-cognizing, calls forth by himself, the variety of experience to be hereafter described; it subsists also in himself, through the power of Māyā; just like the snake etc., seen in place of the rope. This is the conclusion of the Vedānta on this matter. There is no other substratum of knowledge and memory; nor are knowledge and memory admitted to be possible, as the *Nihilists* maintain, without a substratum.

13. *The Lord manipulates the variety of subjective experience, as well as that of objective experience, while cognizant of the subjective and the objective respectively.*

S'ANKARA'S GLOSS.

It is now shown in what manner ātman imagines out the whole of experience. The word "manipulates" is used to indicate a dividing of ātman within himself. Ātman manipulates himself as the variety of objective experiences, such as words etc., as also the *rāsanās* existing on the subjective plane. In other words, he forms *rāsanās* (by a process of divine ideation), while cognizant of the subjective. And while cognizant of the objective, he imagines them as the variety of objective experiences. The Lord means ātman.

(A'nandagiri adds an apt illustration. The potter forms an idea of the jar he wants to fashion and objectively realizes the idea by a process of externalization. Cosmic, or ātmic, ideation proceeds in the same manner up to the point of self-realization.)

14. *Those that subsist within only with the mind, and those that answer to two points in time without, are all mere illusion; for, the difference between them is not based on any other ground.*

S'ANKARA'S GLOSS.

That everything is mere imagination like dream is now questioned; for external objects cognized by one another are unlike mere imaginations of the mind, and are grasped by the mind. This is no sound objection. Such objects as cannot relate themselves to any point in time other than that wherein the mind exists, are those "that subsist within only with the mind", that is to say, such objects are those which only appear to exist on account of their being cognized. Those things that answer to two points in time, are such as are cognizable by others existing at some other point of time and cognizing the latter in their turn. Hence they are mutually cognizant of one another from different points in time. To illustrate: If we say 'he sits till the milking of the cow,' we mean that the cow is milked during his stay, and also that his stay is prolonged till the cow is milked. Other instances of the same kind are such expressions as 'this is so much:' 'he is so and so,' etc. Those objects that are in this manner mutually cognizant are said to answer to two points in time. Objects which subsist within, only so long as the conceiving mind is present, as well as external objects, which (by being independent of the mind) answer to two points in time, are all mere illusion. For, the answering to two points in time, the peculiarity of external objects, is not derived from any cause other than 'being imagined,' (which is the cause also of the phenomena of dream). It being so, the illustration of dream, applies here also in its full meaning (and points to the ill-siveness of objective experience).

15. *Those that are in a subtle condition within, as well as those that are manifest without, in a gross condition, are all mere imagination, the difference lying only in the means of cognition.*

S'ANKARA'S GLOSS.

Though objects produced merely by mental *rāsanā* are unmanifest and subtle within, and though objects without are manifest and gross, the difference between the two is caused

only by the instrument of cognizing, such as the eye etc., and not by anything substantial in the nature of the things themselves. For, the phenomena of dream are, for the time, as real as those of waking. Hence the difference being based only on a difference in the instruments of cognition, waking experience is as much an illusion as that of dream.

16. *The first result of ideation is Jīva, whence the various entities, objective and subjective; for its knowledge must correspond to its memory.*

S'ANKARA'S GLOSS.

What is the source of the imagination of objects, subjective and objective, related as cause and effect to one another? This is proposed for explanation. This is *Jīva*, whose very nature is bound up with the idea of cause and effect, as evidenced by such daily experience as "I do this," "this happiness, or that misery, is mine," and the like. *Ātman* is absolutely free from any such idea, but in it is seen, like the snake in place of the rope, the idea of *Jīva*. Through it are evolved, by constituting the ideas of action, actor and act, as the ground of division, the various things, *prāṇa* etc.,—subjective and objective. The cause of this ideation is thus explained. The self-evolved *Jīva* having power to give shape to any idea, has its memory guided by its inherent knowledge. That is to say, from a knowledge of the idea of cause follows knowledge of the idea of effect; then follows memory of the two; then again knowledge and the variety of knowledge in the form of actor, act, and actions. From knowledge rises memory and from memory, knowledge, and this endless series continues without end, giving rise to various subjective and objective things.

17. *As the rope whose nature is not known, is, in the dark, imagined variously to be a snake, a line of water, etc., so is ātman (imagined to be the variety of experience).*

S'ANKARA'S GLOSS.

It is laid down that experience begins with the idea of *Jīva*. Now it is proposed to clearly explain this position by an illustration.

tion. A rope not known as such, is mistaken, in hazy darkness, for a snake, a line of water, a stick, or any one of numerous similar things. The cause of all these is none other than absence of previous knowledge of the rope; for, if the rope were known beforehand, there would be no room, as in the case of things such as the fingers of the hand already well known, for the series of imaginings such as the snake etc. This case well illustrates the point in question. As *ātman* is not known in its native absoluteness as all purity, all thought, and one without a second, in contradistinction to the variety of experience consisting of causality and the ideas of good evil etc., it comes to be conceived as manifold in the form of *Jīva*, *Prāṇa*, etc. This is the clearest declaration of the *Upanishads*.

18. *As complete knowledge of the rope dispels all illusion, and the one changeless conviction arises that it is nothing else but the rope, so indeed is confirmed the right knowledge of ātman.*

S'ANKARA'S GLOSS.

On the conviction being gained that the thing appearing as so many things, is nothing but the rope, all illusion vanishes, and the knowledge so acquired subsists for all time. In the same manner is confirmed the right knowledge that all is one—*ātman*; in other words, *ātman* is realized in the full light of the lamp of knowledge lighted by the *S'āstras*, which proclaim the nature of *ātman* in such texts as "Not this, not that;" "All this is *ātman*;" "It transcends experience, being not other, not distant, not without, ever without and within, unborn, undecaying, nuding, immortal, secure, one, and unique."

19. *It is imagined as Prāṇa and the variety of numberless visible objects,—this is the power of illusion inseparable from the ever luminous, who is (as it were) shaded off by it.*

S'ANKARA'S GLOSS.

If *ātman* were one, how could it be imagined as *Prāṇa* and the variety of objects making up the world of experience? This is explained by saying that all this is merely the result

of the power of illusion inherent in the ever-luminous *ātman*. Just as the illusion spread forth by a juggler would show the sky blooming with flowery trees and plants, so does this power of illusion of the ever-luminous *ātman*. It covers from view even its very substratum, *ātman*. (The *Smṛti* declares) "my illusion is intransgressible."

20. Those acquainted with *Prāṇa* call it *Prāṇa*; those with the *Bhūtās*, *Bhūta*; those conversant with the *Guṇas* call it *Guṇa*; those with the *Tattvas*, *Tatva*.

S'ANKARA'S GLOSS.

Prāṇa, *Prājña*, *Bijātmā*, and the rest ending with *sthiti* (enumerated in verses 20—28), are some of the varieties of numberless objects produced by illusion. These and others of their kind, imagined by all descriptions of beings, are like the snake in place of the rope. The substance is that they are all produced by *avidyā*, on account of the absence of right knowledge in the ever free and distinctionless *ātman*. It is of no material use to define and discuss each of the things called *Prāṇa* etc.

21.—28. Those knowing the quarters, call it the quarters; those immersed in objects of sense, call it those objects; those having their eye upon the *Lokas*, call it the *Lokas*; those thinking of the *Devas*, see it as a *Deva*. Those knowing the *Veda*, describe it as the *Veda*; those understanding *Yajña*, call it *Yajña*; those realizing it as the enjoyer of everything, describe it as such; those seeing it as objects enjoyed, see it in the objects. The knowers of the subtle call it the subtle; the knowers of the gross call it the gross; those familiar with personality, call it the personal being; those having no faith in anything, describe it as pure void. The knowers of time call it time; the knowers of space call it space; those versed in disputation, call it the problem in dispute; those knowing the world, describe it as the world. Those who are cognizant of the mind, call it the mind; those resting themselves in the sense of supreme discrimination, call it discrimination (*buddhi*);

those who can reach only to *Chitta*, call it *Chitta*; those familiar with *Dharma* and *Adharma*, call it one or the other. Some conceive of it as twenty-five, others as twenty-six, while there are others who conceive of it as thirty-one, or even manifold. Those whose ken is bounded by Heaven call it Heaven; those who are bound to the *Āśramas*, call it the *Āśramas*; the grammarians regard it as male, female, or neither; others call it *Para*, *Apara*. Those convinced of creation, call it creation; those sure of destruction, call it destruction, whereas those positive about the present, call it pure subsistence. Thus all describe it as all and everything they like it to be at any time.

29. That idea which is pressed on one, is perceived by him as the sole essence. It protects him, taking on the form of that idea, and allows him to be convinced that this is the sole essence.

S'ANKARA'S GLOSS.

There is no use in this kind of description without end. Whoever is told by his teacher, or any trustworthy person, that any one of the many things, *prāṇa* etc., or the like, is the sole essence (*ātman*), perceives that very idea to be the real *ātman*. And indeed such conception of *ātman*, through the power of such faith and conviction, takes the form of that very conception and protects the devotee in accordance with his desires, and surrounds him with itself in every way. And the devotee also having full faith that this is the reality, believes that the absolute is of the form of that idea.

30. This (*ātman*) ever inseparable from these (things) is imagined as separate. He who understands the truth in its fulness is at liberty to imagine *ātman* as of any form he likes.

S'ANKARA'S GLOSS.

Ātman is ever inseparable from the variety of things described as *prāṇa* etc. Though it is so, it is imagined by the ignorant as something separate and apart from the thing seen, like the snake etc., from the rope. But to the illuminated,

prāṇa and others are none of them apart from *ātman*, like the ideas of snake etc., which are ever in and of the rope. For, the *Śruti* also lays down "All this is *ātman*." Thus he who knows the truth in its fulness; that is to say, in its full import as shown in the *Veda*, as also in its clear form as demonstrated by reason, *viz.*, everything is *ātman* and is as illusive without *ātman* as the ideas of snake etc., without the rope; is at liberty to construe the texts of the *Veda* after any idea that best pleases his fancy. For, none but one fully conversant with this spiritual truth is able to explain what a particular text refers to, or to know the *Veda* in its full import. "None who is not familiar with the spiritual is able to derive any fruit from his acts," says Maṇu.

31. *As are dream and illusion or a castle-in-the-air, so, say the wise, the Vedāntas declare this cosmos to be.*

ŚĀṆKARA'S GLOSS.

The futility of duality demonstrated by reason is now shown to be deduced from the *Vedāntas* as well. Dream and illusion are in themselves entirely unreal, still they are regarded as real by the ignorant. As a castle-in-the-air seen full of people—males and females, all moving about, among rows of well-furnished shops, houses or palaces, on various errands, is entirely obliterated from view, in a moment; and as dream and illusion are entirely unreal though actually perceived; so is the cosmos an illusion of unreality, though experienced as real. Where is this taught? The text replies, in the *Vedāntas*. "There is no variety here"; "Indra becomes many by his power of illusion"; "This was sole *ātman* in the beginning"; "This was *Brahman* alone, at first"; "All danger rises from duality"; "This duality does not exist"; "When all has become *ātman* who can see whom by what?" In these and a number of other texts of like import, the wise, that is, those who can see through things, declare the futility of all. So indeed says also the *Vyāsa Smṛti* "(Duality is seen by the wise) to be like a hole in the wall of thick darkness, or like the bubbles

that froth over fresh rain-water, ever being dissolved, ever away from bliss and ever reducing themselves to naught after dissolution."

32. *There is no dissolution, no creation, none in bondage, no pupilage, none desirous of liberation, none liberated; this is the absolute truth.*

ŚĀṆKARA'S GLOSS.

This verse is meant as a concluding summary of the preceding discourse. When duality is all illusion and *ātman* alone is the reality, it follows that all that forms the subject of experience, whether derived from ordinary intercourse or from sacred texts, is mere illusion. It being so there is no dissolution, that is to say, destruction, in the absolute sense of the word. Creation means production, evolution, birth; and the being in bondage is the condition of *jīva*. Pupilage is the condition of one trying to realize *moksha*. One desirous of liberation is he who feels the necessity of liberation, and the liberated is one who has already realized it. The absolute truth is that there being no dissolution and no creation, the being in bondage, etc., cannot at all be possible. It may be questioned—how can we say there is nothing like creation or dissolution? We say this because of the entire absence of duality, and this is borne out by such texts of the *Śruti* as "where there is duality there is danger"; "who sees anything like duality in this (passes from death to death)"; "all this is *ātman* alone"; "this is sole *Brahman*"; "all this is one without a second"; and the like. Creation and dissolution are possible only of that which exists, not of that which, like the horns of the hare, does not exist at any time. The *advaita* is neither produced nor destroyed. That it should be one without a second, and should, at the same time, have a beginning and end, is a simple contradiction in terms. It has already been described that experience which depends on the notion of duality is mere imagination of the form of *Prāṇa*, etc.

having *ātman* for its substratum, like the imaginary snake, etc., which have the rope for their substratum. The snake, etc., seen in place of the rope as a result of subjective imagination, are neither produced from, nor dissolved in, the rope, nor are they produced from, or dissolved in, the mind, nor even in both (the rope and the mind). Thus duality being like any of these things which are mere subjective imaginations (it can have no real beginning or end). Nor is duality at all present in the mind immersed in trance or sleep. Hence it is clear that duality is nothing but mere subjective imagination, and therefore it is well said—the absolute is the negation of dissolution, etc.

If it were so, the object of all teaching ought to tend towards inculcating the negation of duality and not towards establishing the position of the *advaita*, for there is apparent absurdity (in employing that which proves a negation, to establish a position). If this were admitted there would remain nothing to substantiate the positive existence of the *advaita*; and the whole argument must of necessity terminate in the establishment of pure Nihilism, for even duality has been demonstrated to be nothing. This objection does not stand. It is no use reverting to a point already raised and discussed before, that the imaginary snake, etc., cannot subsist without a substratum (the rope). The objector may advance that the illustration of the rope will not do, inasmuch as the rope, the substratum of the imaginations, ought, like the latter, to be no more than mere imagination. This we say is not right. For, on the disappearance of the imaginations, the unimagined residuum that persists, is for that very persistence, not an imagination, but the reality. It is not correct to say that that also is as much imagination as the snake, for, even before knowledge of the unreality of the snake, it is entirely real, being never like the imagined rope, the subject of imagination. Moreover the existence of the person imagining, must be antecedent to the imagination, and ought therefore to be admitted as absolutely real. This ought to be sufficient to show the incorrectness of the argument

which requires that the substratum also ought to be unreal. It is, however, asked how, when (as shown above) the real nature (of *ātman*) transcends all instruments of knowledge, could teaching be of use in putting down the idea of duality. This is no difficulty. For, the whole of duality is merely imagined in *ātman*, like the snake, etc., in the rope. How again is this to be made good? Obviously by observing that cognitions of the form "I am happy"; "I am miserable"; "I am ignorant"; "I am born, dead, old, with body, seen, unseen, the doer, the receiver, united, disunited, decayed, or any similar thing"; "this is mine," etc., are all merely imaginary in *ātman*. *Ātman* is the common substratum of all, for its presence everywhere and anywhere, like that of the rope in all such imaginings as snake, line of water, and the like, is no deviation from its (unconditioned) nature. The opponent again suggests that this being so, specific knowledge of *ātman* is self-evident; what more has teaching to accomplish? Teaching is always expected to accomplish something not accomplished, and is useless if it repeats what has already been accomplished. Our reply here is as follows: *Ātman* is not realized in its native condition because of the obstruction created by such imaginations as happiness, etc., illusively created by *avidyā*. And indeed we do not take any thing other than realization of the native condition (of *ātman*) as final beatitude. Now then teaching puts down duality by producing full consciousness of the not-happy nature of *ātman*, after the manner of the *S'rutis* "not this," "not that," leading thus to a clear idea of its native condition. Non-happiness is not a characteristic (of *ātman*) present in all ideas such as of being happy and the like, for if it were so there were no apparent specific difference produced by the illusive ideas of being happy etc.; in the same manner as in fire which is naturally hot, no specific difference is created by its being supposed to be cold. Therefore *ātman* is purely characterless, and ideas like being happy etc., are attributed to it by mere illusion. It is now clear that the teaching which lays down the being not-happy as an attribute of *ātman*,

means only to imply that It is free from all attributes and relations, whether of happiness, misery, or any other thing. In this connection here is an aphorism of those who know the *āgamas*, to the effect that "It is proved on account of its responding to negation."

33. *The absolute Advaita imagines itself to be the many; all objects are through It; hence the happiest thing is the condition of the absolute.*

S'ANKARA'S GLOSS.

The grounds of the proposition laid down in the previous text are now explained. As in the instance of the rope, through the imaginary forms snake etc., it is the rope, the real thing, that imagines itself to be the snake etc.; in the same manner, through forms such as *Prāṇa* and others without number, substantially unreal, (*ātman*, as it were, imagines itself to be those things). For, indeed, no perception is possible without mental action, and action of all kind is foreign to *ātman*; objects are cognized by a subject in action not by one in simple subsistence. Therefore through notions such as *prāṇa* etc., substantially unreal, the ever real and one *ātman*, the rope-like substratum of all imaginations, imagines itself as divided into many forms. And this notwithstanding its one and unique character. The meaning is this. No imagination can stand upon nothing, it must have a substratum to rest upon. Hence on account of *ātman* being the substratum of all imaginations, and on account of its being ever inseparable and one, the condition of the absolute (*ātman*) is the happiest thing imaginable. That which is unhappy or miserable are only the imaginations themselves, for they are the cause of fear etc., like the rope-snake. The condition of the absolute is free from fear and hence is the only happy thing possible.

34. *The existence of the variety (of experience) cannot be said to be identical with ātman, nor in any way standing indepen-*

dent by itself;—nothing is separate or incorporate, thus say the knowers of the essence of things.

S'ANKARA'S GLOSS.

Why is the condition of the absolute called the happiest? The sense of unhappiness is present only where experience exists in the form of individuality, as seen in the exclusive existence of things by themselves. For, in *ātman*—ever one and absolute existence, the whole of the phenomenal consisting of *prāṇa* etc., together with the whole of the variety of experience, when examined by the light of the absolute, does not exist; just as the rope when examined with the help of a light is not what it appeared to be, viz., the snake etc. Nor is the phenomenal existent by itself, for it is ever imaginary like the snake seen in place of the rope. Moreover things like *prāṇa* etc., are not mutually exclusive like horse and buffalo. Hence on account of being unreal, nothing exists either separate, by itself, or incorporate, one in the other. Thus say the knowers of the essence of things, i. e., the *Brāhmaṇas*. It is implied in this manner, that on account of not being the cause of the unhappy, the condition of the absolute is the happiest.

35. *By the sages free from attachment, fear, anger, and well-versed in the secrets of the Veda, this ever one, the negation of the phenomenal, is regarded as the pure unconditioned (essence).*

S'ANKARA'S GLOSS.

This right knowledge is now extolled. The sages, that is to say, those who ever devote themselves to contemplation, being free from all evils such as attachment, spite, fear, anger, etc., and therefore able to properly discriminate right from wrong; and who know all secrets of the *Veda*, being fully enlightened, declare from their knowledge and study of the *Vedāntas* that *ātman* is ever free from all imaginations

and is never in relation to any condition. *Ātman* is also the negation of the phenomenal; that is to say, the phenomenal consisting of the mutually exclusive units which make up duality, does not exist in it which, therefore, is ever one. The implication is that those alone who are free from all evil, and ever absorbed in meditation on the meaning and substance of the *Veda*, and are *sanyāsins*, can realize *ātman*; and not those whose mind is subject to the tempest of passions, or inclined like the *Tārikas* and others, towards upholding their own creeds and opinions.

36. *Therefore knowing It to be such, the mind should constantly be directed to the Advaita, having realized which (the enlightened) should walk the world like a block of (dead) matter.*

S'ANKARA'S GLOSS.

As the *advaita* is the only happy condition, being that in which no evil is possible, the enlightened one should realize it as such by unifying his memory solely with it. In other words, he should constantly use his memory to the end of impressing, up to final and full realization, the idea of the absolute (*ātman*) on the mind. Having known the *advaita*, having been confirmed in consciousness of the *advaita*, in the form of the cognition "I am *Brahman*," and having thus realized *ātman* as above enjoyment and acquisition, unborn, and transcendent, the wise man should walk the world like a block of dead matter; that is to say, without (relating himself to duality by) declaring in any manner what he is, or what he has become.

37. *The ascetic should place himself above praise, above the formality of salutation, above the rites consummated with the use of the word Svadhā, and should abandon himself entirely to circumstances, being above the mutable as well as the immutable.*

S'ANKARA'S GLOSS.

How should the ascetic walk the world? He should be above the pleasure of praise, or the anxiety of securing that good-will which accrues from careful observance of forms, social and religions, and all similar conventionalities.* In other words, he should free himself from all cares, and take up the life of a completely retired *paramahansa*; for, says the *s'ruti*, "knowing this *ātman* etc."; to which the *smṛti* adds "(the ascetic should have his) mind ever unified with it, ever one with it, ever in it, ever devoted to it, etc." The futile is the body, for it changes every moment. The firm is *ātman*. He has the futile for his abode when, on account of intercourse necessary for purposes of eating etc., he is obliged to temporarily forget himself, ever immovable like *ākāśa*, and relate himself to the sense of egoism. Thus he has the futile for his abode in this sense, and not in the sense of being related to external objects of sense. Being so he should leave himself entirely to circumstances, that is to say, he should leave his being provided with food etc., merely to circumstances.

38. *Having realized the nature of the essence within and without, one should become the essence, should ever rest in it, and should be firm in it.*

S'ANKARA'S GLOSS.

The essence within consists of the elements *prithvi* etc., and the essence without is the body etc.,—all then are entirely unreal, like the rope-snake or like dream or illusion. For, says the *s'ruti*, "concrete things are mere play of words, being empty names" etc.; "*ātman* is everywhere within as well as without, unborn, transcendent, undivided, having no within or

* The word *Svadhā* in the text refers to the ceremonies known as *Svādhas*. Every offering in that ceremony is accompanied by the utterance of that word. The sense is that the ascetic should renounce even these rites which are connected with the dead.

without, entire, whole, all-pervading like *ākāśa*, subtle, immovable, characterless, without parts, without action," etc; "It is the truth,—*ātman*"; "Thou art that." Having thus realized the true essence (i. e., having known all within and without to be *ātman*), one should become it, and should rest in it, and not, like those ignorant of *ātman*, in mere objects of sense. The object of saying that he should be firm in it is this. There are some who take the mind to be *ātman*, and believe it to be affected by its action. They delude themselves into the belief that action of the mind assimilates *ātman* with the body, and that concentration of the mind allows it to rebecome itself—thus feeling vainly despondent or joyful for the one idea or the other. Those who are real knowers of the essence should, however, not commit this mistake, for *ātman* is ever changeless, and therefore not open to any chance of being dislodged from its native condition. The wise should be so firm and resolute as to be convinced that they are always *Brahman*, ever in and of it. In other words, the consciousness of the self-realization of *ātman* should never cease even for a moment. Well says the *smṛti* "the wise should look with equal eye whether upon a dog or a *chandāla*) they should be equal to all."

CHAPTER III.

(GAUDAPĀDA'S—KĀRIKĀ)

OF THE ADVAITA.

1. *The Jiva betaking itself to devotion, believing all to be the result of evolution from Brahman, and therefore unchanging and unborn even before such evolution, is said to be of narrow intellect, inasmuch as it so believes.*

S'ANKARA'S GLOSS.

Ann. The word *Ann* is fully explained even by simply enunciating the proposition "*Ātman* is the negation of the pheno-

menal, blissful, and ever one without a second"; as also by the other proposition "It being known duality does not exist." Duality has been shown to be mere illusion in the preceding chapter, by illustrations of dream, illusion, castle-in-the-air, etc., and also by reasoning based on grounds such as "the capability of being seen," "the being finite," and the like. It is asked whether the *Advaita* is to be taken as proved only on the evidence of the *Śruti*, and whether no reason can possibly demonstrate it? This chapter, therefore, shows how the *Advaita* can be demonstrated by reason. The last chapter ends with the conclusion that all difference of whatever kind implied in acts of devotion, is mere illusion, and the only reality is *ātman*, the *advaita*. This is perfectly correct. *Jiva* is any individual, here referring to one trying to obtain liberation. This *Jiva* betakes itself to devotion as a means to the end, *viz.*, *moksha*, and believes the relation between itself and *Brahman* to be one of devotee and the object of devotion. It understands that by the help of this devotion, it, subsisting in the present only or being evolved from *Brahman*, shall, in future, that is—after death, become *Brahman*. For, as before evolution it, as well as all other things, was unborn, all, including itself, must become that which they were before evolution, by force of the said devotion. Such a *Jiva*, inasmuch as it regards *Brahman* as conditioned in this manner and therefore other than the absolute, is called of narrow intellect, that is to say, with intellect limited by ignorance, by those who are acquainted with the absolute reality. The *Upanishad* of the *Talavakāra śākhā* has it "that which is not shaped by speech, but that by which speech is shaped, is *Brahman*, and not what thou worshippest."

2. *Therefore, I begin to describe that which is infinite limitlessness of thought (sentient?), which is ever unborn, and which is equal everywhere; thus showing how, though appearing to give birth (to this variety of things) on all sides, it is not at all affected by any such thing.*

ŚĀNKAARA'S GLOSS.

As one unable to realize *ātman* as ever unborn and present within and without, and therefore believing it to be limited by *avidyā*, thinks "I am born"; "I subsist because *Brahman* has evolved me out of itself"; "I shall become *Brahman* by devotion to It"; and thus remains in stupid narrowness of mind; I begin to describe *Brahman* which in reality is infinite limitlessness, etc. Narrowness of mind accompanies knowledge of duality, for there where one sees another, hears another, narrowness or limitedness arises. This is born out by the *śruti* declaring all to the mere name etc. *Brahman* called *bhāma*, the unconditioned infinite, is that which is opposed to this. That is the infinite limitlessness of thought, realization whereof destroys all narrowness of mind born of *avidyā*. The source of the unconditioned infinite is not known and it is therefore called the ever unborn. It is also equal everywhere, for there is in it nothing like inequality or unevenness caused by any variety in the form of parts etc.; for, that which has parts is said to be uneven in itself. But this (*Brahman*) is without parts, and is therefore equal everywhere, being not marked by any part being brought into prominence. It is now proposed to show how this *Brahman* is not at all affected by any change, though ever appearing in different shapes like the rope in forms such as the snake etc.

3. *Ātman* is likened to *ākāśa*: being the totality of all *Jivas* put together like so many *ghatākāśas*, and being inclusive of the *ghatas* as well. This is the fittest illustration of evolution (from *Brahman*, if any).

ŚĀNKAARA'S GLOSS.

Brahman is ever unborn and is the infinite limitlessness of thought. This position is now substantiated by reasons and illustrations. As *ātman* is the highest and the infinite, it is likened to *ākāśa*, for it is like it without parts and all-pervading. It is also like each *ghatākāśa* (the portion of *ākāśa* intercepted in a jar), each *Jiva* being the *ghatākāśa* (and the

totality of all being *ātman*, the *mahākāśa*). Each *ghatākāśa* when lost in the *mahākāśa*, is all *ākāśa*. The same applies to *Jiva* and *ātman*. Or the first half may at once be construed in this manner. As *ākāśa* is the totality of all *ghatākāśas*, that is to say, is, as it were, made up of them, so is the absolute made up of the variety of *Jivas*. The substance is that the production or evolution of *Jiva* from *ātman*, heard of in the *Vedāntas*, is only after the manner of *ghatākāśa* produced from *mahākāśa*. As from the same *ākāśa* are produced all the *ghatas* as well (*ākāśa* being that space which gives form to the jar—*ghata*), so from the absolute, the *ākāśa* of the illustration, are produced, after the same manner, all the elements such as *prthvi* and others, gross or subtle, in fact all that is subject to causality, being all mere imagination like the rope-snake, and answering to the *ghata* of the illustration. Hence the text says "being inclusive of the *ghatas* as well." When the *śruti*, with a view to enlighten the ignorant, speaks of the production of *Jiva* from *ātman*, the production should be understood only after the manner of the production of *ghatas* and *ghatākāśas* from *ākāśa*, i. e., *mahākāśa*.

4. As on the dissolution of *ghata*, the *ghatākāśa* is merged in *ākāśa*, so *Jiva* is merged in *ātman* in the same manner.

ŚĀNKAARA'S GLOSS.

As the production of *ghatākāśa* is consequent on that of the *ghata*, and as on the dissolution of the latter, the disappearance of the former ensues, so, in the same manner, are the *Jivas* produced on the formation of the body and similar limiting conditions, and dissolved in *ātman* on their disappearance. In other words, the production or dissolution of *Jiva* is not real in itself, but is merely imaginary in the manner described.

5. As on any one portion of *ākāśa* intercepted in a jar, being soiled, so to speak, with dust, smoke, etc., all such intercepted portions are not soiled or affected, so the misery or happiness of one *Jiva* is not the misery or happiness of all.

S'ANKARA'S GLOSS.

This verse is an answer to the argument of the dualists to the effect that *âtman* being one in all, it must follow that the birth, death, or misery of one, ought to be the birth, death or misery of all; and further that this being the case, there cannot be any just or possible adjustment of cause and effect. The answer is as follows. As on one *ghatâkâsa* being soiled with dust etc., all *ghatâkâsas* are not soiled, so all *Jivas* are not affected by the happiness or misery of one. The objector asks—do you admit the unity of *âtman* or not? We reply—yes, and add whether the objector has not heard what we said ere long on this point, likening *âtman* to *âkâsa*, and thus showing its unity. Then, retorts the objector, *âtman* being one, nothing could prevent the said unity of experience. This difficulty raised by the *Sāṅkhyas* does not hold. The *Sāṅkhyas* do not postulate *âtman* as capable of being affected by happiness, misery, etc., but declare that these (happiness etc.,) belong inseparably to *buddhi* (the mind). And besides this, there is no authority or argument for regarding *âtman*, the transcendent essence of consciousness, as apart (from experience). You need not say that in the latter case (not regarding *âtman* as apart from experience), the “being for another” of the action of *pradhâna*, will not be borne out; for whatever the *pradhâna* may be supposed to accomplish by itself “for another,” has no inseparable relation with *âtman*. If bondage or liberation accomplished by the *pradhâna* were possibly related in an inseparable manner, to *purusha*, ever apart, then indeed will the “being for another” of the action of *pradhâna*, not be compatible with the unity of *âtman*, and the multiplicity of *âtman* (*purusha* in *Sāṅkhya* phraseology) will deserve to be upheld. But the *Sāṅkhyas* do not regard bondage or liberation as being in inseparable relation with *âtman* (*purusha*), for *purushas* are regarded as centres of simple consciousness, ever free from all variety. Hence “being for another” of the action of *pradhâna* is rendered perfectly possible by the mere being of *purusha*, and the assumption of the multiplicity of *purushas* is simply redundant. In other words, the “being for another” of the action of *pradhâna* cannot be strained to serve as a demonstration

of the multiplicity of *purushas*. And the *Sāṅkhyas* have nothing further to put forth in support of this theory of multiplicity. The *pradhâna* takes on itself bondage and liberation only through the nominal instrumentality of the mere being of another (the *purusha*). This *another* is the cause of the action of *pradhâna* only by the very fact of his being, and not on account of being with any additional attributes (as in the theory of those—Patanjali and others—who posit an *Īvara* over the *purusha* of the *Sāṅkhyas*). Hence the assumption of the multiplicity of *purushas* betrays sheer ignorance, and is wide of the sense and import of holy writ. Even that which the *Vaiśeṣikas* and others put forth, viz., that desire (and eight other attributes) are in inseparable relation with *âtman*, is not correct. For, impressions* producing memory cannot, in the first place, be in inseparable relation with *âtman* which has no parts and no magnitude. Moreover, memory being only a result of the contact of mind with *âtman*, the rule of memory (that memory cannot accompany perception) will not hold, as memory will be continuous and simultaneous. Even the said contact of *âtman* with mind is hypothetical, for *âtman* belongs to a class other than that of mind, and is entirely void of touch. And the *Vaiśeṣikas* do not allow that *guṇa*† (property or attribute), *karma* (action), *sāmānya* (generic mark) and *viśeṣa* (differentia) can exist independent of *dravya* (substance or substratum)—*âtman* in the present instance. For if they can be independent of substance, desire, etc., must also be so in the case of *âtman*, and both in the one case as in the other their connection with substance ought to be wholly impossible. If again you say, that in the case of substances and attributes which are inseparably one, such inseparable relation (*samavāya*) is perfectly possible, we say it is not, for it is impossible to prove inseparable relation of

* Impression being one of the nine attributes of *âtman* in the *Vaiśeṣika* theory.

† The contact (*Samyoga*) whose possibility is just denied, is a *guṇa* according to this theory and hence the argument to corroborate the denial.

desire etc., inasmuch as the substratum—*ātman*, ever permanent, is antecedent to them, they being quite impermanent. If, however, this inseparableness of desire etc., and *ātman*, were granted, the former ought to be as permanent as dimension etc., which accompany the latter—a *reductio ad absurdum*. Moreover, there will be no room for liberation as such. If inseparable relation were something in itself other than its substratum,—the substance,—the relation between it and the substance must be something beyond itself, as in the case of attribute and substance. If you say that inseparable relation is a constant inseparable relation, and nothing external, everything related by this relation ought to be inseparably constant. Or if substance and attributes be still separate, the possessive used to indicate the possession by the former of the latter, would be meaningless. *Ātman* too must of necessity become impermanent, being with attributes inconstant in themselves, as proved by their coming and going. Moreover the being with parts, and the being subject to change, as in the case of the body, will be another set of arguments against the constant character of *ātman*.

As *ākāśa* is regarded, on account of the illusion of *avidyā*, to be soiled with dust, smoke, and the like, in the same manner, when *ātman* is regarded as happy or miserable on account of the accident of the mind born of the illusion of *avidyā*, bondage, liberation, etc., are rendered relatively possible for it. For, disputants at variance as to the nature of the absolute are all perfectly agreed as to the illusive and *avidyā*-born character of the realm of relativity and experience.

Hence it follows that the theory of the multiplicity of *ātman*s (to justify which the objection at the beginning has been raised) set up by the *tārīkas*, is superfluous and useless.

6. *Form, capacity, name, differ here, there, and everywhere; but that is not sufficient to imply any difference in ākāśa;—and the illustration may fully apply to Jīva.*

S'ANKARA'S GLOSS.

How is it possible that experience which proceeds with the multiplicity of *ātman*s as its very bases, should be justified by mere *avidyā*, on the theory of the unity of *ātman*? This is thus explained. In the case of *ākāśa* we see quite a number of the variety of its forms, large, small, mediocre, as seen in the form of a jar, a piece of hail, or a blanket; as also a corresponding variety of capacities such as fetching water, preserving water, serving as a cover, etc.; and lastly a variety of corresponding names such as jar, piece of hail, blanket, etc. This we see here, there, and everywhere, in fact throughout the world of relativity and experience. This experience is created only by the said variety of form, etc., and has no connection with the real thing; for, in reality, *ākāśa* is never with variety, being ever one and changeless. As this experience therefore implies no variety in the *ākāśa* itself, but only in certain external accidents, so in the case of *Jīva*, answering to the *ghatākāśa* of the illustration, variety in *ātman* produces them, the variety itself being a result of the accident of body born of *avidyā*. This is the conclusion at which the wise have arrived.

7. *As ākāśa portioned off by a jar, is neither a part nor an evolved effect of ākāśa, so is Jīva never a part or an evolved effect of ātman.*

S'ANKARA'S GLOSS.

It may be argued that the variety of forms such as *ghatākāśa* etc., is in itself, real. This cannot be. For, *ghatākāśa* is not something formed out of *ākāśa* like ear-rings from gold, or bubbles, foam, etc., from water; nor is it, like the branches of a tree, a distinct part of it. Similarly *Jīva*, the *ghatākāśa* of the illustration, is neither a part nor an evolved form of *ātman*, the *mahākāśa* of the illustration. Hence experience based on the multiplicity of *ātman* is entirely baseless.

8. *As ākāśa becomes soiled in the eye of the inexperienced, so does ātman become soiled in the eye of the ignorant.*

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the ultimate fact of being), just as is the object in describing ākāśa as being under ground as well as in the stomach.

S'ANKARA'S GLOSS.

Moreover, in the words "that which is super-physical (*adhidaiva*) as well as corporeal (*adhyātma*); that which is *tejomaya* and *amṛtamaya puruṣa*; that which is the knower within all such as *pṛthvi* etc., is the highest *ātman*;—all is *Brahman*," though the pairs (*adhidaiva* and *adhyātma*, *tejomaya* and *amṛtamaya*, etc.) are put forth, the object is only to describe the absolute, *Brahman*, up to the limit where duality or relativity disappears. It is also indicated when this is to be found; for it is said that it is found there where the nectar of *Brahma-vidyā* is tasted. This nectar is the highest bliss, is in fact the *madhu* (honey or nectar) *jñāna*, set forth in the *Madhubrāhmaṇa*. It is there that this is so described. The meaning is further developed by a reference to the illustration of *ākāśa*, which is one in all pairs such as the earth and stomach, and the like.

13. *The oneness of Jiva and ātman in unity is praised, whereas variety or separateness is censured, which shows that this is the truth.*

S'ANKARA'S GLOSS.

That the *Sāstras* as well as sages like *Vyāsa* and others should extol the unity of *Jiva* and *ātman*, demonstrated by reason, and borne out by scripture; and that the idea of separateness or variety supposed to be natural as within the general experience of all, and advanced therefore by those perverse theorizers who have no insight into the real meaning of the *Sāstras*, should be censured by the knowers of *Brahman*, in such texts as "It has no second"; "He experiences danger who finds even the smallest difference"; "All this is *ātman*"; "He goes from death to death who here perceives anything like distinction," and many more of the same import;—that all this should be so, shows that this is the truth,

easy of comprehension, and in accord with reason. The false theories put forth by the *tārikas* are not of easy comprehension, that is to say, are not such as can be accepted, on examination, to be in accord with reason.

14. *The assumed separateness of Jiva and ātman before evolution, is only metaphorical, with a view to (describe what is to) be, and does not at all deserve to be real.*

S'ANKARA'S GLOSS.

The phrase "before evolution" must be understood to mean 'in that part of the *Upanishad* which speaks of evolution, i.e., in the *karmakānda*.' The separateness of *Jiva* and *ātman* is described in the said part (*karmakānda*), in various ways varying with the object of desire, in such texts as "Desirous of this"; "Desirous of that"; "He, the highest, supported heaven and earth", etc. This being so, the question is asked how, when the words of the *jñānakānda* conflict with those of the *karmakānda*, the former alone are taken to be in accord with truth and reason? The reply is as follows. The separateness described in the *karmakānda*, anterior to such texts of the *Upanishad* as "That wherefrom all beings emanate"; "As small sparks from fire"; "From this *ātman* came forth *ākāśa*"; "It saw"; "It created light"; which all speak of evolution, is not real. If not, what is it? It is only metaphorical, and the separateness implied is like that between *mahākāśa* and *ghatākāśa*, or like the present tense used in the phrase "he cooks rice", said in regard to somebody cooking rice in future. Moreover texts in support of separateness cannot be shown to uphold real separateness as such, for, texts speaking of the real separateness of *ātman* are empty statements in accord with the general run of the experience of those who being imbued with *avidyā* labour under a sense of separateness. Whereas in texts speaking of evolution, destruction etc., it is the unity, oneness, of *Jiva* and *ātman* that is clearly sought to be established, as in the texts "Thou art that"; "He does not know who knows"; "He is another"; "I am another", etc. Hence having in view the

the (*varṇas*) and observe prescribed scriptural usages and rites. The use of the word *āśrama* at once implies that the first three classes (*varṇas*) are meant, and those are possessed of lower, higher, and middle powers of vision, that is to say, endowed respectively with low, ordinary, or high powers of intellect. Devotion and *karma* are enjoined by the *Veda* out of pure sympathy, to indicate the road that leads by degrees to realization of the absolute. But this only for those who are possessed of ordinary and low powers of intellect; and not for those whose powers of vision are high, and who therefore know *ātman* already as one without a second, as described in the *Sruti* "that which is not thought of by the mind but that whereby mind is able to think at all, is *Brahman*, and not that which is worshipped," "thou art that"; "all this is *ātman*," etc.

17. *The advocates of duality, obstinate each in their own conviction, conflict with one another, whereas this conflicts with none, not even with them.*

S'ANKARA'S GLOSS.

The *advaita* is the truth demonstrated by reason and sanctioned by scripture, and all else foreign to it is false and imaginary. But the philosophy of duality is false for this additional reason, that it is eaten up at core, by conflicts within its own fold. How is this? It is as plain as anything. The followers of Kapila (*Sāṅkhya*), Kaṇāda (*Vaiśeṣika*), Buddha (*Buddhist schools*), Jina (*Jainas*), all dualists, are obstinately firm each in their individual convictions, that is to say, are so depraved and perverse as to hold that truth in its entirety must be of this form and this alone. It being so they naturally hate whomsoever they regard as their opponent. Being thus affected with sympathy and aversion, they conflict with one another for the sake of their individual conviction. With these thus conflicting among themselves, our view of the unity of *ātman*, teaching the non-separableness of all, is not at all in

conflict, like one not in conflict with one's own hands and feet. Hence not being open to sympathy or aversion, the idea of the unity of all is the truth.

18. *The reality is the advaita, duality is only its part. The dualists regard duality as real either way, whence this position of ours is not antithetical.*

S'ANKARA'S GLOSS.

It is now explained how the *advaita* is not antithetical to the *Dvaita*, the philosophy of duality. The *advaita* is the reality, and duality, that is to say, variety, is only a part of it; in other words, only a result, an effect of it, borne out by the texts "all is one without a second"; "It evolved light," etc. Reason also adds its evidence to this, for in the absence of the activity of the mind, in *śamādhi* or trance as also in swoon and sleep, duality is not at all present. Hence duality is only a result of unity. The dualists hold that either way, that is to say, in reality as well as by way of illusion, duality is the truth. As this conviction, in their case, is a result of sheer ignorance, the *advaita* known to us, the enlightened ones, and enunciated in such texts as "*Indra* becomes manifold through illusion"; "there is no second," etc., is not in conflict with their idea. This is like one who seated upon a mad elephant, does not, out of his sense of general non-opposition, urge the beast upon a mad man who, though on the ground, maintains that he too is seated on a similar elephant, and that the man seated on the elephant should drive his beast at him. Therefore knowledge of the *advaita Brahman* is the very self, the very light, of the dualists; and for this very reason this our theory is not at all antithetical to theirs.

19. *This the ever unborn appears as if with distinction only on account of māyā, and for no other reason, for, if distinction were real the immortal would become mortal.*

1

2

S'ANKARA'S GLOSS.

It is objected that in the case of those who maintain that the absolute never admits of any change, it will be difficult to reconcile texts which speak of evolution. We reply there are indeed such texts, but their meaning is not what it appears to be, for it has already been explained that all such texts serve only as helps to the mind in the act of grasping the absolute. Though thus disposed of, the question is re-opened with a view to allay all doubt in regard to the favourableness or otherwise of these texts, to the main point at issue. Whether we take the evolution of things as real or as mere illusion spread forth by an illusionist, the fate of texts speaking of evolution, remains unaffected. It may be urged in this connection, that when choice has to be made between the metaphorical and the actual sense of words, the latter ought to prevail. We say—no. For, evolution in any sense (other than illusion) is not known to us, and is superfluous even if demonstrated. All evolution whether supposed to be actual or metaphorical refers only to illusive evolution through the power of *avidyā*, and not to anything real. The *S'ruti* also chimes in “within and without all is the unborn.” Hence that which the *S'ruti* declares one without a second, unborn, immortal, and reason demonstrates to be the same, is what has already been enunciated in the preceding pages. This is the sense of the *S'rutis* in question, and none other.

24. By the text “There is no variety here,” as also “*Indra*, by *mâyā*, etc.,” (it is plainly implied that) the eter unborn becomes many only through *mâyā*.

S'ANKARA'S GLOSS.

How can it be said that this alone is the import of the said texts? It is replied that if evolution were absolutely real, the variety of experience must necessarily be real, and there ought to appear no texts speaking to the contrary about experience. But in fact we have quite a host of texts speaking of the unreality of experience, to wit, “there is absolutely no variety

here” etc., Therefore the evolution spoken of in these texts, only as means for a clear understanding of *ātman*, is simply imaginary. And this is further borne out by the use of the word *mâyā* to indicate the act of evolution in the text “*Indra* becomes manifold through *mâyā*.” It may be argued the word *mâyā* means the mind, and we say yes to this. But as knowledge produced in the mind through the senses is all *avidyā*, it is not wrong to say that *mâyā* means illusion. For, the said text would, with the special meaning assigned to the word *mâyā*, mean that *Indra* becomes many through knowledge produced by the senses, that is, in other words, through *avidyā*; for the *S'ruti* also has it that “The unborn is born manifold” implying that the birth is only through illusion. The word “only” in the original text emphasizes the fact of this birth being pure illusion; for, the being and not being born as many, are two statements contrary to each other and are like the simultaneous predication of heat and cold in the case of fire. The realization of the unity of *ātman* has a very important object in view as described in the text “when could there be even the least idea of delusion or misery to him who realizes Unity?” or, as implied in the text censuring the sense of duality: “he passes from death to death” etc. This, therefore, is the one determined sense of the *S'ruti* in question.

25. Moreover, by the negation of *sambhūti*, the whole of the effects are negated, and by the words ‘who can cause it to pass into birth’ is denied the whole of causality.

S'ANKARA'S GLOSS.

“Those who worship *sambhūti* (*Hiranya-garbha*) enter the region of thick darkness.” This text excluding *sambhūti* from worship, excludes the whole of the effects (inasmuch as it is the highest of them). If this (*sambhūti*) were absolutely real its exclusion in this manner would never be possible. (Therefore it as well as all effects are unreal). It may be urged here that the negation of worship in the case of *sambhūti* is meant only to point to the co-ordination of *sambhūti* with the



karma called *vināśa*, in the same manner as the negation of worship in the case of *avidyā*, in the text "those who worship *avidyā* enter the region of darkness" (is meant to point to the co-ordination of *vidyā* and *avidyā* i.e., *karma*.) Yes, it is indeed true that the exclusion of *sambhūti* is really meant to assert the co-ordination of devotion to God (*Hiranya-garbha*) implied in *sambhūti*, and the *karma* called *vināśa*. Still it should not be forgotten that as the *karma* called *vināśa* has as its result, freedom from death in the form of the result consequent on inborn ignorance, so the co-ordination of devotion to God (with the said *karma* called *vināśa*) meant for reforming the performer, and of the form of action produced by desire for some result, must have as its result freedom from death in the form of the dual impulse of end and means. Thus then it follows that as one freed from the impurity known as death of the form of the dual impulse of end and means, becomes entirely pure, *avidyā* of the form of the co-ordination of devotion and *karma* has freedom from death as its end. (As here, so in the text instanced to corroborate the fact of such co-ordination) co-ordination of (two opposites like) *avidyā* (*karma*) and *vidyā* is reconciled by the fact that, as one free from the death of *avidyā* consisting of impulses, and therefore free from all attachment, obtains immediate realization of the unity of the absolute, on application to the Upanishads; the said co-ordination of *avidyā* and *vidyā* in the same person is easy of explanation by their succession in time. This being (the import of the difficulty suggested by the exclusion being made to mean co-ordination), it follows that the sense being other than that suggested by the words, the censure implied in the exclusion of *sambhūti* from worship, is, having regard to the immortality obtainable by *Brahmajñāna*, sufficiently well deserved. Even though devotion (to *sambhūti*) is of use, by being the means of destroying impurity, (still) not being the way to the immortality (of *Brahmajñāna*, it deserves to be regarded as inferior and unreal. Hence *sambhūti* being thus negated, its reality is only relative; for, having regard to the absolute unity of

ātman, the tendency of effects towards any other kind of immortality (is of no use), and is therefore declared unreal. In the same manner, *Jīva*, the creation of illusion, the result of *avidyā*, reverts to its native form, on the disappearance of *avidyā*. It being so, it is impossible to say whence it is born. No one can reproduce the snake seen in place of a rope by force of *avidyā*, after it is entirely destroyed by proper discrimination. In the same manner no one can produce the *Jīva*. In the interrogative form of the phrase "who can cause it to pass into birth?", is implied the emphatic negation of causality. That is to say, there is nothing which can act as a cause to produce something which being mere illusion (*avidyā*), is subsequently destroyed. The *S'ruti* also has it "this is from nowhere and has not been born of any."

26. "It is not this, not that." As this explanation negatives every thing of it, employing pure incomprehensibility as reason, (it follows that) the ever unborn ever subsists self-luminous.

S'ANKARA'S GLOSS.

The *S'ruti*, believing that *ātman*, though demonstrated by the negation of all distinction or character in the words "hence this is the conclusion;" "It is not this, not that," is difficult to understand; and being therefore anxious to describe it by all possible means at its command, proceeds to negative all positive predicates of *ātman*. In other words, the *S'ruti* denying of *ātman* all that is comprehensible, in fact, all that can be the subject of the idea of being born; and thus showing the invisibleness of *ātman* in the words "it is not this, not that," desires to negative everything positive that can be attributed to it, by employing incomprehensibility as a reason, in this sense that one not knowing the entire subordination of all means whatever to the end to be achieved, should not take the means themselves to be as real as the end (*ātman*). Hence one knowing the means to be inseparable from the end

and the end to be ever one and changeless, the ever unborn *ātman* which within, without, and everywhere is revealed of itself, in all its native light.

27. *That which is, may appear to pass into birth, only through illusion, and not of itself; he who maintains the reality of this birth, must maintain also that the born is born again (and so on without end).*

S'ANKARA'S GLOSS.

It is determined by numerous texts that *ātman* which is everywhere, ever unborn, is the only one without a second, and nothing beside it possibly exist. The same conclusion is now demonstrated by reason. It may be urged if *ātman* is ever incomprehensible, it may be something unreal. This cannot be, for, we see its effects as plain as anything. As we infer the existence of the illusionist from effects such as the production of different forms etc., brought about by the existent worker of the illusion, so visible effects such as the birth of worlds, etc., must lead us to infer the existence of the absolutely real *ātman*, the substratum of the whole of illusion as spread out in the variety of forms etc. For, the birth of worlds, like that of the elephants etc. of the illusionist, is possible through the power of illusion only, dependent on a cause really existent and not non-existent. It is, however, not possible to say that anything is actually born of *ātman*. The words "of itself" in the text may be taken with the words "through illusion" and the first half of the verse may be made to mean 'the existent may be supposed to give birth to things, like the rope to the snake etc., only through illusion and not of itself, that is, not in reality.' In other words, though the ever-existent is incomprehensible it appears to give birth to many things or to take many forms, only through illusion, like the rope appearing as a snake etc. That philosopher who, however, holds that *ātman*, the absolute existence, ever unborn, converts itself into the variety of the cosmos, cannot say so on account of the contradiction implied in the

very words unborn and born. If he continues to maintain that *ātman* does convert itself into the world of experience, he must admit that what is once born will be born again and so on *ad infinitum* (precluding all possibility of absolution). Thus it is plain that *ātman* is ever unborn and one.

28. *The non-esse never passes into birth either in reality or in illusion, for the son of a barren woman is born neither in reality nor in illusion.*

S'ANKARA'S GLOSS.

There are some who postulate *non-esse* as the source of everything. It is, however, impossible for them to show that anything can come out of nothing, either in reality or illusion. For there is nothing in experience to corroborate the idea. The son of a barren woman is an empty concept, never realizable either in reality or in illusion. Hence this theory is entirely untenable and false.

29. *As in dream the mind acts as if dual in character, through the power of māyā, so in the waking condition also it acts in the same manner through the same cause.*

S'ANKARA'S GLOSS.

How do we say that the becoming of being is only through illusion? As the snake is pure being when seen as the rope, the mind is all being when seen as *ātman* by the help of true knowledge. The mind though single appears dual in dream, in the form of cognizer and cognized, through the power of illusion, like the rope appearing as a snake. In the waking condition also, the mind appears dual in the same manner, through the same cause.

30. *The mind though one appears as dual in dream, so also in the waking condition it, though single, appears dual through illusion.*

S'ANKARA'S GLOSS.

The mind though in reality one with *âtman*, like the snake is one with the rope, appears as if it were itself dual, in dream. For, in dream there exists not the cognized of the form of elephants etc., nor the cognizer of the form of the eye etc., independent of the perceiving agent (the mind). As in dream so in waking, there being nothing independent of the perceiver.

31. *The whole of duality, of whatever form, is simply a phenomenon of the mind, for it is never experienced when the mind is naught.*

S'ANKARA'S GLOSS.

It may be asked what is the ground for saying that duality is all a phenomenon of the mind, even like the imagination of a snake in place of the rope. This is here shown on the strength of an inference. Phenomenon of the mind means result of the imaginings of the mind; and the conclusion to be established is this, that 'All duality is of the mind' in this sense. The reason for such conclusion is that it (duality) stands or falls with it (mind). When the mind is naught, when it is no mind, all its imaginings being withdrawn into itself like the snake in the rope, by the constant exercise of proper discrimination and non-attachment, or even in sleep, duality is not experienced. Hence on account of the absence of duality in experience, it follows that it does not exist.

32. *When it ceases from imagining, by a knowledge of the truth of Âtman, it becomes naught, and remains at rest for want of things to cognize.*

S'ANKARA'S GLOSS.

It is here explained how the mind could be reduced to naught. The truth of *âtman* means the truth that *âtman* alone is real, like earth in the text "all evolution is mere play of words, earth alone (in the case of pots etc., which are

forms of it) is the truth." Knowledge of the truth of *âtman* means *realization* of the truth as here explained by the *S'ruti* and its interpretation. This truth being realized there remains nothing to cognize, and the mind having nothing to act upon, remains at rest, like fire for want of fuel. This is followed by that condition wherein the mind is naught.

33. *Thought is declared ever free from all imaginings, unborn, inseparable from the knowable, and Brahman is the sole object of this thought,—the unborn knows the unborn.*

S'ANKARA'S GLOSS.

If duality is a chimera, who is it that grasps *âtman*? This is now explained. It (*âtman*) is described by those who know it as free from all imaginings, that is to say, as not imagining anything, and therefore without distraction. It is unborn for the same reason. It is all thought (sentiency) and is *inseparable* from the knowable *i. e.*, *Brahman*, the absolute. For, says the *S'ruti*, "the power of knowledge, of that which knows, never fails like the heat of fire"; "*Brahman* is all thought and bliss"; "*Brahman* is the absolute truth, eternal thought, the ever endless." That which is an object of knowledge to *Brahman* is itself and nothing else, it being inseparable from everything that can be the subject of knowledge, like heat from fire. Hence the unborn *âtman* (*Brahman*), like the ever-overflowing (self-illuminating) sun, is self-cognitive. That is to say, in either instance no extraneous light is required, they themselves being all the immutable and constant essence of light and thought respectively.

34. *The condition of the mind in trance, and therefore free from imaginings, and all light, should be carefully distinguished from sleep, for, it is not like it.*

S'ANKARA'S GLOSS.

It was said before that the mind, free from imagination, on account of the knowledge of the truth of *âtman*, becomes, for want of things to cognize, entirely tranquil, like fire not fed by fuel; and thus falls into the condition of trance (*samâdhi*).

It is also said that the mind being thus at rest, duality vanishes. The condition of the mind when it has realized this knowledge, that is to say, when it is free from imaginings, and is all light, being in a trance, should be understood with some care by the practitioner of *yoga*. It may be said that there is nothing to take note of in this ; inasmuch as absence of distinctive knowledge being the common character of both, the condition of the mind cannot be other than that of deep sleep. This is not at all true. For, the condition of the mind immersed, during sleep, in the torpidity of *avidyā*, and still full of the potential impressions of the cause of experience, is quite distinct from that absolutely independent and perfectly tranquil condition of trance, all light. The seeds of *avidyā* in the form of the potential tendency to act, lying imbedded in the mind, are all burnt to ashes when it is immersed in this condition. The fire that so burns is the fire of the knowledge of *ātman*. Hence the two conditions cannot be similar, and the distinction should be carefully noted.

35. *In sleep the mind is simply overpowered, not so in trance, for then it has become fearless Brahman, all effulgence.*

S'ANKARA'S GLOSS.

The cause of the said distinction is thus described. The mind is simply overpowered in sleep, that is to say, it, with all the impressions and seeds of *avidyā*, is reduced to that seed-like condition of potentiality, which is all darkness and admits of no perception. When, however, the mind is entranced, nothing of this kind happens, that is to say, it is not immersed in darkness, because the condition of trance is one all thought and light. Hence the distinction between trance and sleep is well-defined, and well-marked. When thus free from the evil of duality of the form of *avidyā* present in the distinction of cognizer and cognized, the mind itself is absolute *Brahman*, and is therefore beyond all fear ; for duality, the cause of fear, is nowhere. "Brahman is tranquility and fearlessness" ; "he who knows it is beyond" ; says the *Sruti*.

The same is amplified by saying that it is all effulgence. Effulgence is here employed as a symbol of thought (*jñāna—gnāsis*.) Thought is the very nature of *ātman*, and *Brahman* too is that whose nature is the light of thought ; in other words, whose nature is all thought, immutable, and one. The word "all" in the text further implies that this 'thought' is all pervading like *ākāśa*.

36. *It is unborn, free from sleep and dream, without name and form, ever-effulgent, all thought ; no form is necessary (for it).*

S'ANKARA'S GLOSS.

In consequence of the absence of all cause of birth, it is, within and without, ever unborn ; for birth is a result of *avidyā* like the snake of (the illusion prevailing in regard to) the rope ; and this *avidyā* is destroyed by knowledge of the truth of *ātman*. It is without sleep because it is unborn, for being the ever-waking *adwaita* it is free from sleep, and for the same reason, from dream as well. Name and form seen in it are creations of mere ignorance, and they are destroyed, like the rope-snake, on the rise of knowledge. It is without name and form, for, it is not possible to describe it (*Brahman*) by name, or define it as of any form whatever. The *Sruti* also says "From it speech turns back baffled." Moreover, it is ever-effulgent, that is to say, always of the form of effulgence ; thought, being free from the evolution and involution implied respectively in knowing in the wrong manner and not knowing at all. The knowing and not knowing are like day and night, and the darkness of *avidyā* is the cause of the constant absence of light. On account of the absence of this darkness, and on account of being itself constant, unchangeable thought—effulgence—it is well called ever-effulgent. Hence also it is all thought, all knowledge. For a realization of *Brahman*, thus described, no form whatever is necessary to be observed, such as *samādhi* etc., which those ignorant of *ātman* set supreme value upon, and attempt to carry out. In other words, *avidyā* being

destroyed, there is no room for doing anything, *Brahman* being ever pure, all thought, and ever free.

37. *It is beyond all kind of expression, free from all conception, all peace, eternal light, the highest trance, ever immovable, and above fear.*

S'ANKARA'S GLOSS.

The cause of its being without name is further explained. The word expression is intended for the instrument of expression, that whereby one expresses, *viz.*, speech; and *Brahman* is beyond speech. The word speech too is used only metonymically, for the sense is that it is not burdened with any external instrument of knowledge, *viz.*, the external senses. It is free from conception in a similar sense. Conception here means the instrument of conceiving, *viz.*, the mind; hence *Brahman* is free from, that is to say, is without the mind. For the *Sruti* declares "It is without *prāṇa*, without mind, the ever effulgent"; "It is higher than that which is beyond *akāra*." Because it is without distinction and character it is all peace. It is ever-effulgent in the sense of being all thought, all knowledge. It is the highest trance inasmuch as its realization brings about that condition of the mind which is the highest trance; or it is so called because in it the mind finds the highest happiness and rest. It is immovable, that is, beyond change, and therefore above fear as well.

38. *In that where no concepts arise there is nothing to apprehend or give up. Then thought is centred in ātman—thought, formless and all peace.*

S'ANKARA'S GLOSS.

As it is said, It is the highest trance, immovable, and above fear, there is no possibility of there being anything in it to apprehend or give up. For apprehension and abandonment are possible only where there is change or the possibility of change, both of which are impossible in *Brahman*. For,

duality or being with parts, which is the cause of change, is nowhere in *Brahman*. Moreover, where there is no room for the rise of any concept, apprehension and abandonment are simply out of question. When knowledge of the truth of *ātman* ensues, thought, on account of the absence of everything else to rest upon, is centred in *ātman*, like the heat of fire centred in the fire (for want of fuel). This thought is formless, and all peace, that is to say, without even the least variety. Thus is wound up, by proper demonstration and by quoting texts from the *Sruti*s to corroborate that demonstration, what was begun with the words "Therefore I begin to describe that infinite limitlessness of mind" etc. The words 'formless' and 'all peace' suggest that everything other than knowledge of *ātman* is simple narrowness of mind, for the *Sruti*, also says: "O Gārgi! whoever leaves this world without knowing the immutable is indeed a wretch of narrow mind," implying that all who realize *Brahman* become fully satisfied and desire nothing.

39. *That yoga is the real one which is (absolute, being) not in touch with anything; it is difficult to be approached by (so-called) yogins, for they shrink back from it, imagining fear where there is none.*

S'ANKARA'S GLOSS.

The absolute which is of this nature, is described in the *Upanishads* as that *yoga* which is not in touch with anything. That is to say, which is free from all relation (to any imaginable thing or state). It is difficult to be approached by so-called *yogins*, because these go by that name while ignorant of that real knowledge (which is called absolute *yoga*) in the *Vedāntas*. In other words, that *yoga* which is not in touch with anything is realized only through knowledge of *ātman*. The *yogins*, meaning so-called *yogins*, shrink back from this absolute *yoga*, in the fear that it will annihilate the very self on which they fondly depend, thus imagining the greatest fear where there really is none.

40. *To a yogin, are dependent on control of mind, fearlessness, destruction of misery, the light of knowledge, and eternal peace.*

S'ANKARA'S GLOSS.

Those who know that the mind as well as the senses are all imaginary, like the snake seen in place of a rope, and not existing apart from *ātman* or by themselves ;—those who in fact are thus *Brahman*, experience entire freedom from all fear, and eternal peace. In other words, they experience *moksha*, and that not through anyone or by any means, but quite of itself. Whereas those *yogins* who, being of inferior or middling powers of vision, and being ignorant of the knowledge of the truth of *ātman*, believe that mind and the rest are all independent of *ātman*, and only related to it, can experience the said fearlessness and peace only if they can exercise control over their mind. Not only this but complete destruction of misery also will be one, of the results. The ignorant, however, can never experience this, for in their case, misery follows every act of the mind which stands only in some relation to *ātman*. The being awakened to real knowledge is also dependent on control of the mind ; and so also is *moksha*, eternal peace.

41. *The mind can be controlled by untiring perseverance, equal to (that of one engaged in) emptying the ocean, drop by drop, with the tip of a straw of kuta-grass.*

S'ANKARA'S GLOSS.

As one who applies himself with perseverance and patience, without being at all tired, discouraged, or disconcerted may accomplish even the emptying of the ocean, removing drop after drop, on the tip of a straw of *kuta*-grass ; so the same good qualities adhered to with resolution may enable the *yogin* to establish full control over the mind.

42. *The mind diffused in the enjoyments of imagination, or lost in oblivious case, should be brought back (to *ātman*) by the*

proper means, for imagination and oblivion are both equally dangerous.

S'ANKARA'S GLOSS.

Is persevering application the only remedy for controlling the mind ? No. One who works with perseverance and application, should bring the mind, by remedies to be shortly described, back to *ātman*, when it diffuses itself in the enjoyments of imagination (called up by desire). Oblivion is that condition wherein it becomes oblivious, in other words, sleep ; and the mind, though at perfect ease, in such oblivion, should be awakened from it and brought back to *ātman*. Why should it be brought back if it is at ease ? Because this condition of oblivious ease is as dangerous as that of imagination. Hence the mind should be kept from imagination and oblivion.

43. *It should be turned back from imagination and enjoyment by a memory of misery ;—it sees not the born on remembering all to be unborn.*

S'ANKARA'S GLOSS.

What is the remedy ? The mind diffused in the enjoyments of imagination, should be brought back by impressing upon it the memory of all duality born of *avidyā* being nothing but misery ; in other words, by strongly impressing on it the sense of complete non-attachment. If it recollects what it has learnt from books and teachers, that all is the unborn, it does not need the born i. e., duality, for then it itself does not exist.

44. *The mind immersed in oblivion should be simply awakened ; and when diffused in imagination, should be brought back (to *ātman*). The intermediate condition should be known as that in which attachment exists in a potential form. When it has gained the condition of proper equilibrium it should not be disturbed.*

S'ANKARA'S GLOSS.

The mind should be awakened by constant practice of knowledge, and of the habit of non-attachment, if it has a tendency to fall into oblivion, that is, sleep. By awakening is meant its being turned towards *ātman* by proper discrimination. The word used in the text for *manas* (mind) is *chitta* (the objectivising power of the mind), but both here mean the same thing. If it has diffused itself in enjoyments of imagination, it should be pacified and brought back to *ātman*. The mind of one thus trying repeatedly to control it, and therefore on its way back from enjoyment as well as oblivion, is, if it has not gained the condition of equilibrium, in a condition wherein both the enjoyment and the oblivion exist in a potential form. It should not therefore be left to droop half-way, but should be carried, with effort, to the condition of equilibrium. When it has gained this last condition it should not be disturbed, that is to say, it should not be allowed to relate itself to objects of enjoyment.

45. *It should not be allowed to indulge in the happiness (even) of that condition; but (the ascetic) should free himself from all attachment by proper discrimination. If the mind thus brought to a point should try to externalize itself, it should be unified with ātman.*

S'ANKARA'S GLOSS.

The ascetic nearing the condition of *samādhi* (called the condition of equilibrium in the preceding verse) experiences a degree of happiness, which continues even in that condition. But the mind should not be allowed to attach itself even to this happiness. How should the ascetic then stand? He should understand by discrimination that whatever is of the form of happiness is born of *avidyā*, and is therefore futile; and he should in this manner free himself of all attachment or relation, by turning the mind away even from that supreme moment of bliss. When, however, the mind, after being thus brought to a point, tries to externalize itself, tries in fact to

indulge in a world of external objects called into being by itself, it should be controlled by the remedies described before, and should be unified with *ātman*, that is to say, should be reduced to mere being as implied in the very form of pure thought.

46. *When the mind falls not into oblivion, nor is distracted by enjoyment, it is itself Brahman, being without action, and beyond relativity.*

S'ANKARA'S GLOSS.

When the mind controlled in the manner described, does not fall into oblivion and is not distracted by enjoyment, and is therefore without action, that is, as firm as the flame of a lamp in a place protected from the slightest breeze; and is also beyond relativity created either by its own actions or those of another, then indeed it has become Brahman.

47. *That happiness is described as centred in itself, all peace, containing liberation within itself, indescribable, the most sublime, the one unborn, (not apart from) the cognized, ever unborn in its turn, and itself that which is all thought (Brahman).*

S'ANKARA'S GLOSS.

The happiness just described as the result of the knowledge of the truth of *ātman*, is centred in itself; all peace, that is to say, free from all evil; containing liberation in itself, that is to say, equal to, or more than *kaivalya* itself; and indescribable, because of being entirely unlike, and unconnected with anything. It is also the most sublime, inasmuch as it is cognizable only by ascetics; and it is unborn, because it is not born or produced like anything resulting from sensible objects. It is not apart, in the form of being ever *sat* (being), from the cognized, which also, in its turn, is in reality ever unborn, and all being so, is *Brahman* by its very nature (thought). This happiness is so described by those who know *Brahman*.

48. *No Jiva is born, nor is its cause ascertained;—this indeed is the highest truth that “nothing is born.”*

S'ANKARA'S GLOSS.

All this talk about controlling the mind, and about evolution resembling the evolution of various forms from a piece of iron or a lump of clay, and also about devotion etc., is a mere means to the end, viz., realization of the absolute; and has in itself no meaning whatever. The real truth therefore is this that no *Jiva* is ever produced, nor is any actor, any experiencer of fruition, in any way, ever produced. Hence it is natural that It, the ever unborn and sole *âtman*, has no ascertainable cause, which fact in itself corroborates the first statement (for *Jiva* and *âtman* are not different). This truth that in, and of *Brahman*, the unconditioned absolute, nothing is born (in fact the whole of experience is not a reality and is never produced), is the highest truth, and the various truths given before were but as means to the realization of this end.

CHAPTER IV.

(GAUDAPĀDA'S KĀRIKĀ)

OF QUENCHING THE FIRE-BRAND.

1. *I bow to that best of men who knew the âkāśa-like attributes as inseparable from the knowable, by knowledge resembling âkāśa.*

S'ANKARA'S GLOSS.

With the declaration “this is the highest truth” is well and finally established the position of the *advaita*, undertaken for demonstration on the occasion of an examination of sacred texts to determine the sense of the word *Aum*, clearly defined by showing the futility of duality and distinction implied in the possibility of experience, and lastly perceptibly presented

to the mind in the chapter styled “Of the *advaita*,” on the authority both of scripture and reason. And a hint has been thrown out in the concluding part of the preceeding chapter that the philosophy of duality and nihilism, opposed to the *advaita* established by a concensus of all sacred texts, is entirely false, being torn asunder by internal and mutual opposition, brought about by partiality to individual opinions and jealousy of, and aversion to those of others. Moreover the *advaita* has been praised as the true philosophy, being non-antithetical in its nature. Hence it is proposed in this chapter styled “Of quenching the fire-brand,” (following that rule of induction which allows of the affirmation of a universal positive relation between the two terms of a proposition, only after examining and refuting all possible opposition between them) to complete the examination of the truth of the *advaita* by accentuating the internal mutual apposition of the various schools, and by thus showing their utter futility.

This first verse is meant as a salutation to the promulgator of the *advaita* philosophy conceiving him as nothing apart from the *advaita*. The worship of the teacher is useful as a means to bring this undertaking to a successful issue.

Knowledge resembling *âkāśa*, means knowledge all-pervading like *âkāśa*. What is done by such knowledge? The attributes of *âtman* are known. These attributes too are *âkāśa*-like, that is to say, resembling *âkāśa*. The knowledge by which these attributes are known is again not separate from the knowable, i.e., the attributes themselves, inasmuch as knowledge and the known are, like heat and fire or light and the sun, not separable. He who knew by knowledge inseparable from the attributes, the very form of *âtman*, the known or knowable, is indeed *Īvara*, called *Nārāyana*, and to him I bow. He is the best of men, (*purushas*) and is therefore called *purushottama*. In thus saluting the teacher it is implied that the philosophy of the *advaita*—which teaches the unity of knower, known, and knowledge, is to be demonstrated in this chapter, through a refutation of all opposite theories.

2. I salute him who taught the yoga called *asparia* (that which is not in touch with anything, i.e., absolute), which conduces to the well-being of all, which is beneficent, free from dispute, and non-antithetical.

ŚĀNKARA'S GLOSS.

Now is a salutation directed to the yoga taught by the *advaita* philosophy with the object of showing its superiority over all others. *Sparśa* means touch, relation, and that which is not in touch with anything, which is beyond relativity, is called *asparśa*, in other words, the absolute *Brahman*; the yoga of those who are one with *Brahman* being so called. It conduces to the well-being of all, (because it is different from all other kinds of yoga involving more or less of pain and trouble). There are certain forms of yoga such as the performance of austerities, etc., which, though tending to the greatest happiness, partake largely of the form of misery. This yoga is not of this kind, but is throughout conducive to the happiness of all. But, it may be argued, even enjoyments of the senses are such. True, so they no doubt appear, but such enjoyment can hardly be beneficent as well. And this yoga is equally pleasant and beneficent, for it is, by nature, ever immutable. Moreover it is free from dispute, that is to say, it is that which is not the subject of disputation in the form of arguments *pro* and *con* advanced by two opponents. Why so? Because it is non-antithetical, that is to say, not opposed, in its nature, to any theory of belief. I salute that teaching which has taught me this yoga.

3. Some philosophers postulate evolution of being, others are proud in their conviction, of non-being, thus disputing each the conclusion of the other.

ŚĀNKARA'S GLOSS.

It is shown how the upholders of duality quarrel among themselves. Some philosophers, that is to say, not all, but the *Sāṅkhyas* alone, maintain that things are already in being be-

fore they appear as things. There are others, the *Vaiśeṣikas* and the *Niyāyikas*, who, proud of their intelligence, hold that things are produced of nothing. Thus they dispute with each other, and try to become each the superior of the other.

4. That which is, cannot not be, as that which is not, cannot also be; thus disputing they drift to the *advaita* and (unconsciously) imply that *ajāti* (absolute non-evolution) is the truth.

ŚĀNKARA'S GLOSS.

It is now shown what these, disputing each other's conclusions, tend to establish. That which is or has been, needs not to be produced, for it, like *ātman*, already is. Thus argue the supporters of the theory of evolution from *non-ens*, refuting the opposite theory of the *Sāṅkhyas*. These, however, in their turn, say that it is perfectly absurd to imagine something coming out of nothing; and thus show the falsity of the theory of evolution from *non-ens*. Thus refuting each other these dualists tend to the *advaita*, and setting aside both being and non-being, accept the *advaita* theory of absolute non-being or non-evolution as the real truth.

5. We gladly say yes to the absolute non-evolution that they thus tend to establish; and see no use in arguing with them. Know this then to be that which is free from all dispute.

ŚĀNKARA'S GLOSS.

We simply accept as good the absolute non-evolution that they thus (indirectly) establish, and do not care to argue the point with them by espousing like them one issue or other.

Hence know, ye pupils, that this is the real truth often and often declared by us, as in this manner, free from all dispute.

6. Of that being which is ever unborn, birth is predicated by some; but it is impossible that the unborn and the immortal, could ever partake of the mortal.

7. *The immortal does not become mortal, nor vice-versa; for in no way is it possible that a thing can be changed into something quite the opposite.*

8. *How can he who believes that the naturally immortal becomes mortal, maintain that substance remains immortal though passing through birth, and stands ever changeless.*

S'ANKARA'S GLOSS.

These have been explained before (chapter II. 20-21-22). They are repeated here only with the view of bringing into prominent relief the opposition of the schools of dualistic thought.

9. *By the nature of a thing is understood that which is complete in itself, that which is its very condition, that which is inborn, that which is not artificial, or that which does not cease to be itself.*

S'ANKARA'S GLOSS.

As the nature of a thing is not known even in ordinary experience to be subject to change, it is proposed to define what is meant by the nature of a thing. "Complete in itself" means complete on account of its being well formed, in that shape, from the beginning. An illustration of this kind of nature is the occult powers or *siddhis*—*animā* and others, accruing to the *yogins*, and never changing in any of the three conditions of time. So also is that the nature of a thing which is its very condition, such as heat and light of fire, never apart from fire either in time or space. That which is inborn, that is to say, born with the thing to which it belongs, is also the nature of a thing, as the power of flight in birds. Anything else not artificially superinduced, as the nature of water to seek a downward course, is the nature of a thing. And lastly anything which never ceases to be itself, in any condition, is also the nature of a thing. If in mere imaginary things which make up ordinary experience, *nature* means that something which never alters, what should it mean when

referring to things eternally real? In other words, the nature of things absolutely real, *viz.*, absolute immortality, can never be subject to even the least change.

10. *All jivas are by nature free from decrepitude and decay, the very thought of these in any of the jivas believing themselves subject to them, is equal to an abandonment of their nature.*

S'ANKARA'S GLOSS.

What is that substratum of what is called *nature* in the preceding verse, which is regarded as subject to change by certain theorists; or what is the flaw in such a theory? This point is now enlarged upon. "Free from decrepitude and decay" means free from all change of every description. What is meant by the expression "all *jivas*"? It means *jivas* which, being really *ātman*, are free by their very nature. It being so, if these *jivas* should imagine themselves subject to decrepitude and decay, *i.e.*, to change in their native form,—*ātman*—like the imagination of a snake in place of the rope, they would desert their nature by the very act of such imagination. (And this is absurd.)

11. *Those who regard the cause itself as the effect, admit the transformation of the cause into the effect. How could that which can be transformed into something be called unborn; or how can that which admits even of partial change be called permanent?*

S'ANKARA'S GLOSS.

The *Vaiśeṣika* shows how the *Sāṅkhya*s in their theory of being involve themselves in contradiction. Those philosophers who regard the cause, meaning the material cause like clay etc., of pots etc., as the effect; who, in other words, say that the cause is transformed, like milk (into curds), into the effect, imply that the ever-existent and unborn *pradhāna*, the cause, passes into birth in the form of effects such as *mahat* etc. If then the ever-unborn *pradhāna* passes into birth, and transforms itself into *mahat* etc., how could it be said to be unborn? To say that it is unborn, *i. e.*, immut-

able, and born, *i. e.*, passing into change, is in itself an obvious contradiction; moreover it is held that the *pradhāna* is permanent, but if it admits of change, say even partially, how can it be said to be permanent? For even ordinarily a jar which admits of being broken on one of its sides is never called permanent. The contradiction is thus twofold: the cause is ever unborn and yet born; it is permanent and yet capable of being partially cut off.

12. *If it be explained that the inseparableness of the effect from the cause is all that is meant, then indeed the effect also ought to be as unborn as the cause; or if it be urged that the inseparableness of the cause from the effect is the meaning, how about the permanence of the cause?*

S'ANKARA'S GLOSS.

This verse is meant to amplify the preceding. If the *Sāṅkhyas* should explain that the cause is the effect in the sense that the effect is inseparable from the cause, the effect should be as unborn as the cause, which circumstance contradicts all experience inasmuch as it maintains that a thing is an effect and is yet unborn. If then it were put forth that the cause is the effect in that the cause is inseparable from the effect, it would be entirely impossible to say that the cause has permanence, for one part of a hen cannot be cooked while the other is in the act of laying eggs.

13. *There is no illustration to support the statement of those who say that effects are born of the unborn; and as to their being born of the born reconciliation is very difficult.*

S'ANKARA'S GLOSS.

Moreover there is no illustration to support the theory of those who say that effects are born of a cause which itself is not born of anything. And as there is no illustration, the proposition stands that nothing is born of the unborn. If it be said that effects are born of a cause itself born of something

else, it is impossible to avoid a *regressus in infinitum* in regard to the last cause. Hence this theory also cannot be reconciled to reason.

14. *How can those who say that effect is the cause of the cause, and vice versâ, maintain that either the cause or the effect is without beginning?*

S'ANKARA'S GLOSS.

The *Sruti* declares the entire absence of duality in the realm of the absolute, in the words "when all has become *âtman* etc." The argument in this verse is from the point of this text. The cause, *i. e.*, *dharma* (merit) and *adharma* (demerit) has for its cause the effect, *viz.*, the body etc., which too, in their turn, have for their cause the same *dharma* and *adharma*. Those who postulate this kind of interdependence of cause and effect and accept a specific beginning of each, cannot, without obvious contradiction, maintain that cause and effect are without beginning. In short, the immutable and firm *âtman* can never become either cause or effect.

15. *Those who maintain that the effect is the cause of the cause, and vice versâ, would assert evolution after the manner of the birth of the father from the son.*

S'ANKARA'S GLOSS.

The contradiction is further explained. The contradiction in which those who maintain the production of the cause from the effect born of that cause, involve themselves, is just the same as that implied in one's speaking of the possibility of the birth of the father from the son.

16. *You must determine the order in which cause and effect succeed each other, for if they be simultaneous they cannot be related to each other, like the two horns (of an animal).*

S'ANKARA'S GLOSS.

If you say that the contradiction just pointed out is not logical, it is for you to show in what order are cause and effect produced. For if they are simultaneous it is not possible to speak

of any relation between them, as it is impossible to speak of any between the two horns of a bull produced simultaneously.

17. *The cause being produced the effect will not be definite ; and an indefinite cause cannot produce any effect.*

S'ANKARA'S GLOSS.

It is shown how it is not possible to speak of a relation of cause and effect, between the two simultaneously produced. The cause being produced from the effect which itself is not yet definitely produced, will not be definite, i. e., will be non-existent like something produced from the horns of a hare. And the cause itself being a mere horn of the hare can never produce the effect. Two things thus dependent on each for the production of the other, can never, like the two horns of a hare, come to be related as cause and effect, or even as anything else (i. e., as the container and contained etc.).

18. *If the cause is produced from the effect and the effect from the cause, which of the two, dependent each on the other, is prior to the other ?*

S'ANKARA'S GLOSS.

If even after showing the impossibility of causality as conceived by the duality, they should maintain that it is possible for cause and effect to beget each other, we ask—which of the two is antecedent to the other, so that it may be, at least relatively, seen as the cause of its consequent.

19. *The reply must lie in inability (to explain), or in ignorance (of the matter altogether), or in entire unjustifiability of the order of succession; in all which the learned only shed additional light on our theory of absolute non-evolution.*

S'ANKARA'S GLOSS.

If you say that this cannot be explained, this inability is in itself a clear confession of ignorance of the matter, i. e., of that which is the absolute truth of the matter. Or if you try to

explain the order of succession, the one already pointed out by you is not at all justifiable, is in fact not consistent with logic. Thus the relation of cause and effect being shown to be impossible, the theory of absolute non-evolution is brought to greater prominence, in this indirect manner, by the learned of each of the dualist opponents.

20. *The illustration of seed and tree is itself matter of proof; anything which belongs to the same class as the thing of which something is to be proved, cannot be used as middle term in establishing that something of the thing in question.*

S'ANKARA'S GLOSS.

The opponents say "we have maintained the relation of cause and effect between an antecedent and its consequent, and you have raised mere verbal difficulties to show this position as absurd as that of the birth of the father from the son ; or as deficient in any possible relation between antecedent and consequent as the two horns of a bull. But in fact we have never maintained the production of the effect from a cause not already existent, or of the cause from effects not sufficient in themselves." To this we ask—what then have the opponents been maintaining all the while ? It is replied that the relation of cause and effect is analogous to that of the seed and the tree. This position we now proceed to analyse. This position is tantamount to saying that the illustration of seed and tree is an instance of the kind of relation to be demonstrated. It may be asked whether the apparent relation of cause and effect between the seed and the tree, is without beginning ? We suppose not, for all antecedents must be with beginning like their consequents. As a tree produced this moment is with beginning, the seed produced from another tree (existing in the past) is, by the very succession implied in the act of production, necessarily with beginning. Thus all antecedent trees and seeds must be with beginning ; and this being applicable to all cases, and everything born of the seed or the tree being with beginning, nothing can be said to be without beginning. The

same applies to cause and effect. If it be maintained that each of the series of seeds and trees is without beginning, we demur to any such thing, for it is difficult to establish the continuous unity of any such series. Each of the series cannot be conceived, by the upholders of the beginninglessness of the series, as anything existing in entire independence of the seed or the tree; nor could each of the series of cause and effect be conceived as existing independent of individual causes and effects. Hence it is well explained how the beginninglessness of cause and effect can be maintained. Thus this as well as every thing else of the kind urged by us against the beginningless-theory of causality, is not at all of the form of verbal difficulty. Moreover even in the world, those who are versed in the art of logical deduction, are not known to use anything which is yet matter of proof, as a middle term to establish relation between the major and minor terms of a syllogism. The word middle term is used here more in the sense of illustration, for it is the illustration that leads to the minor premiss and through it to the conclusion; and the case in question is not a middle term but an illustration.

21. *The absence of the knowledge of antecedence and consequence brings into relief the theory of absolute non-evolution; for if a thing is said to be consequent it is absurd to say that its antecedent is unknowable.*

S'ANKARA'S GLOSS.

It is explained how more light is shed by the learned on the theory of absolute non-evolution. The absence of the knowledge of antecedence and consequence, in regard to cause and effect, is itself sufficient to bring into relief the doctrine of absolute non-evolution. That which is a consequent is of course definitely known, and if that is definitely known, why should its cause not be known as its antecedent; for one who knows an effect as such, ought necessarily to know its cause, the relation of cause and effect being inseparably one. Hence this ignorance plainly illustrates the theory of absolute non-evolution.

22. *Nothing is produced either of itself or of another, nor is anything in fact produced, whether it be being, non-being, or either.*

S'ANKARA'S GLOSS.

Nothing is born of anything for the reason that whatever is supposed to be born (produced) is not born of itself, of another, or both of another and of itself; nor is it being, non-being, or either. In fact the being produced of something is impossible to establish in any manner. Nothing is born of itself i.e., from its own form, not sufficient in itself. Nothing can reproduce itself, as a jar, a jar. Nor is anything produced from something else, as cloth from a jar; and another cloth from the first. And thirdly nothing can be born both of itself and another, for obvious reasons; for example, a jar and a cloth cannot together produce either the one or the other. It may here be urged that we always see the production of jars from clay, and of children from parents. This is all very true, for, the ignorant have no doubt a subjective consciousness of birth (and the relation it is supposed to involve) and the corresponding expression to denote the idea. But it is the business of the wise to analyse these very subjective impressions, and the words used to express them, and determine the truth they contain. It turns out that all objective foundation of these subjective impressions, and verbal expressions, is nothing more than a name, the *Śruti* also confirming the conclusion in the words "all effects are mere words and names." Again if the objects of experience are ever-existent like clay or parents, you need not suppose their superfluous production. If they are non-existent like the horns of a hare, they cannot, by their very nature, be ever produced. And lastly if they are both existent and non-existent, they will, by the very contradiction in their nature, be destructive of each other, and will produce nothing. Hence it stands to reason that nothing is produced; those, however, who, by postulating the presentation of an object as a result of production, maintain the unity of action, actor, and act, side by side with the transitory nature of objects, set up

something entirely removed from reason and experience. For things do not exist in the moment next to their presentation, and there being no cognition, memory is impossible (a circumstance which upsets the very possibility of experience, the thing to be explained).

23. *From that which is without beginning, the cause cannot derive its birth, nor the effect, of itself ; that which is known as causeless is without beginning as well.*

S'ANKARA'S GLOSS.

Moreover in accepting the beginninglessness of cause and effect you necessarily accept their being not produced. Thus of an effect without beginning no cause can take its birth, for you don't admit that an effect without beginning can produce anything. Nor can you say that an effect is produced of itself, that is, without an external cause, or from a cause without beginning and unborn. Therefore in accepting the beginninglessness of cause and effect you accept their being never produced. The rule of experience also dictates that what is without a cause is without a beginning ; for that only has a beginning which has a cause ; and not that which has none.

24. *Subjective impressions must have an objective cause, otherwise both ought to be non-existent. For this reason, as also on account of the presence of evil, the reality of objective experience accepted by philosophers (at variance with the adaita) is forced on all.*

S'ANKARA'S GLOSS.

A doubt is raised in order to fortify by its solution, the position already taken. Subjective impressions consist of the variety of mental presentations accompanied by corresponding words to express them. These must have a cause in the existence of objects without the cognizing subject. It is impossible that impressions and words should exist without corresponding objects, for they must have a cause corresponding to their form. If words and ideas have nothing objective to

rest upon, the variety of impressions such as sound, touch, colour, and the like, must all be naught along with the ideas corresponding to them, and absolute non-existence must reign supreme. But this conflicts with experience. Hence because subjective impressions and their variety both exist in experience, it is necessary to explain them by the theory of the opposite school which holds to the reality of objects. It is not possible to explain away the variety of experience, by positing in place of an objective cause with colour, touch, etc., mere variety in the subject, all thought, through some action in, and of itself. In other words, variety in the subject is impossible, as in a pure crystal, without its being in touch with something external. Hence follows the reality of objects existing outside the subject, as maintained by others. Moreover, evil in the form of pain caused by burns, pricks, etc., does exist, which ought not to be, if fire or thorns the cause of the burn or the prick, were not a something independent and outside of the subject. But evil in this form is always present in experience, which fact also is an additional proof of the reality of the objective.

25. *It is true that reason must assign a cause to subjective impressions ; but arguments drawn from the nature of things point to the causelessness of the cause.*

S'ANKARA'S GLOSS.

The preceding is now refuted. It is true that subjective impressions must have a cause, because of the contingency of absolute non-existence, and on account of the presence of evil. You are perfectly welcome to your reason for accepting the existence of things as they appear to exist ; but if you ask what we have to say against such conception—here it is. Jars etc., which you take as the objective cause of subjective impressions, have themselves no cause, nothing to rest upon ; and they are therefore not the cause of subjective impressions. This conclusion is forced on us by the very nature of things. For, the jar, after its real nature—clay, has been understood, does not

exist apart from the clay, as exists a buffalo in entire independence of a horse. But the jar does not so exist in entire independence of clay, and so also do not exist a cloth apart from its threads, or the threads themselves in their turn apart from their parts. Going thus deeper and deeper into the very nature of things, even till language itself fails, we do not light upon any thing which can become the cause of another thing. Or the words in the text interpreted as "from the nature of things," may be interpreted as "from the unreality of appearances"; and the futility of everything supposed to be objective may be deduced from the fact of all appearance being unreal like that of a snake in the rope. And even the cause itself would be no-cause, being only conceived as such through illusion; for it must cease to be cause when the illusion disappears. Experience accords with this, inasmuch as in sleep, trance, or liberation, nothing external to *ātman* is cognized, on account of the entire absence of illusion. It being so, that which is set up as the truth by the deluded cannot be accepted as such by those whose mind has not lost its balance. Thus are refuted the arguments drawn from the contingency of absolute non-existence and the presence of evil.

26. *The mind does not relate itself to objects, nor does it allow them to reflect themselves in itself; for objects are unreal and their reflection is not apart from the mind.*

SĀNKAARA'S GLOSS.

Because there is nothing external the mind does not relate itself to external objects. It is not also a reflector of them, because its activity is similar to its action in dream. External objects are, even in the waking condition, as unreal as the phenomena of dream, for reasons given more than once. Nor is the reflection of objects anything apart from the mind, in other words, it is the mind itself that externalizes itself as objects.

27. *The mind is never in relation to the cause, in any of the three periods of time; and it is not easy to see how it could conceive or receive false impressions without a cause.*

SĀNKAARA'S GLOSS.

Then we must say it is false knowledge—the reflection in the mind, of jars, etc., which do not exist in reality. If this were so, something must be found out wherein there is no such false knowledge, and in reference to which we pronounce this knowledge to be false. Let us examine the facts. The mind never relates itself to the cause—external objects—in any of the three periods of time, past, present, future. If it can be shown that it does relate itself to external objects in some moment of time, that in itself would constitute the reality in reference to which the other impressions of the mind may be called false. But such reality is nowhere, whence the assumption that false knowledge is the cause of the impressions in the mind, falls to the ground, there being no cause for such hypothesis. In other words, the theory of false knowledge (*anyath-ākhyāti*) does not hold water. This is the very form of the mind, that it should continue to take on the form of jars etc., their non-existence in reality notwithstanding.

28. *Hence not only are objects cognized by the mind not produced, but also the mind that is supposed to cognize them. Those who regard it as produced, are gazing for a foot-mark in the sky.*

SĀNKAARA'S GLOSS.

The discussion beginning from verse 24 contains the arguments of the *Vijñānavādins* (subjective idealists), a sect of the Buddhists, which are advanced against those who maintain the reality of objectivity. The teacher (*adhaitin*) gladly accepts the conclusion, and using that very conclusion as the middle term, proceeds in this verse to overthrow the principle underlying the conclusion. We gladly approve of what the subjective idealist has advanced, to wit, that the mind takes on the form of jars etc., their non-existence in reality notwithstanding. For, this explanation accords with the facts of nature. But because this is so, the supposed production of the mind (the subject) ought also to become nothing more than

an idea ; and the mind should be regarded as not produced even in the same manner as the things supposed to be cognized by it. Hence those idealists who regard the mind as produced and partaking of momentariness, miserableness, emptiness, and non-*ātman* ; in other words, who try to understand the mind as (independent of, and) understandable by itself, do something equal to looking up at the sky for a foot-print. These idealists are thus more audacious than their opponents the dualists ; and the Nihilists,* who maintain absolute annihilation of self-consciousness, are fools of a yet higher type, inasmuch as they wish to compress the heavens in the palm of their hand.

29. *The unborn is said to be born, but its very nature is to be ever unborn ; and the nature of a thing can never be otherwise.*

S'ANKARA'S GLOSS.

This verse is the conclusion of what has been discussed above. *Brahman* is unborn and one, on grounds already described. The mind too having been shown to be unborn is *Brahman* as well. If one should now say that it is born, this will be equal to saying that the unborn is born. And this will be contrary to its very nature which makes it ever unborn. The rule in regard to the nature of a thing is that it never alters. (Hence the mind can never be said to pass into birth even through illusion).

30. *The world cannot be said to be without beginning and at the same time non-eternal ; nor can liberation which has a beginning be eternal.*

S'ANKARA'S GLOSS.

Here is another flaw in the theory of those who maintain the reality of the world and liberation. The world which is without beginning, which in fact has not a definite past, cannot, in

* The *Mādhyamika* sect of the Buddhists.

reason, be shown to have an end. For, in experience, nothing which has no beginning is non-eternal. If you instance the break in the continuity of the relation of seed and tree (as against this thesis), we say it is not to the point, for it is not one single entity. In the same manner it is not possible to demonstrate the eternity of *moksha*, realized only at the moment of its knowledge, and therefore known to have a beginning. For jars etc., with beginning, have no eternity. If it be said that (*moksha* in the form of destruction of *bandha*) not being any substance, can be eternal like the destruction of a jar (which though not a substance and though with beginning is without end) ; such an assertion will go against the real positive character of *moksha* maintained by you ; for *moksha* being only negative, and therefore a nonentity, will be like the horn of a hare, and therefore without beginning.

31. *That which is naught at the beginning, and is so also at the end, necessarily does not exist in the present ; objects are all like ordinary illusions though regarded as real.*

32. *The being used as means to some end of the objects of waking experience, comes to naught in dream. Hence on account of being with beginning and end they are certainly false and no more.*

S'ANKARA'S GLOSS.

These verses were explained before (chapter II. 6-7) ; and are cited here only to corroborate our position in regard to the entire non-existence of creation and liberation.

33. *All things seen in dream are false, being seen within the body ; for in so small a space, how could objects exist and be seen.*

S'ANKARA'S GLOSS.

These and the following verses are meant to explain what has already been demonstrated, *viz.*, that the facts of nature point to the cause being no-cause and so forth.

34. *The seeing of a thing at a distance by going up to it is not possible, for no perceptible time is taken in the act of going; and on being awake, the dreamer does not find himself in the place where he dreamed himself to be.*

S'ANKARA'S GLOSS.

The time taken in going, as also the place of going, are all definite in waking experience; but there appears to be no rule in regard to these in dream; whence it follows that the dreamer does not cognize things at a distance by actually going up to them.

35. *On being awake, the dreamer does not see anything of what had been the subject of conversation with friends (in the dream); nor does he possess anything he had then acquired.*

S'ANKARA'S GLOSS.

A man might talk to friends in a dream on various subjects, but he sees nothing of them on being awake. Nor does he hold in his possession whatever gold etc. he had acquired in dream.

36. *The body active in dream is unreal, inasmuch as there is another (tangibly) apart from it; everything is unreal like this body, being only a creation of the mind.*

S'ANKARA'S GLOSS.

The body which appears to be wandering about in dream is quite unreal, for a body other than that is present at the spot where the dreamer is actually sleeping. As the body active in dream is unreal, so are all things unreal even in waking experience, being, like it, mere creations of the mind. The substance of this section is this, that waking experience is as much futile as the phenomena of dream.

37. *On account of the similarity of perception, waking experience must be the cause of dream; and, it being so, waking experience must be relatively real to the dreamer.*

S'ANKARA'S GLOSS.

The unreality of waking experience is further proved from this, that dream is an effect of it; the experience of dream, consisting of perceiver, perception, and perceived, being similar to that of waking. And because it is so, waking experience is real only to the dreamer and to none else. As dream is real to the dreamer, that is to say, as the phenomena of dream appear as objects of common experience and really existent, so objects making up waking experience appear as if they were within general experience and really existent, being the cause of the phenomena of dream. But these are not so in reality, in other words, waking experience is like dream and no more.

38. *All are entirely unborn, inasmuch as experience does not warrant the possibility of the birth of anything; and the production of the unreal from the real is quite impossible.*

S'ANKARA'S GLOSS.

To begin with a doubt. Though waking experience is the cause of dream, it need not be as futile as dream; for dream is only momentary, and waking experience is relatively permanent. The reply is that this is so only to those who are not sufficiently enlightened. Those who have received the light do not see any truth in causality and regard all as entirely unborn, i. e., as *âtman*; for the *Vedântas* declare "all within and without is the unborn." If it be said that from waking experience which is real, are produced dreams which are unreal, we say—no. For, the unreal is never produced from the real, the horns of a hare have never produced anything.

39. *Being full of the unreal seen in waking experience, the dreamer re-enacts the same in dream; and the unreality seen in dream is, moreover, not seen in the waking condition.*

S'ANKARA'S GLOSS.

That there is no truth in causality is an obvious contradiction after saying that waking experience is the cause of dream. This difficulty is thus explained. The relation of cause and effect as conceived by us, in the instance adduced, is this-wise. One full of the unreal, seen like the snake in place of a rope, during his waking experience of the unreal, re-enacts the same in dream, calling into being the triad of perceiver, perception, and perceived, similar to that of the waking condition. Though thus full of the unreal again in dream, he does not, on being awake, as by parity of reasoning he ought, see the same unreality—the imagination which in dream called it into being, being absent. The breach in the chain of causation thus explained, is hinted at in the text by the word “moreover.” And conversely (though waking experience may generally be regarded as the cause of dream) several things seen in waking experience, are never experienced in dream. (Hence the chain of causation is neither absolute nor real; but) waking experience is only *said to be* the cause of dream (as an unreal cause of an unreal effect) not in absolute reality or truth.

40. *The unreal as well as the real cannot have the unreal as their cause; nor can the real have the real as its cause; and how could the real be a cause of the unreal.*

S'ANKARA'S GLOSS.

In truth causation itself is a chimera. How? The unreal, like the horns of a hare, cannot be the cause of the unreal like a flower in the sky. Hence the unreal cannot be the cause of the unreal. In the same manner jars etc., which are (supposed to be) real, cannot be the effect of an unreal cause such as the horns of a hare. Thirdly, the real, such as jars and the like, is not the cause of the real, such as other jars and the like. And the fourth category—the real being the cause of the unreal—is purely impossible. No other relation than these four is possible under causation. Hence the enlightened regard causation as a myth.

41. *As through false knowledge one handles as real, things beyond the range of all possible waking experience, so, in dream, through false knowledge, one sees things possible only in that condition.*

S'ANKARA'S GLOSS.

This is put in, to do away with even the least possibility of the relation of cause and effect between waking experience and dream, though both be unreal. False knowledge means wrong perception born of indiscrimination. As one, by a simple feat of imagination, can believe himself handling as real, objects which cannot possibly be imagined as existent in waking experience such as the rope-snake etc., so he may imagine himself as seeing elephants etc., in dream, through similar false knowledge. But both in the one condition as in the other, the experience of each is peculiar to itself, and there is no relation of cause and effect between the two.

42. *Causation is put forth by the wise only for those who being afraid of the absolute cessation of causality stick to the reality of things, from the warrant of their experience and from their fond attachment to forms.*

S'ANKARA'S GLOSS.

The warrant of experience is of the form of a belief in the reality of experience which is truly unreal. Attachment to forms is faith in the merit of performing religious observances peculiar to one's *varṇa* and *āśrama*. The possibility of causation countenanced at times by the wise, is only as means to an end; and is meant only for the ignorant who, for the two reasons just explained, hold on to the reality of things. They, the ignorant, might do so, but students of the *Vedānta* must of themselves be able to realize the one ever unborn *ātman*, and know the futility of the rest. The *śrotriyas*, those who hold to forms, being thick-headed, are afraid of the absolute cessation of causation, implied in our theory of absolute non-evolution, in

the belief that it tends to self-annihilation. The possibility of causation and all such things is meant only as a help to such persons, as already explained.

43. *Those who, afraid of absolute non-evolution, rely on their account of experience, and go astray, are not much affected by the evil results of their belief, though it is difficult to say they escape with perfect impunity.*

S'ANKARA'S GLOSS.

Those who being thus afraid of the theory of absolute non-evolution, rely on the warrant of their own experience, and guide themselves by faith in the forms of religion and go astray, that is to say, swerve from *ātman* and accept duality, are not much affected by the evil results of this their false belief in causation, for, they are (on account of their strict observance of formal religion), on the path of truth. If there must be some evil, it will be small, being the consequence of their not having realized the truth.

44. *As an elephant, called up by illusion, is said to exist on the warrant of experience, and on account of being the cause of action, so also are objects said to exist on the same grounds.*

S'ANKARA'S GLOSS.

It may be said that because of the warrant of experience, and of the possibility of making things the subject of action, duality in the form of objective experience does exist. This is not true, for the grounds adduced do not allow of any such assertion. Why not? We see in experience an elephant produced by mere illusion, we act upon seeing it as if it were real, and regard it as in every way a real elephant, by tying it, mounting it, and doing all possible things with it. The existence of duality, on these grounds, is therefore like the existence of this elephant. Hence the two grounds adduced do not prove the reality of objective experience, i. e., duality.

45. *Thought—all peace and one, the ever unborn, immovable, and immaterial, appears as admitting of creative motion, and material existence.*

S'ANKARA'S GLOSS.

Here is explained what is that *Sat* which is, as it were, the substratum of the false notions of creation etc. The *Sat* is ever unborn, still it appears to pass into birth, like any ordinary being, say—*devadatta*. It appears to admit of motion as if it itself were moving, like the same *devadatta* going from one place to another. It appears as if it were a material thing, a substance, the substratum of certain attributes, like the same *devadatta* appearing white, long, etc. In truth, however, It is ever unborn, immovable, immaterial, unsubstantial. What is it then that answers to this description? It is all thought which being free from the said accidents is all peace and therefore one.

46. *Thus neither is the mind produced nor are the objects; those who know this are never deceived into false knowledge.*

S'ANKARA'S GLOSS.

Thus, that is, for reasons given, the mind as well as objects (*Jivas*) are never produced, say the knowers of *Brahman*. The plural "objects" is metaphorically used, with an eye to the variety created in the one *ātman*, by the accident of corporeality. Those who know *ātman* to be pure thought, are not deceived by false knowledge, that is to say, they do not fall into the dark abyss of *avidyā*; for, says the *S'ruti*, "where is there any illusion or sorrow to one who has realized unity?"

47. *As motion makes a fire-brand appear straight, crooked, etc., so motion makes thought appear as perceiver, perceived, and the like.*

S'ANKARA'S GLOSS.

The said true knowledge is further explained. As motion makes a fire-brand appear straight etc., so are produced in

ātman the appearances of perceiver, perceived, and the like. What are the perceiver, and perceived? They are only the motion of that which is all thought; only a motion appearing as such, through *avidyā*. For immoveable thought never moves, and thought has already been described as unborn and immoveable.

48. *The fire-brand is untouched by the appearance and is ever unborn (as such), for its motion is not at all real; similarly is thought untouched by appearance, and is ever unborn, its apparent motion being mere illusion.*

S'ANKARA'S GLOSS.

As the fire-brand is neither straight nor crooked being motionless, and is therefore unborn as, and untouched by, the illusion; so is the unborn and immoveable without all change on the disappearance of *avidyā* which is the cause of the illusion of change, and is thus free from the appearance of birth and the like.

49. *The appearances of the fire-brand in motion do not come from without, nor do they result in anything other than the fire-brand at rest, though they do not appear to enter it.*

S'ANKARA'S GLOSS.

Moreover the fire-brand being in motion, its appearance as straight or crooked is not brought into it from anything without it. And the appearances do not appear in any other place when the fire-brand is at rest. Nor do they enter it at the time of its going into rest.

50. *They do not go out of the fire-brand because they are not of the class of substance. The same applies to thought inasmuch as appearance is common to both.*

S'ANKARA'S GLOSS.

The appearances do not go out of the fire-brand because they are not of the class of substances, such as a house etc.

In other words, as they are not real they do not go or come. Going in or out is possible only of real substances, and not of pure unsubstantiality. The same may, by parity of reasoning, be applied to appearances in thought.

51—52. *Appearances do not come from without when thought is in motion; they do not go out anywhere beyond the motion; nor do they enter thought. They do not go out because they do not partake of substantiality; they are always indescribable on account of their not being subject to the relation of cause and effect.*

S'ANKARA'S GLOSS.

The similarity is clearly brought out. Everything said of the fire-brand holds true of thought; the only difference in thought being its ever immutable character. Whence could there be any possibility of appearances such as birth and the like in thought, ever immutable? On account of the impossibility of demonstrating anything like a relation of cause and effect, the relation of producer and produced cannot be established; and the said appearances are therefore ever indescribable and non-existent. The collective sense is that as the fire-brand, not in itself straight or crooked, is illusively seen to be such, so thought, ever unborn, is seen to pass into birth etc., only through illusion.

53. *Substance is the cause of substance and things other than substance of things other than substance; but Jīvas cannot be shown to be substance or things other than substance.*

S'ANKARA'S GLOSS.

Ātman is unborn (that is to say, not a substance, being without parts) and one (that is to say, not something other than substance, say—attribute). Those who imagine some kind of causation must admit that substance is the cause of substance, or something other than substance of something other than substance, but not itself of itself. And non-sub-



stance is out of question inasmuch as it is never known in experience to be the independent cause of anything. *Jīvas* are neither substance nor something other than substance, and cannot therefore be the cause or effect of anything. Thus not being substance nor anything other than substance *ātman* (*Jīva*) is not the cause or effect of anything.

54. *Thus objects are not born of the mind, nor the mind of objects, the wise thus betake themselves to absolute non-evolution, the entire negation of causality.*

S'ANKARA'S GLOSS.

Thus for reasons already explained, the mind is nothing other than thought which is *ātman*; and objectivity is not a result of the mind nor the mind of it, for, objects are mere appearances in thought. Thus no effect is produced from a cause, nor a cause from any effect; and the wise, i. e., knowers of *Brahman* betake themselves to, find the highest peace in, the theory of absolute non-evolution which is entire negation of causality.

55. *As long as there is the least faith in causality, cause and effect will continue to operate; that faith being destroyed, cause and effect are nowhere.*

S'ANKARA'S GLOSS.

What then about those who have firm faith in causality? As long as there is this faith in the form of the convictions "I am the producer of the cause in the shape of pious merit or demerit," "mine are merits or demerits," "I shall derive fruition from them after a time, in some incarnations"; in other words, as long as there is this false knowledge of causation in *ātman*, and the consequent fixing of the mind on the idea, cause and effect must continue to operate, that is to say, merit and demerit and their results must continue to affect such an individual. When, however, this faith in causation, born of *avidyā*, is destroyed by realization of the *advaita*, even like obsession etc. by proper incantations, medicines, or herbs, then only do cause and effect cease to exist.

56. *As long as there is faith in causality, the world is eternally present; this faith being destroyed the world is nowhere.*

S'ANKARA'S GLOSS.

What harm is there if cause and effect continue to exist? As long as faith in causality is not destroyed, the world is eternally present, it continues to exist to all eternity. The same faith being destroyed, the world is nowhere for want of the cause of its existence.

57. *Everything is produced by the power of avidyā and nothing therefore is eternal. Everything again is unborn, being inseparable from Sat, and there is nothing therefore like destruction.*

S'ANKARA'S GLOSS.

It may be urged how after maintaining that there is nothing besides one unborn *ātman*, could one speak of cause and effect or of the world and its production or destruction? The answer is as follows. The power of *avidyā* is that power of it which spreads forth the illusion of experience and the world, in place of *ātman*; and everything being born of this power, nothing in the domain of *avidyā* is eternal. The world, therefore, though described as produced and destroyed, is well said to be "eternally present"; for in absolute reality everything is the unborn *ātman*. Thus because there is nothing in the shape of birth, there is nothing corresponding to it in the form of death, viz., the destruction of cause or effect.

58. *Those entities that are said to be produced are not produced in truth, their production is similar to that of an illusion, and illusion certainly is no reality.*

S'ANKARA'S GLOSS.

Entities, viz., *Jīvas* and other things that are imagined to be produced, are not produced in reality, but appear to be so, only

through the said power of *avidyā*. And thus birth being but a result of illusion, ought to be nothing more than illusion. Then is illusion any substance? Not at all.

59. *From seeds, all illusion, nothing comes forth but sprouts of illusion, and these are neither permanent nor impermanent. The same applies to the existence of all beings.*

S'ANKARA'S GLOSS.

How is the production of entities, mere illusion? As from seeds such as of the mango-tree, all *māyā*, nothing but sprouts of *māyā* spring forth,* and these are neither permanent nor the reverse; in the same manner, beings, that is objects, *Jīvas*, everything nameable, have no beginning, and no end, being quite unreal.

60. *All entities being absolutely unborn, cannot be said to be permanent or not; where in fact words fail it is impossible to enter into analysis.*

S'ANKARA'S GLOSS.

All entities being shown to be absolutely unborn, being all dependent for their existence on thought, characterless, one, and eternal, permanence or impermanence cannot be predicated of them. That which cannot be grasped in words, which cannot be expressed, cannot possibly be analysed into this or that, having this or that attribute permanent or impermanent. The *Śruti* also says "whence words fall back etc."

61. *As in dream the mind acts as if dual in character through the power of *māyā*, so in the waking condition also it acts in the same manner through the same cause.*

62. *The mind though one appears as dual in dream, so also in the waking condition it, though single, appears dual through illusion.*

* This is a familiar illustration, being borrowed from the performance of certain experts in *legordemaiu* who produce illusive mango-trees, etc.

S'ANKARA'S GLOSS.

That the abstract *advaita*—thought—should appear as describable in words is only a feat of the mind, and nothing real, as explained before (chapter III. 29-30).

63. *The dreamer going about in all ten directions sees the whole variety of *Jīvas* born of eggs, perspiration, etc.*

S'ANKARA'S GLOSS.

The unreality of duality which admits of being described in words is borne out by this further reason as well. The dreamer going about in all ten directions in dream, sees the variety of *Jīvas* whether born of eggs, perspiration, or any similar source. What next?

64. *These, however, exist only in the mind of the dreamer, and are in no way apart from it; in the same manner this mind too is existent only to the dreamer.*

S'ANKARA'S GLOSS.

Objects seen by the mind of the dreamer cannot exist outside of it; in other words, it is only the mind that objectivises itself. In the same manner the mind of the dreamer must be regarded as existent only for him; that is to say, it exists nowhere apart from the seer (*ātman*) of the dream.

65.-66. *One going about in the ten directions, in the waking condition, sees the whole of the variety of *Jīvas* born of eggs, perspiration, etc.; but these are existent only for the mind active in this condition, and are in no way apart from it;—the mind too should, in the same manner, be regarded as existent only for the seer of this condition.*

S'ANKARA'S GLOSS.

Jīvas seen in the waking condition do not exist anywhere but in the mind of the seer of that condition, for, they are not soon independent of the mind, and are like the *Jīvas* seen in and

through the mind of the seer of a dream. The mind again, made up of *Jivas* and their perception, is not independent of the seer of the waking condition, being, like the mind of the seer of a dream, an object of perception to the seer of the waking condition. The rest has already been explained.

67. *Both are object of perception to each other, which of them can really be said to be? Both in fact are beyond the range of every rational instrument of knowledge, for these are possible only in and through them.*

S'ANKARA'S GLOSS.

Jivas and mind are each an object of perception to the other. The mind exists relatively to the *Jiva*, and the *Jiva* exists relatively to the mind. Hence they are each an object of perception to the other. Therefore anything cannot be said to exist; neither the mind nor its objects. No wise man will assert the existence of either, for, as in dream, the elephant as well as the mind perceiving the elephant are not really existent, so also it should be in this instance. How is it said that they are beyond every rational instrument of knowledge? Because they are utterly incomprehensible and indescribable; and their comprehension by any instrument of knowledge is possible only when they are supposed to exist. In other words, the triad of knower, known and knowledge, is possible only in the domain of unreality. If you deny the mental cognition of a jar, it is impossible for you to perceive the jar and *vice versa*. In short, the meaning is that it is impossible to define the respective province of instruments of knowledge and the objects to be apprehended by such instruments.

68. 69. 70. *As the Jiva existent in dream is born or dead, so all Jivas are and are not. As the Jiva, all māyā, is born or dead, so all Jivas are and are not. As the Jiva created (by an illusionist) is born or dead, so all Jivas are and are not.*

S'ANKARA'S GLOSS.

Created, *i. e.*, sent forth by an illusionist by the help of incantations, herbs, or medicines. As *Jivas* existent in dream and illusion, and seen as born of eggs, perspiration, etc. pass through birth and death, so all *Jivas*—human entities—which are really non-existent, are (with all concomitant appearance of birth, death, etc.) mere results of the objectivising tendency of the mind, and nothing more.

71. *No Jiva is born nor is there any possibility of any such birth; that there is nothing is the highest truth.*

S'ANKARA'S GLOSS.

So long as the world of experience is supposed to be real, birth and death of *Jivas* are possible like those seen in dream. But the highest truth is that no *Jiva* is ever born, in the first place. The rest is plain.

72. *The whole of experience consisting of perceiver and perceived is merely an imagination of the mind; hence the mind is described as not in relation with objects, eternal, and absolute.*

S'ANKARA'S GLOSS.

The whole of experience, *i. e.*, duality made up of perceiver and perceived, is pure imagination—a function of the mind which, in absolute truth is *âtman*, and is, as such, not in relation with objects, eternal, and absolute. The *S'ruti* says “the *purusha* is always free from relation.” That alone relates itself to objects which has any objects without itself; but the mind, having nothing external, is perfectly free from all relation and therefore absolute.

73. *That which exists only in imagination does not exist absolutely; and though it may continue to exist in accordance with the imagination of any other school of thought in absolute reality it does not.*

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S'ANKARA'S GLOSS.

If the mind is free from relation, being without external objects to cognize, such a position is not easy to maintain, inasmuch as the idea of teacher, taught and teaching, implied in imparting this truth, goes against it. This obstacle need not detain us. For all such triads are as imaginary as anything else. These imaginations are useful only as means to the end, realization of the absolute: for, imagination is only a function of the mind, and whatever exists of it does not exist in reality, and cannot be seen in reality. For, says the *Śruti*, "duality is nowhere when *gnosis* arises." The existence of objects maintained by other schools of thought, may be true for them; but from our stand-point of the absolute, nothing exists. Thus the absoluteness of the mind is not at all shaken.

74. *It is unborn also in imagination, for, in reality, it is not even unborn; it is so imagined only relatively in reference to the positions of other schools.*

S'ANKARA'S GLOSS.

If teaching etc., were simple imagination, the being unborn of *ātman*, taught by this teaching, ought to be imagination as well. We say—yes; for it is unborn only through such imaginations as teaching and the like; in absolute reality it is not even unborn. It is said to be unborn only as against the position of those schools (which maintain that it passes into birth); and this description of It is therefore as much imagination as anything else, nothing being true in absolute reality.

75. *(Men) have persistent belief only in pure unreality, for duality does not really exist. He who thus understands the non-existence of duality is never born, being beyond the range of causality.*

S'ANKARA'S GLOSS.

Persistent belief in duality is mere inclination of the mind, from perversity of intellect, inasmuch as it is only a belief in

something purely unreal, for duality does not really exist. As the cause of birth etc., is this persistent belief in the reality of the unreal, he who realizes the non-existence of duality is never born, being above false knowledge.

76. *In the absence of cause, superior, inferior, or middle the mind is not born; for whence could an effect follow without a cause?*

S'ANKARA'S GLOSS.

Superior causes consist of certain forms of religion peculiar to each *jāti* and *dśrama*, and carefully observed under the supposition that they lead to the position of gods, by those who are free from the desire of any (other) fruit. Middle causes are religious acts mixed with certain irreligious practices, which lead only to the world of mortals. Inferior causes lead to the condition of birds, etc., being wholly irreligious. When one knowing *ātman*, the *advaita*, does not relate himself to any of these causes, in fact imagines them as naught, like a man of discrimination not seeing the dirt etc., which children would see in the sky, the mind is not born, that is to say, it does not objectivize itself in the shape of gods, men, birds, etc.,—the results of the respective causes. No effect can be produced without a cause, just as sprouts are not produced without seeds.

77. *The being unborn of the mind thus free from causality, is unconditioned and absolute; and the same is true of all, ever unborn, for it is all an objectivization of the mind.*

S'ANKARA'S GLOSS.

It is explained how, in the absence of cause, the mind is not born. It is now shown what is the import of this position. "Free from causality" means free from the cause of birth, consisting of religious merit and demerit. And this freedom is attained only by realization of the absolute. The being unborn of the mind thus free, is unconditioned, that is, not





The *Sruti* also says, "He who describes it is looked at with wonder, the seer of it is regarded as the cleverest" etc.

83. *The childish miss it by predicating of it such things as existence, non-existence, existence and non-existence, absolute non-existence; derived respectively from their notion of change, absence of change, combination of both, or absolute negation.*

S'ANKARA'S GLOSS.

The perception that the absolute is existence or non-existence or the like, being the result of careful analysis undertaken by the (so-called) learned, serves only as a veil between them and *âtman*. When this is so even in regard to the learned, what should we say of those who are mere simpletons? Some (the *Vaiśeṣikas*) predicate existence of *âtman*, whereas others (the subjective-idealists, i. e., the *Vijñānavāda* Buddhists) maintain that there is no such thing as *âtman*. A third, (the pseudo-nihilist) the *Digambara-Jaina*, maintains that it *is* and *is not*; it is a compound of being and non-being; while a fourth (the nihilist, i. e., the *Mādhyanikabuddha*) holds that it is absolute non-existence. In all these he who predicates existence of *âtman* derives that attribute from its changeful nature (for, in his theory, *âtman* is subject to happiness, misery, desire, and the like), and predicates it of it, to mark it out from all other things which are perishable by nature. The second position derives its predicate from the immutableness of the subject (which imagines the ideals). The third predicate is possible of *âtman* because in the opinion of that school it partakes both of change and immutability. The fourth position derives absolute non-existence from its opinion about the nature of things. The learned trying to know *âtman* by theories like these are only acting like children, for these results of their analysis of the nature of *âtman* serve only to cover the reality from view. If it is so in their case it is no wonder that the ignorant should be persistently misled.

84. *He has seen all who has seen the Lord as untouched by any of these predicates, which serve only to hide him from the seer.*

S'ANKARA'S GLOSS.

The nature of the absolute, knowledge whereof is sufficient to acquit the learned from the charge of childishness, is now described. The Lord—*âtman*—is covered and therefore kept hidden from sight by the predicates put forth in the preceding four theories. In truth *âtman* is beyond all relativity, and is purely absolute. He who realizes the *advaita* as thus absolute and beyond relativity, and as the very *puruṣa* described in the *Upanishad*, sees all, is in fact a really wise and learned man.

85. *Having obtained the whole of omniscience, and that condition of a Brâhmana which is one and without beginning, middle or end,—what remains there to be desired?*

S'ANKARA'S GLOSS.

Having obtained the whole of omniscience as just described, and having obtained the condition of a *Brâhmana* (one who is *Brahma*), as laid down in the text "this is the permanent glory of the *Brâhmana*," and ever without beginning, middle or end, nothing remains to be desired. *Âtmalâbha*, realization of *âtman*, is the last and highest good comprising all possible good in itself. The *Sruti* also says "he has nothing to gain by observing or not the forms of religion," etc.

86. *This is the highest humility of the Vipra, this is the ultimate and natural pacification, this is the natural introversion of the senses,—who knows thus acquires peace.*

S'ANKARA'S GLOSS.

The being *âtman* is the height of humility natural to the *Vipra* (*Brâhmana*). This realization of *âtman* is the highest pacification (of the mind). It is natural pacification and not one

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is not a thing to be accomplished, for nothing is of use to a thing which is always the same.

94. *Those who always rely on separateness never see the light; those who maintain the reality of separateness, are bound to separateness and are therefore called narrow-minded.*

S'ANKARA'S GLOSS.

Those who realize the absolute as described before are really high-minded, all others are simply of narrow mind. For, these latter are bound to separateness, that is to say, to individuality and therefore to duality and the world of experience. They are the up-holders of the theory of individuality, i.e., separateness, in the absolute; in other words, they are dualists. They are truly called narrow-minded because they can never see the light of the absolute.

95. *Those few alone are known in the world as of high intellect who are firm in their conviction of the unborn and the undivided. This the world cannot reach.*

S'ANKARA'S GLOSS.

The absolute is not capable of being realized by those little beings who, being beyond the teachings of the *Vedānta*, are of small intellect and narrow mind. Those few alone, including even women and others, who are firm in their conviction of the unborn and the undivided, are known in the world as persons of high soul and high intellect (*mahātmās*), in other words, as persons one with the supreme essence. This, that is to say, that which is known to these few—the absolute—is not within reach of the world, the ignorant, the vulgar men of ordinary intellect. “Even gods lose themselves on the way of those who have become the All, who being all love leave no foot-prints behind”; “The way of these is not known like that of birds in the sky;”—says the *Smṛti*.

96. *Thought is described as that which itself unborn does not relate itself to attributes themselves equally unborn; and*

it is said to be unconditioned inasmuch as it is thus beyond relativity.

S'ANKARA'S GLOSS.

How are they said to be high-souled? All things being unborn, that is to say, being one, thought is ever unborn and one, like the light and heat of the sun. Thought being such never relates itself to anything and is therefore fitly described as unconditioned like *ākāśa*.

97. *The least idea of variety in the mind of the ignorant bars all approach to the unconditioned; not to say anything of its preventing the destruction of that which keeps it hidden.*

S'ANKARA'S GLOSS.

From the preceding it follows that the least idea of variety or duality or separateness, either subjective or objective, in the mind of the ignorant, prevents him from going towards the absolute. And when the very way is thus barred, it is needless to say that the said idea prevents the destruction of that which keeps the absolute hidden from sight.

98. *Entities (attributes) have never been in any relation with the obstruction, being entirely pure by nature; they are all light and ever liberated from the beginning, and are described as knowable only because they are all thought.*

S'ANKARA'S GLOSS.

That the destruction of that which keeps the absolute hidden from sight, is prevented, may be taken to mean that even in this theory the existence of a something in the form of obstruction is admitted. This is denied. For, all are absolutely unrelated to any obstruction, to the so-called bond of *avidyā*. Moreover they are entirely pure by their very nature, and all light, and ever liberated. If so, how is it that they are described as “knowable”? Because they are of a nature capable of being known. As the sun who is all light is described as shining, rising, etc; or as mountains never possibly in motion

are still described as standing; so are things described as knowable though in themselves all thought.

99. *Thought in the enlightened whose effulgence is everywhere never relates itself to objects, nor do attributes or knowledge relate themselves to anything. This however is not the same as that which is held by the Bauddhas.*

S'ANKARA'S GLOSS.

As thought in the enlightened never transfers itself to any of the objects (attributes), it is always centred in itself, like light in the sun. "The effulgence of the enlightened is everywhere" means that thought is all-pervading like *ākāśa*. Attributes, that is to say, the attributes of the worshipful or the enlightened, i. e., *ātman*, are also not in relation with anything, like *ākāśa*-like thought. This is only the summing up of what has been said before that thought is like *ākāśa*, and so forth. The *ākāśa*-like thought of the enlightened whose effulgence is everywhere like *ākāśa*, never relates itself to anything, nor do things (attributes) relate themselves to anything. The substance—*ātman*—is like *ākāśa*, immutable, whole, permanent, one, unconditional, incognizable, free from appetites such as hunger etc. The *S'ruti* too says "The sight of the seer is never lost." The absolute is the unification of perceiver, perception, and perceived (it is the unity of the unlimited and limiting). But all the same this is not the same as that which the subjective idealists (*Bauddhas*) say, by their theory which substitutes subjective ideas in place of objective things, absolutely denying their existence. This theory wears a semblance to the *advaita*, but is not that absolute *Monism* which is the pivot of *Vedānta* philosophy.

100. *We, having realized that condition which is difficult to be seen, sublime, uncreate, even, all light, free from variety, salute it as best we can.*

S'ANKARA'S GLOSS.

This treatise is now concluded with a salutation meant to extol the magnitude of the Absolute. It is difficult to be seen,

because difficult of comprehension, being not related to any of the four possible predicates. Hence it is sublime, not within reach of the ignorant, even like the bottom of the fathomless deep. It is also uncreate, even, and all light. Having realized this condition free from all variety, we who are that condition itself, salute it, to the best of our power; that is to say, though it is impossible to talk of salutation after realization of the Absolute, we say this only from the stand-point of relativity and experience.

(The commentator concludes, as he began, with the following prayer).

1. I bow to *Brahman*, the destroyer of all fear of those who betake themselves to It, which, though absolutely unborn, appears by the power of its greatness to pass into birth; which appears as if in motion, though always at rest; and which though one, appears as many to those whose inner vision is dimmed by the perception of an endless variety of (unreal) existences.

2. I am prostrate at the feet of this my *guru*, the worshipped of the worshipful, who, from sheer love and sympathy for beings immersed deep in the waters of the ocean infested with terrible monsters in the form of the series of births, brought forth for the good of all this nectar, impossible to be obtained even by the gods, from the inmost depths of the ocean of the *Veda* churned with the churning-rod of his intellect.

3. I reverence with all my soul the holy feet,—the dispellers of the terrors of incarnation—, of him, by the effulgence of the glory of whose intellect the whole of the darkness of delusion haunting my mind fled away, appearing or disappearing from time to time, above or below the waters of the terrible ocean of numerous births. He at whose feet persons taking shelter obtain eternal and unfailing knowledge, accompanied with supreme peace of mind and complete reconciliation with Self.

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AVIDYĀ— Microcosmic power of <i>Prakṛti</i> — original matter.	BIJĀTMĀ— The <i>Sukṣmātmā</i> called <i>Sutrātmā</i> or <i>Antaryāmin</i> .
AVYĀKṚTA— The undefined; the <i>Mahat</i> of the Sāṅkhyas; the undifferentenced <i>Brahman</i> of the <i>Advaitins</i> .	BRAHMAN— The absolute All.
ĀDHIDĀIVIKĀ— Forming part of <i>Adhidaiva</i> .	BRAHMAVIDYĀ— The philosophy and science of the Absolute.
ĀDHYĀTMIKĀ— Forming part of <i>Adhyātma</i> .	BUDDHI— The mental principle which de- termines, and distinguishes; con- science; the Higher Self.
ĀGAMA— The Vedas.	BUDDHINDRIYAS— The organs of knowledge viz., the eye, the ear, the skin, the nose, the tongue.
ĀHAVANITĀ— One of the three fires forming the Agnihotra.	CHĀITANYA— The spiritual principle opposed to matter.
ĀKĀS'A— The element so called.	CHITTA— That part of mental operation which takes the object as some- thing apart from the subject; generally the mind.
ĀNANDAMĀYA— The fifth of the five sheaths of the human body, in which original <i>ajñāna</i> presides.	DHARMA— Opposite of <i>Adharma</i> which see.
ĀS'RĀMA— Position, place; one of the four periods over which human ac- tivity is distributed.	DIGAMBARA-JAINAS— A sect of the Jainas opposed to the S'vetāmbaras. They do not wear clothes, and do not allow among many minor differences that a woman can attain final liberation.
ĀTMALĀBHA— Attaining realization of self.	DRAVYA— Substance, the substratum of some property.
ĀTMAN— Self; the great soul; the Absolute.	GHATA— An earthen jar.
AUMKĀRA— The word Aum.	
BHUMĀ— The Unconditioned.	
BHUTA— The elements.	

GHATĀKĀS'A— The <i>Ākāśa</i> enclosed in a jar.	KOS'AS— Sheaths, five in all, of the human body.
GUṆA— Property.	KSHETRA— Literally a field; the body.
HIRAṆYAGARBHA— The microcosmic spiritual prin- ciple on the subtle plane.	KSHETRAJNA— He who knows the body; the soul.
IS'WARA— The reflection of <i>Brahman</i> in <i>māyā</i> ; generally <i>Brahman</i> itself.	MADHUVJNĀNA— Knowledge set forth in the <i>Madhu-Brahmana</i> .
JĀTI— Birth; evolution; technically the one common essence of many things.	MAHĀKĀS'A— The great <i>Ākāśa</i> .
JNĀNAKĀNDA— The department of spiritual knowledge.	MANAS— The mind, the principle which <i>thinks</i> , which relates itself to objects.
KALPA— The last great cycle made up of many <i>manvantaras</i> .	MANOMAYA (Kos'a)— The third of the five sheaths in which the mind preponderates.
KĀRANA— The cause; the causal plane.	MĀYĀ— Illusion.
KARMA— The law of cause and effect; any act in general.	NYĀYA— Literally the Syllogism; Hence the system which deals with Syllo- gisms viz., the Indian system of Logic so called.
KARMAKĀNDA— The department of formal religion.	PARA— Supreme; another.
KARMENDRIYAS— The organs of action viz., the hands, the feet, speech, and the two secret organs.	PARAMAHANSA— Supreme soul; a Rāja-Yogin of the last degree.
KARS'ĀPAṆA— A particular coin.	PRĀJNA— The microcosmic spiritual prin- ciple on the causal plane.
KAS'ĀYA— That subtle influence in the mind produced by enjoyment, and left there to fructify in time to come, and distract the mind from <i>Samādhi</i> .	PRĀṆA— The vivifying principle in nature.

PRĀṆAMAYA (KOS'A)—
The second of the five sheaths in which the *prāṇa* predominates.

PRITHIVI—
The element so called.

PURUṢHA—
The Sākhyan Soul which is separate in every being.

PURUSHOTTAMA—
The Highest Puruṣa—i. e. Brāhmaṇa.

RASA—
Taste; the Sense of.

SAMĀDHI—
That stage of concentration where in there is consciousness of the object alone; ecstasy; trance.

SĀMĀNYA—
See *Jāti*.

SAMAVĀYA—
The inseparable relation between the cause and its effect; as between a cloth and the threads of which it is made.

SAMBHUTI—
A particular kind of *Upāsana* (devotion.)

SAMYOGA—
Relation by union.

SĀṆKHYA—
The philosophy so called; the philosophy of enumeration.

SANNYĀSIN—
One who has abandoned the world.

SHĀKHĀ—
Literally a branch; that particular reading and worship which is peculiar to every one group of Vedic teachers.

S'ROTRIYAS—
Learned in Vedic lore.

S'RUTI—
The Veda.

STHITI—
Condition.

SVADHĀ—
The word used in offering oblations to the *Pitṛs*.

TAIJASA—
The microcosmic spiritual principle on the subtle plane.

TAITTIRIYA—
Follower of that S'akha of the (Black) Yajur Veda which bears that name.

TĀRKIKAS—
Those who go by Tarka, reason; Rationalists—The Naiyayikas.

TEJOMAYA—
All light.

TURYĀ—
Fourth; the State of *Brahmajāna*.

VĀCH—
The Word, the Logos.

VAIS'ESHIKA—
Those who expatiate on the generic and specific marks of things, hence the school of philosophy so called; they are allied to the Nyāya.

VAIS'VĀNARA—
The microcosmic spiritual principle on the gross plane.

VARṆA—
The four orders.

VĀSANĀ—
The subtle impression in the mind capable of developing itself into action; it is the cause of birth and experience in general.

VEDĀNTA—
The philosophy given as the end of the Veda viz., the *Upanishads*; the philosophy of the *Advaita*.

VEDHĀ—
The *Prājapati*.

VIGNĀNAMAYA (KOS'A)—
The fifth sheath in which *buddhi* preponderates.

VIGNĀNAVĀDINS—
A sect of Buddhist idealists (subjective.)

VINĀS'A
A particular kind of formal worship.

VIPRA—
A *Brāhmaṇa*; particularly a *Brāhmaṇa* born bred and learned as such.

VIRĀJ—
See *Vais'vānara*.

VIRĀT—
See *Virāj*.

VIS'ESHA—
Differentia.

VIS'VA—
The microcosmic spiritual principle on the gross plane.

VIS'VĀNAR—
Same as *Vais'vānara*.

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
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